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There is a tendency in education theory to place the focus on the consequences of racial 
hegemony (racism, Eurocentric education, low performance by racial minorities) and ignore that 
race is antecedent to these consequences. This dissertation explores the treatment of race within 
critical theory in education. I conduct a metaphysical analysis to examine the race concept as it 
emerges from the works of various critical theorists in education. This examination shows how 
some scholars affirm the scientifically discredited race concept by offering racial essentialist 
approaches for emancipatory education. I argue that one of consequences of these approaches is 
the further tightening of racial constraints on the student’s personal autonomy. This mandates 
that critical theorists gain a deeper understanding of race as a problem, conceptually, 
epistemically, ideologically, and existentially. I argue that critical theorists of education draw 
from work conducted in the philosophy of race by theorists such as K. Anthony Appiah, Jorge 
Gracia, Charles Mills, and Naomi Zack to gain insights on the metaphysics of race to better 
inform theory and praxis. I further recommend the creation of a critical philosophy of race in 
education to address and combat race as a problem and its consequences. I contend that the 
groundwork for philosophy of race in education must entail strategies that encourage and assist 
theorists and teachers to move toward the elimination of the race in society, while utilizing race 
only as heuristic tool to address its consequences. Additionally, I argue that a philosophy of race 
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Before I joined the field of education, I was a graduate student in philosophy. 
Being a black person in Western academic philosophy is akin to being an anomaly. You 
are the elephant in the room that everybody sees, but that nobody wants to be caught 
noticing for fear that you might want to talk about it. The “less black” you can be the 
better. When I say “less black,” I do not mean to imply that there is actually a way of 
being black nor do I intend to suggest that there are any actual intrinsic properties that 
one must have to be black. Rather, I mean “black,” the racial identity typically assigned 
by American societal culture and the assumed qualities that accompany its ascription. 
Assumptions about this collective racial identity often include conjecture 
regarding one’s disposition, character, cognitive capacity, and one’s ideological 
allegiance to blacks writ large. It is the latter assumption that proves as troublesome 
within the discipline as it does in contemporary American culture. In academic 
philosophy, the often-selectively applied normative model of the ideal philosopher is one 
who can operate as somewhat of a disembodied mind—as a thinking machine without 
real world commitments. It is this assumed identity that theoretically allows the 
philosopher to rise above one’s embedded circumstances to analyze and solve complex 
problems about this and other possible worlds without prejudice. Typically, the ability to 
occupy the ideal philosopher identity for the white male is taken to as a given. However, 
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for persons with real world markers--the woman, the “racial” minority, ethnic minority, 
and members of other marginalized groups, the willingness to embrace the philosopher’s 
identity is considered a “competence.” One must show allegiance to it above all other 
identities (and identifiers) as these embodied identities are regarded as impediments to 
truly rigorous thought instead of vehicles for nuanced philosophical thought.  
I discovered that the subject of race within academic philosophy is an even bigger 
elephant in the room, only most never see it, and most would not care anyway. It is a 
subject discussed on the periphery of philosophical discourse, usually as an aside to 
subjects taken to be of overarching precedence. Thus, it is not surprising that a 
philosophy about race is not readily embraced within the discipline. Indeed, its treatment 
is not unlike that of feminist theory, placed off to the side in some academic basement, 
only the philosophy of race receives fewer accommodations and substantially less critical 
appreciation. It has only been within the last two decades that the philosophy of race even 
received the privilege of sometimes being loaded in and less occasionally shot out of the 
primarily male and European-friendly canon.  
Of course, one would think that given problematic existential issues directly 
connected to it, the subject of race would act as perfectly rich fodder for the philosopher’s 
critique. After all, this is certainly the case with other topics like the environment, gender, 
business, law, science, and the moral status of non-human animals. The unfortunate truth 
is that in mainstream philosophy, the concept of race and even the role that it has played 
within the history of Western philosophy is virtually absent from the discourse--a point 
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well illuminated by philosopher, Charles S. Mills.
1
  And, it has been outside of this 
mainstream where philosophers of race have attempted to facilitate and sustain a 
philosophy of race that provides diverse and innovative approaches to the often-
complicated issues tied to race.  
A fundamental feature of the philosophy of race, one that binds the diverse set of 
theories together, is that race is treated as a problem in and of itself. For philosophers of 
race, its thorough examination is considered a necessary prerequisite to any truly rigorous 
and comprehensive engagement of race-related issues and, in some cases, the areas with 
which race often finds itself at an intersection (economics, institutions, gender, sexuality). 
 Race is a biological falsity--a social construct.
2
  Yet, in American society, race is 
not only considered biologically real, it is also heavily invoked in our everyday lives. It is 
a concept that acts both consciously and subconsciously as a determining factor of our 
sense of self, our personal and socio-cultural allegiances, and even our ideological, 
political, and global commitments. The sheer scope of these implications necessitate that 
we attempt to understand the concept of race. This means doing what we can to know 
when, where, how, why or, perhaps most importantly, whether we should employ its 
usage. Within the discipline of philosophy, this stewardship has been taken up, almost 
exclusively, by the philosophy of race. It is within this subfield of philosophy to which I 
commit myself as a philosopher. 
So, given my experiences in philosophy and my engagement with the philosophy 
of race, moving into the academic field of education to pursue philosophy of education 
                                                 
1
 Charles Mills, Blackness Visible. (Ithaca:  Cornell, 1998), 8-12. 
2
 Ibid., 46. 
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was quite a culture shock. I often facetiously describe my existential transition from 
philosophy to education as “going from black to African American.” Similar to my 
experience in philosophy, the sole basis of my (given) identity was the often vague and 
ambiguous physical characteristics frequently operationalized in American society to 
designate someone a member of the black race. Beyond this, my two fields diverged. 
This immediately became apparent as I moved from being expected to disavow any 
personal and theoretical obligations that I was presumed to have in philosophy to being 
assigned to a revitalized conception of blackness in education. It was “revitalized” in the 
sense that it not only contained the traditional bio-social aspects that normally accompany 
race-talk, albeit in a more subtle and less deliberate manner, but also a broad ethno-
cultural component that acted as a mandate for new theoretical obligations.  
In the educational realm, racial identity was treated as something in need of 
affirmation, rather than something problematic or something that should possibly be 
rejected. Often masked as a form of ethnicity, race was treated as something intrinsic to 
personhood; “black” and “African American” were labels used interchangeably, to 
denote natural (substantive) and ideal (normative) things. To my surprise, this treatment, 
which was quite overt within the classroom space, was not simply a reflection of our 
societal culture, but also a reflection of a substantial amount of race theory produced 
within the discipline. I found that even theory that attempts to avoid speaking in racial 
terms often does so inadvertently. Most frequently, this occurs in the form of ethnic and 
cultural assumptions and designations regarding particular groups of people. As a result, 
issues such as racism are treated as if independent of the concept of race. Instead, these 
issues are addressed as consequences of ethnocentrism, cultural and economic conflict, or 
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disparate power amongst preexisting races. This is despite the often-overt invocation of 
race to justify the maltreatment of persons in society, both past and present. 
The difficulty of differentiating race from other constructs like ethnicity or culture 
is a testament to the degree that race permeates the American cultural psyche and its 
stranglehold on the very institutions that should be engaging it most critically. Within 
parts of the field of education, the combining and conflating of these constructs (race, 
ethnicity, and culture) and the lack of understanding of their actual relationship(s) 
suggests an absence of analytic scrutiny of race. The more immediate consequence of 
“race” being so deeply embedded in the educational realm of American fabric is that it 
can prevent theorists from properly identifying and framing the problem of race as 
foundational. Race can stunt our ability to find the most effective tools for bringing about 
the most comprehensive and effective resolutions to the racial issues facing students in 
and outside of the classroom. 
Due to its practical goals and application for the educational setting, the 
compartmentalized nature of race theory in education has not facilitated the type of 
“surgical” discourse necessary to fully explore race at a depth adequate enough to 
understand its effects. This is further complicated, if not hampered, by the fact that under-
theorized suppositions of difference sometimes act as necessary components to the 
various social and political agendas pushed in some of the theory. There is an abundance 
of theory that speaks on racial and ethnic identity within the hegemonic paradigm, but 
very little work on how racial identities are dispensed, the ontological content and status 
that accompanies racial designations, or how those constructed identities find their 
grounding, ontological support, and reaffirmation in the classroom advertently or 
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inadvertently by well-intentioned teachers. This omission represents a “race gap” in 
education theory. 
In this dissertation, I argue that this race gap within education theory needs to be 
filled--that race is a problem worth isolating for analysis by theorists within education. To 
do this, I attempt to shed light on the processes in which the social construct of race, the 
ascription of racial, ethnic, and cultural identity, become idealized abstractions within 
some education theory. This is what I refer to as the problem of reification.  
Like any ascribed identities, racial identities can shape what we know, how we 
come to know ourselves, and the world around us. Imposing negative racial identities is, 
of course, already of ethical concern for educators. I contend that the scope of this 
concern be broadened to include all racial identities, as imposing any form of racial 
identity can come with consequences—ones that include the production and reproduction 
of a variety of harms to students. Racial identities can take over and become our primary 
point of epistemic reference. So, instead of merely seeing the world from their unique, 
complex, and diverse, socio-cultural circumstances, students may end up seeing the world 
as a white person or as a black person.  
If we take the personal autonomy of the student seriously, then the imposing of 
this reductive epistemological framework should be troubling. The possibility of 
producing, enforcing, and facilitating the continued existence of errant racial knowledge 
could result in the passive and active reproduction of this knowledge by the student 
towards herself and others. My suggestion here, and what I attempt to show in the 
chapters that follow, is that this is not merely an issue the scope of which is limited to the 
classroom, nor is the problem squarely epistemic in nature. Rather, it is that the 
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implications of race have real world consequences for students beyond the classroom. As 
philosophers of education, we can no longer ignore the problem of race and reification. 
Race is a moral problem, and as I assert, one that rests in our hands as theorists in the 
field of education and perhaps of greater importance, as agents within the broader ethical 
community. 
Theoretical Perspective   
My analysis is grounded with what I take to be a necessary set of undergirding 
propositions that will help insure that I avoid the reproduction of any further reification of 
the race concept as I move my arguments forward. First, to be in keeping with what has 
been accepted and supported by the empirical sciences, I acknowledge there is no 
biological distinction of race(s) that corresponds to what we generally regard as races.
3
  
As a society, we either tend to disregard or we are simply ignorant of any evidence that is 
contrary to the existence of human races. Thus, I hold that some form of racial 
essentialism encapsulated by our racial and ethno-cultural reifications is the necessary 
component to what keeps us connected to the belief in races. My theoretical perspective 
will operate on the grounds that while there may be distinctions between race, ethnicity, 
and culture within the social sciences, that such distinctions are betrayed, ignored, 
unknown, or conflated within societal culture. Another proposition that undergirds my 
theoretical perspective is that the understanding and critical engagement of the “race” 
concept is necessary when attempting to address any social and pedagogical issues in 
which phenotype and morphology is used as an indicator for race, ethnicity and culture.  
                                                 
3
 Ibid., 32. 
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What should be clear from this perspective is that this dissertation is intended to 
be an applied exercise in the philosophy of race. Furthermore, I identify myself as a racial 
eliminativist, meaning that I believe the most effective remedy in dealing with the 
problem of race and its consequences is the necessary deconstruction and dissolution of 
the race concept. Racial eliminativism both shapes and informs the analysis that I 
undertake and it is ultimately toward the abdication of race in American society that I 
argue in the following chapters. 
Objects of Investigation 
I recognize that there are a diverse array of viewpoints posited within the various 
areas of education theory regarding race and race relations. However, my investigation 
will focus on a few of the more influential and respected theorists in the broader field of 
critical theory in education. This includes such areas as critical race theory, critical 
multiculturalism, radical pedagogy, and Afrocentric theory.
4
 There are several reasons 
why I have chosen critical theory in education as the object of my investigation. The first 
is that theorists within this discipline attempt to engage race in both a rigorous and 
philosophical manner. They approach education with a critical lens and by doing so 
demonstrate a commitment to self-reflectivity and the need for adaptability and 
correction where needed within the field of education. Secondly, areas within critical 
theory in education attempt to confront pressing, sometimes controversial, race-related 
issues head on. The final reason that I have chosen critical theory in education as the 
focus of this dissertation is that it is where I situate myself theoretically, as a philosopher 
                                                 
4
 I will sometimes refer to “critical theory in education” simply as “critical theory.” 
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of race, within the broader field of education. Hence, I have a vested interest in this field 
achieving its desired ends of mitigating racial hegemony in the classroom space. These 
factors are of great importance to my analysis as it is neither my goal to undermine well-
intentioned educational theory nor the teachers in the classroom space that it attempts to 
inform. Rather, I hope to enhance the field by adding to its arsenal and broadening and 
strengthening its knowledge base.  
Since the theorists that I engage in the following chapters hail from the world of 
critical theory in eduation, they largely focus on the intersections between power and race 
inside and outside of the classroom. Specifically, they concentrate on the black/white 
racial paradigm. For the purposes of my dissertation, I, too, focus my analytic energies on 
this binary. However, my primary focal point is the treatment of black Americans, 
especially black students. While I do believe that my own experiences as a black 
individual and scholar within the philosophical and educational domains of the academy 
give me unique insight into this subject, the reason that I have chosen the black racial 
group as the principal subjects of investigation is because they are rather uniquely 
perceived and treated as the most monolithic of the racially/ethnically designated social 
groups in education theory.  
Race, especially in regard to blacks, often gets ingested into what Michael Omi 
and Howard Winant refer to as “the ethnic paradigm”–a paradigm inherent within 
multiculuralist theories. They state,  
“…. with rare exceptions, ethnicity theory isn’t very interested in ethnicity among 
blacks. The ethnicity approach views blacks as one ethnic group among others. It 
does not consider national origin, religion, language, or cultural differences 
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among blacks, as it does among whites, as sources of ethnicity. It would be quite 
interesting to see how ethnicity theory might address the range of subgroupings 
represented in the U.S. black community.”
5
 
The increased pressure placed upon theorists within education theory by 
multicultural education proponents has meant that the ethnic paradigm has become 
increasingly pervasive within critical theory in education. Moreover, its increased 
ideological dominance creates a unique set of circumstances for black students in the 
classroom. Persons assigned to the “black” race are thought to practice or belong to a 
distinctly bordered “African,” “African-American,” or “black” culture and are also 
perceived as being linked solely, and as I attempt to illuminate, even metaphysically, to 
the African continent. This is simply not the case for persons designated as “white.” It is 
not thought that a white person should practice or belong to a monolithic “European” or 
“white” culture, nor is it expected or required that this person identify one’s assigned race 
or ethnicity with all of Europe. Indeed, if a white person chooses to identify Europe as an 
ethnic affiliation, it is regarded as too broad a distinction. Usually, such an identity, 
“European American,” would only be employed for heuristic purposes within critical and 
political discourse. In societal culture, however, this designation would usually collapse 
into countries of ancestral origin or regions within the European continent. For example, 
one can identify as “Irish American,” “Italian American,” both, or if she so chooses, 
neither--that is, if societal culture regards her as white. Blacks are permitted the same 
variability of choice in neither societal culture nor educational culture. They are 
                                                 
5
 Michael Omi and Howard Winant, Racial Formation in the United States: From the 1960’s to the 1990’s. 
2
nd
 Ed. (New York: Routledge, 1994), 14. 
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considered to be African Americans or black only. It is my view that since blacks lack the 
choice of self-determination in regard to identity or even negotiated identifications, they 
provide a solid test case for my analysis. 
I recognize that the concentration on blacks within the black/white binary presents 
some limitations for my analysis. My conclusions will lack a high degree of 
generalizability, especially in regard to harms and potential harms inadvertently 
mandated by the theory in which I examine. There is simply too much variability and 
inconsistency when we talk about race, ethnicity, and culture. Thus, the same critique 
made of multiculturalism, for example, in regard to what is perceived as “black” or 
“African American culture,” may or may not apply to “Puerto Rican American culture,” 
“Chinese American culture,” or “Sioux culture.” This is because of the diverse histories 
and circumstances of people who belong to these presumed cultures or to whom these 
cultures are assigned in educational circles create their own unique sets of contextual 
particularities.  
Furthermore, cultural practices of certain groups are simply more identifiable than 
those of other groups whose supposed “cultures” are more highly subject to external and 
internal conjectural definition. The existence of an African American culture is unique 
because it is treated as given, fixed by race, that is somehow thought to transcend family, 
socio-historical circumstances, economics, geography and be remarkably impervious to 
cultural syncretization. So, for the sake of analytical clarity, I acknowledge my specific 
approach bears only contextual relevancy specific to the conception of race as it applies 
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to blacks in and, in some cases, outside of the United States.
6
  However, I regard this 
limitation as strength for the analysis that follows, as allowing ourselves to think too 
broadly about particular groups rests at the root of the problem of race in education.
7
 
Descriptive Analysis of Critical Theory in Education 
In Chapter Two, I offer a descriptive analysis of critical theory in education. I 
begin this task with an overview the problem of racial reification. Following this 
discussion, I attempt to show how some theoretical work within critical theory in 
education directly and indirectly affirms racial essentialism. I further reveal how some 
theory has the tendency to treat racial hegemony or racism as the problem and our 
cultural conception of race as independent and inconsequential to that problem. I attempt 
to show there is a lack of understanding of the deep essentialist ontology of race in some 
of the most penetrating and rigorous theoretical discourse in education. This analysis will 
hopefully evoke the creation of more effective and holistic approaches to combat racial 
issues, to provide a more exhaustive list of symptoms that occur as a result of racial 
ontology, and to help eliminate racial ontology altogether. 
  I demonstrate the claims of my descriptive argument, that some critical theory in 
education is guilty of reproducing race via the process of reification, by utilizing a 
question--directed method to provide answers to such questions as the following: 
1.  How are race, ethnicity, and culture generally defined and distinguished 
within the critical theory that I will explore? 
                                                 
6
 I do hope that the type of analysis of analysis that I am conducting in this dissertation is applicable to 




a. What is the conceptual relationship between these variables within 
the theory? 
b. What is the conceptual ontology of these variables as presented by 
the theorist? How has does the theorist reify “race?” 
2. How does the theory utilize these concepts to inform theory and practice 
within the field of education (e.g. in regard to identity, racism, the canon)? 
  I evaluate the logic of the answers/arguments that are provided. The logical 
analysis that I use is based on the basic philosophical methodology utilized in most 
contemporary Western philosophy. Formally speaking, I look for the validity of the 
theorists’ positions, where an argument’s validity would entail that there is no way for a 
conclusion to not be true if its premises are true. I also look for the soundness of the 
arguments that are made, where soundness indicates that an argument meets the standards 
of validity and that its premises are indeed true.
8
 Like most philosophical analysis, these 
logical rules will be carried out implicitly rather than explicitly. While I am well aware 
that this standard of logic is the subject of debate among hardcore logicians and those 
within the field of education who decry an epistemic over-reliance on “reason,” I believe 
that for my investigative purposes it is a sufficient, if not necessary, tool to demonstrate 
the problems in the theory that I engage. Where the theorists in my analysis do not 
explicitly state arguments and propositions, I attempt to draw inferences and propose 
implications based on the evidence provided within their analyses. Warranted and 
unwarranted assumptions that ground relevant positions are also highlighted. I approach 
these theorists under the assumption that they desire their work to be evaluated in a 
                                                 
8
 John Nolt, Logics. (Belmont: Wadsworth, 1997), 6-12. 
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reasonable, serious, and critical manner based on the evidence and arguments provided, 
rather than rhetorical value. This is, in part, the basis on which I have chosen their 
particular works for examination.  
 The question may be posed, “why this method?” As previously stated, logical 
analysis is an integral part of most contemporary philosophy in academic circles. It is 
present in pragmatic theory, existential theory, political theory, and moral theory. I 
believe it can be particularly useful for the analysis of race where so much of the related 
dialogue is the object of conjecture. I am in full agreement with philosophers of race, like 
Kwame Anthony Appiah, who champions the use of analytical philosophy to unpack the 
concept of race and philosopher Jorge Gracia, who states, 
9
 
“Philosophy can ‘put it all together’…by taking from other disciplines what they 
offer, by critically analyzing this information, and by supplementing it with the 
analyses that it uniquely can provide. Logic can help us to clarify the various 
conceptual issues raised by the notions of race, ethnicity, and nationality, and to 
identify hidden assumptions used in discourses about them and judge the validity 
of the arguments offered by various views.”
10
 
 The methodological approach that I use in this dissertation will permit us to rise 
above the existential fray, so to speak, to better understand the metaphysics of the 
concepts that inform how we live, how we learn, and how we know; in turn, a successful 
analysis should provide useful data that will allow us to make sure that our conceptual 
knowledge coheres with the actual world. Unfortunately, much about our belief in race is 
                                                 
9
 Appiah, Color, 33.  
10
 Jorge J. E. Gracia, Surviving Race, Ethnicity, and Nationality: A Challenge for the Twenty-First Century. 
(Lanham: Rowman and Littlfield, 2005), xix-xx. 
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“otherworldly” in nature—grounded by realist assumptions, while remaining insensitive 
to real world evidence. A logic-based investigation will help ground the transcendent 
concept race in the theory. 
  There are two primary dimensions to my conceptual analysis of critical theory in 
education. The first of these is an analysis in which I explore and critique how several 
contemporary theorists talk about race and the role race plays within their work. 
Specifically, I examine how these theorists, despite their methodological and practical 
differences, have managed to take the normative conceptions of race of the past and 
restructure them as substantive and idealized ontologies.  
The first of these contemporary theorists is Afrocentric pedagogist Molefi Kete 
Asante. Asante argues for an African-centered pedagogy as a solution to help better the 
lives of African American students. He constructs his Afrocentric approach in opposition 
to the dominance of Eurocentrism within education. Drawing from three of his works, 
The Afrocentric Idea, “The Afrocentric Idea in Education,” and “Afrocentric 
Curriculum,” I show how Asante offers an essentialist and axiomatic vision of race, 
especially in regard to African Americans. 
11
 
The second theorist that I investigate for this contemporary analysis is critical race 
theorist Gloria Ladson-Billings. I draw from the book in which her theory is most fully 
presented, The Dreamkeepers: Successful Teachers of African American Children. I 
explore her racial and cultural views regarding the education of blacks posited in her 
                                                 
11
 Molefi K Asante, “Afrocentric Curriculum” in Educational Leadership. 49.4 (1991), 28-31, Asante, 
Molefi K. Asante, The Afrocentric Idea. (Philadelphia: Temple, 1998), and Molefi Kete Asante, “The 
Afrocentric Idea in Education,” The Journal of Negro Education, 60 (1991): 170-780. 
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influential “Culturally Relevant Teaching” strategy.
12
 I attempt to show how reified 
conceptions of race, ethnicity, and culture are intertwined within this very influential 
book.  
I also engage the work of critical multiculturalists Joe Kincheloe and Shirley 
Steinberg. I evaluate some problematic positions that they put forth in regard to the 
education of black students in their book Changing Multiculturalism.
13
 I argue that their 
views on race are quite similar to the essentialist conception of race Afrocentric 
education.  
The final critical theorist of education that I will examine is Peter McLaren. 
McLaren provides an interesting twist to the racial dichotomy by utilizing oppositional 
political conceptions of both “blackness” and “whiteness.” I draw my analysis from two 
of his books Revolutionary Multiculturalism and Life in Schools: An Introduction to 
Critical Pedagogy in the Foundations of Education.
14
 
The second dimension of my conceptual analysis is a historical conceptual 
analysis that provides an account of the development and construction of “blackness” in 
the philosophy of education. This task is carried out in Chapter Three of this dissertation. 
In this examination, I explore the history of black education from the philosophies 
offered by persons such as Booker T. Washington, W.E.B. Du Bois, Carter Woodson, 
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and some of the ideologies that surfaced out of the Black Power movements leading up to 
the establishment of Black Studies. I attempt to demonstrate how the philosophies of race 
argued for normative conceptions of race that, once activated, were intended to improve 
the circumstances of black people. Furthermore, I follow the conceptual trajectory from 
past to present to show how these historical notions of race likely came to rest as the 
foundations of the more contemporary conception of blackness found in critical theory in 
education. 
Normative Analysis 
There are potentially dangerous consequences for producing and reproducing 
reified conceptions of race—consequences that I hold necessitate that we move beyond 
our current starting points of looking at race. In Chapter Four of this dissertation, I argue 
that critical theory in education that advocates racially diasporic strategies and content 
will facilitate the continuance of pre-existing harms for black students. Moreover, I 
contend that the failure to dismantle the inherent essentialism of the race concept in our 
theories before re-deploying it the classroom will result in the exacerbation of these 
harms. I hold that given the nature of the racial construct and its usage within critical 
theory in education accompanied by the aforementioned harms, we as theorists and 
educators, and most importantly, catalysts for these harms, have an ethical responsibility 
to end these problems where possible. Mitigating negative consequences caused by the 
construct of race requires that we attempt to understand its individual racial ontologies as 
comprehensively as the available tools will permit us.  
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The Philosophy of Race   
In Chapter Five, I show how there are theorists in education who also suggest that 
a greater conceptual clarity must gain ground within education when we approach 
questions of race, ethnicity and culture. Among these theorists are Cameron McCarthy 
and Warren Crichlow. They reject discourse in education circles that treats racial groups 
as monolithic groups in which designated members share the same sorts of biological and 
cultural characteristics.
15
  The work of theorists like McCarthy and Crichlow help 
strengthen the mandate for the construction of a theoretical bridge that will take critical 
theorists in education towards a deeper and more holistic approach to race in education.  
I offer a prescriptive argument that will help address McCarthy and Crichlow’s 
concerns and as well as the issues I raise in the preceding chapters. The concept of race 
has been conceptually de-centered from race theory and buried within the ethnic 
paradigm of critical theory in education. I contend that the philosophy of race couched in 
the world of academic philosophy provides conceptual and foundational knowledge that 
could help close the race gap in educational theory and thereby act as a mitigating agent 
to offset harms by re-centering race in the discourse. I argue that critical theorists begin to 
bridge the divide between the disciplines of education and philosophy to provide stronger 
theory to confront the problem of race in education. It can provide educators with a more 
in-depth view of the complexities and dangerous conflation between race, culture, and 
ethnicity—variables in which students’ identities and environment are often largely 
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contingent. I intend to demonstrate that these variables need to be centered in educational 
discourse as constructs with consequences as such. Furthermore, I contend that educators 
seek a better understanding of the substantive link between the complex nature of these 
constructs and overt problems such as racism and ethnocentrism. This inquiry will 
hopefully demonstrate to administrators, educational policy makers, and theorists the 
need for more rigorous courses for teacher preparation that deal with such issues with a 
more exhaustive depth. 
This chapter also includes a second question-directed descriptive analysis that 
attempts to shed light on the various ways in which the methodologies, strategies, and 
knowledge within the philosophy of race can assist critical theorists in education. This 
investigation will provide answers to questions such as, 
1. What are some methods and approaches used to examine race within the 
philosophy of race? 
2. How are race, ethnicity, and culture distinguished and defined within 
philosophical critical theory? 
a. What is the relationship between these variables? 
b. What are the ontological implications of these variables? 
3. How does philosophy of race use its analysis to inform further theory (e.g. 
identity, racism, race relations) 
4. How do these philosophies of race relate to one another? How are they 
different? 
 In the philosophy of race, simply asserting that race is a social construct does not 
go far enough. There is an attempt to answer the question “What, then, is ‘race?’ as we 
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know it our American culture.” If there are no human races, “what do we mean when we 
call ourselves black, white, mixed, Asian, etc?” For these philosophers, an inherently 
problematic conception of race is found in the answers to such questions and given this 
problem, they ask, “how do we operationalize this new knowledge in regard to issues 
related to race?” 
The growing affinity for a less critical than intended multiculturalism has 
complicated these questions even more so as the confusion, interchangeability, and 
relationships between race, culture, and ethnicity provide further ambiguity. 
Philosophers, then, have begun to take advantage of the methodological arsenals of their 
field in an attempt to offer descriptive clarity to these concepts that have been at the 
center of so much social turmoil. Thus, one of the primary goals for philosophers of race 
is to better provide a sound starting point for normative work.  
I explore the philosophical works of four important philosophers of race who 
challenge the concept of racial realism to highlight this description of the philosophy of 
race. The first of these philosophers is Charles Mills. My analysis will focus on his race 
theory presented in the book, Blackness Visible. Borrowing from contract theory, Mills 
argues that race is a vertically (hierarchically) structured, politically, socially, and 
historically contingent white supremacist system. This system is maintained by a 
hypothetical, intersubjectively agreed upon contract amongst whites.
 16
  
I show how Mills, playing the role of metaphysician, offers an analysis of the 
“social ontology” of race. Further drawing from the fields of ethics and the philosophy of 
science, he places himself in opposition to “racial realism,” a position that asserts a 
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biological conception of race in which cultural, social, and physical traits are passed on 
genetically. For Mills, racial realism is a manifestation of a system based on power 
arrangements. Thus, he endorses a social constructivist view on the metaphysics of race, 
while acknowledging that race is socially real and has social and ontological 
implications. I illuminate how, for Mills, “Blackness” was created in this system to be a 
distinction from “Whiteness.” I further explain how racial identity, “mixed” raced, and 
culture factor into the racial system for Mills.
 17
 
 I also present an overview of Kwame Anthony Appiah’s theory of race. Appiah is 
perhaps the most highly regarded analytical race theorist of the last two decades. He 
utilizes methods from the philosophy of language and the philosophy of science to 
discover how our current folk conception of race developed from conjecture at a time 
before the advent of biological science. His philosophical investigation seeks to 
demonstrate how race was the product of suppositions about heritable biological, cultural, 
and moral traits.
 18
   
 Much of Appiah’s critique is concentrated on “racialism,” a concept that is 
accepted amongst critical race theorists as synonymous with “racial essentialism” or 
racial realism. Appiah offers a definition that attempts to provide clarity essentially 
stating that racialism is the belief that human beings can be divided up and separated into 
races contingent upon a set of physical (e.g. skin color), nonphysical (e.g. intelligence), 
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and metaphysical (essences or “racial blood”) traits. Each set of properties makes that 
particular race distinct from other races.
19
  
 I include what I take to be a very significant argument that Appiah makes 
regarding identity. He argues for the use of de-essentialized racial identities as ethical 
identities, and provides a compelling account for why “cultural identities” are not suitable 
replacements for racial identities. I also explore how Appiah confronts the problem of 
race in regard to the role of collective identities based around reified constructs and how 
they activate axiomatic conceptions of authenticity and, as I also argue in the preceding 
chapter, can negate one’s autonomy.
20
  
 I further discuss how Appiah’s theory of race informs his views on racism. I show 
how from Appiah’s standpoint one must first understand the nature of our beliefs about 
race before we are able to adequately approach any conversations about race. I therefore, 
present his “Racialist Triad” which consists of three concepts: racialism, extrinsic racism, 
and intrinsic racism.  
Another theorist that I discuss is analytical philosopher, Naomi Zack. She uses a 
broad set of philosophical methodologies in her analyses of the race concept. For 
example, Zack employs a historical-scientific analysis quite similar to Appiah’s to show 
the ways in which scientific and essentialist notions of race that predated modern biology 
were conceptualized without proper bases. She argues that science is the last line of 
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justification for proponents of racial realism and challenges the notion of race on these 
grounds.
21
   
I further explain how Zack uses existential and logical analysis to tackle the issue 
of racial identity. Her analysis reveals how the concept of race, by virtue of the one-drop 
rule, mandates rules of racial taxonomy that maintain white supremacy. She contends this 
is accomplished by authorization of a racially asymmetrical paradigm that maintains a 
“racial purity” that the excludes blacks, and subsequently a group that remains virtually 
ignored within ethno-racial theory, those of “mixed-raced.”
22
   
Most of the philosophers in this investigation are in theoretical dialogue with one 
another. This is certainly the case with the final philosopher of race that I examine, Jorge 
Gracia. He contributes an analytical approach to race and ethnicity that is sensitive to 
science and the foundational analyses provided by scholars such as Appiah, Zack, Omi 
and Winant.
23
   
Unlike Naomi Zack, and to a lesser extent, Kwame Anthony Appiah, Gracia is 
more starkly anti-eliminativist. In his view, the concepts of race and ethnicity, once 
unpacked and properly separated, are theoretically salvageable. Rather than utilize 
problematic conflation of race and ethnicity, Gracia proposes his “Genetic Common 
Bundle View” of race and “Familial-Historical View” of ethnicity, reconstructions of the 
aforementioned concepts that attempts to be mindful of their reality on the ground--
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culturally, socially, and biologically. I believe that he offers a potentially important route 
that will permit critical theorists to help unravel race and ethnicity. 
24
  
 At the conclusion of Chapter Five, I highlight some of the ways that these 
philosophers of race can directly inform and supplement the work of critical theorists in 
education. I believe if the concerns raised by these philosophers of race are taken 
seriously within critical theory in education, the theoretical and strategic approaches to 
the problem of race in the field of education will likely look very differently than they 
currently do. 
Toward A Philosophy of Race in Education 
 In Chapter Six, I offer my own vision of what a philosophy of race for education 
should encompass. Like the philosophers of race that I examine in Chapter 5, I take up 
the question “What is the best way to proceed given that race is a social construct and 
given the type of construct that it is?” Drawing from the works of these philosophers of 
race and my own analysis, I present a normative argument that calls for the necessary 
move toward eliminativism. I argue that a project that includes both racial eliminativist 
and anti-eliminativist components is best suited for dealing with the problem of race and 
racial hegemony. This proposal is intended to take into account the social constructedness 
of race, its harmful consequences, and the valuable role that race and ethnicity may 
already have in the lives of many students and their respective socio-cultural 
communities. I offer recommendations that I consider crucial for the success of this 
multi-pronged approach. 
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I further argue that for the implementation of a philosophy of race in education to 
be successful, that critical theory in education must conduct and utilize conceptual 
analysis to ground a skill-based approach to race for teachers in the classroom. I hold that 
rigorous training in philosophical critical thinking for both theorists and teachers to 
whom our theory informs can act as a useful tool to help negotiate the difficult racial, 
social, and cultural terrain that acts upon students.  
In Chapter Seven, I conclude this dissertation offering some final thoughts, 
recommendations, and implications for implementing a philosophy of race in the field of 
education. Let us now begin this analysis with an examination of the problem of 
















THE PROBLEM OF REIFICATION IN CRITICAL THEORY IN 
EDUCATION 
        
  
 
The Process of Reification 
 Every Christmas Day, millions of children awaken to find presents waiting for 
them. Many of these children believe that the person responsible for leaving these gifts is 
Santa Claus—a white, rotund, bearded man who resides in the uninhabitable North Pole 
and who uses flying reindeer as his mode of transportation. These same children likely 
believe that Santa Claus awards these gifts to them based on the moral merit of their 
actions. 
The truth is, however, that Santa Claus is just a mythical figure of Christian lore. 
The Santa myth is typically invoked for the sake of tradition or for cultural and 
entertainment purposes. Sometimes, Santa is even used by parents as an instrument to 
control or constrain the behavior and desires of their children. This is because, to 
children, Santa Claus is no myth. Santa, his generous acts, and the values, rules, and 
motivations that direct these actions are very real to them. Children will shape their 
actions according to these beliefs. Santa Claus is so real to them that they will even set 
out milk and cookies for him to consume, as a bit of a “thanks in advance” for the gifts 
they will receive. The actual functional value of his existence bears no consequence to 
their reality or psychological lives. 
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The process by which the social construction of Santa Claus and his actions 
becomes interpreted by children as a real thing is what sociologists Peter L. Berger and 
Thomas Luckmann, refer to as reification. In their book The Social Construction of 
Reality, Berger and Luckmann describe reification as “the apprehension of human 
phenomena as if they were things…” and “the apprehension of the products of human 
activity as if they were something else than human products—such as facts of nature, 
results of cosmic laws, or manifestations of divine will.”
25
  So, for example, Santa is a 
myth but we pretend as though he is real and as a result children believe him to be a real 
person. We pretend as though our placing gifts under the tree is really Santa’s doing. If 
we are successful, children come to think that Santa not only must be real but also that he 
must be pleased with them. Given the multitudes of trustworthy adults that “play along” 
with the Santa myth through various means (e.g. parenting, business, media, church, and 
education) there is little reason for children to doubt their own beliefs and intuitions 
regarding his realness. Indeed, it is this broad-scale affirmation of Santa’s existence that 
makes him such an effective device. 
There are plenty of possible examples of reification. After all, we reify throughout 
the course of our daily lives. The types of objects that we reify are seemingly limitless-- 
places, inanimate objects, concepts, social statuses, rituals, rites of passages, etc. 
Sometimes, reifications can extend to actual people, altering the way that we see them, 
the way that they view themselves, or the way that they view others. Consider this 
example of reification. Imagine a person who we know of by description. She leads what 
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we would typically consider an ordinary life. She has an average job, a family, and 
friends; she pays rent or makes house payments. She has ordinary feelings (happiness, 
sadness, anger, loneliness) and desires (love, family, job security, financial stability). We 
expect her to encounter all of life’s typical problems (bad relationships, job loss or 
dissatisfaction, familial discord, etc.). And, even though we might recognize that there 
are circumstantial factors that make her life uniquely different from ours, we still relate to 
her as a person. In fact, it is the aforementioned feelings, desires, and problems that help 
facilitate the sort of egalitarian and empathetic kinship that we are able to feel for her. 
They are what make her “normal,” just like us. 
Now let us say that this same person achieves high profile professional and 
financial success, such as becoming an award winning film actress. It is likely that our 
view of this person and her personhood will change substantially. She ceases being 
normal to us and instead becomes a type of icon--a celebrity. In American society, we 
reify celebrity. It is not simply an empty status used to describe someone with notoriety. 
We give it inherent meaning and a transcendent ontology. We make it a thing in itself. In 
regard to our hypothetical person, we reify her as a result of her celebrity; it becomes 
who she is intrinsically. Her newly reified status will likely entail a qualitatively 
different, probably higher value and set of standards than we normally would assign to 
others and ourselves. Furthermore, we extend this value to her “productions.” For 
instance, we begin to regard her feelings, actions, and “desires” as special because they 
flow from her as a celebrity. These take on a new, often more intense meaning—her 
signature becomes an “autograph”; her touch becomes something that can bring admirers 
to tears; a photograph of her performing mundane tasks, such as drinking coffee or 
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showing physical affection towards someone becomes something that we hurriedly 
shuffle through tabloids to see; the loss of a loved one makes us grieve for her as much as 
we might for someone we know in our actual lives. Even the productions, circumstances, 
and objects of her pre-celebrity life, which would have once been considered ordinary or 
perhaps even arbitrary, acquire greater value. In all of these cases, the celebrity’s 
productions also become objects of our reification. Our continued belief in her celebrity 
affirms these productions while also affirming the reification of celebrity, a human 
phenomenon, itself. 
The process of reification does not necessarily require intent. Public Relations 
firms may help create someone’s image as a celebrity, but our affirmation of this 
reification is usually something we do unconsciously. After all, we do not say to 
ourselves when buying a tabloid at the newsstand or visiting our favorite celebrity gossip 
website, “my action is perpetuating the celebrity of what was once a normal person.”  
Similarly, the intent that leads to the propagation of the Santa myth by family, societal 
members, and institutions (schools, businesses, etc.) is typically benign. Kids who believe 
in Santa might unknowingly disseminate or affirm the myth to other kids in casual 
conversation because they think that his existence is an established matter of fact. 
The Problem of Reification  
While intent is not a necessity when reifying phenomena, there are potentially 
troubling issues that can emerge with the process of reification. These issues are largely 
dependent on the type of human phenomena, activity or products being reified, the 
properties and axioms that accompany the reification, and the degree to which the 
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reification itself is containable. Sometimes, a reification can gain so much power and 
influence that people regard it as self-evident. Belief in the reification can come to denote 
a fideistic commitment to its realness—a commitment that remains unwavering in the 
face of any credible authority or evidence that could potentially undermine it. This can, 
therefore, stunt our ability to recognize, acknowledge, or deconstruct the reification as a 
product of human creation.  
Another issue is that the reification itself can become self-affirming. On the front 
end, we might look to it to authorize and justify a particular production that we associate 
with the object. We unknowingly sift through productions, selectively claiming those that 
are in keeping with the narrative that accompanies the reification. We will ignore 
productions that appear antithetical to that narrative or even dismiss them as anomalies. 
The selected productions then act as affirmation for the reified phenomena from which 
they are thought to derive. So, we can say that the affirmation exists on the back end as 
well.  
Finally, the societal belief in the object can be so widely held and deeply 
ingrained in our cultural beliefs, that the reification can inadvertently, and sometimes 
advertently, get reaffirmed and reconstructed by societal members. In this way, when 
something is reified, it can take on a life of its own in such a way that it is far easier for 
us to sustain it than it is for us to dismantle it. All of these complications that I have 
described make up what I call the problem of reification.  
The concept of “race” is a reification that finds itself entangled in the problem of 
reification. It is a social construct that’s reification is dependent upon the abstracting of 
biological markers (e.g. skin color). There is very little scientific support for biological 
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races in humans, but as stated in Chapter 1, most people believe that race is a legitimate 
biological system.
 26
 This strong commitment to race is demonstrated by the fact that it 
operates as a primary frame of reference for how we conduct our social lives. It serves as 
a basis for how and with whom we interact socially. We refer to it to determine whom 
our friends and partners are, to whom we will extend moral status, and even the nature of 
that status. Thus, the reification of race is not simply a biological system, it is also a value 
system and as such race has been the basis for social and systematic inequity, 
discrimination, and atrocities.  
Over time, however, significant socially progressive change has led to 
adjustments to its value schema. This has helped mitigate its capability to facilitate 
certain types of harms in American society. For instance, it is, in general, no longer 
socially acceptable to physically harm or discriminate on the basis of race. Despite such 
alterations, however, race as a reified entity has remained relatively intact. We still 
believe it be real which is a testament to its pervasiveness in American societal culture. 
Another demonstration of how deeply race is woven into our cultural fabric is that it is 
still invokes within our societal structure. Its realness is even affirmed and maintained by 
our social, political, and educational institutions. One need only view a census form or 
look at the way cultural products are marketed for confirmation of this fact.  
Of course, the idea that our institutions can act as racial affirmation agents should 
not be surprising. After all, they are products of their own environment supported and 
operated by and for members of this society. We would think, however, that the 
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Academy, despite being situated within this deeply racialized society, could extricate 
itself from the reified conception of race. Unlike other institutions, it typically functions 
as the primary intellectual ground in which the most penetrating, reflective work and 
discourse regarding the nature of race occurs. It is where the concept of race has been 
deconstructed and delegitimized as a valid biological entity. Unfortunately, the broad 
scale deconstruction of race on the part of the Academy as a whole has not yet taken 
place. Some disciplines have increasingly begun adjusting their mainstream theory to 
reflect both the constructedness and the pervasiveness of the race concept. Other 
disciplines, however, have had difficulty avoiding the problem of racial reification.   
Given the potentially harmful implications of the racial circumstances within the 
contexts of our application, schools, it is often critical theorists of education who 
continue to recognize the importance and necessity for engaging race. Indeed, the 
substantial amount of work that has been directed towards the subject in critical theory of 
education is a demonstration of its own commitment toward this end. Unfortunately, 
however, critical theory in education, specifically the more philosophically based theory, 
remains one of those areas within American higher education where the reified concept 
of race not only survives, but also gets reconstituted and re-deployed existentially. While 
it is not a matter of whether we attempt to confront race and race-related issues, it is a 
matter of how we engage them--whether we are keeping the concept of race grounded 
while attempting to complete these tasks. The truth is that as theorists situated within 
American society, we often fail to fully recognize the ubiquity and complexity of the race 
concept. As a result, we sometimes allow it to frame the content and dimensions of our 
work. For instance, we may unintentionally sustain race because we operate from the 
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traditionally based conception of race or perhaps, we fail in attempts to provide fully de-
essentialized reconceptualizations of it. The potential pitfalls to the problem of reification 
are many ways as subtle as they are overt. 
As previously stated, race acts as a value system grounded by erroneous 
biological assumptions. This means that if we are affirming race in critical theory of 
education and our theory is applied in the classroom, we are promoting it its legitimacy. 
It is, therefore, important to understand the various ways in which we contribute to the 
problem of racial reification and the ways that it manifests in the field of education. This 
means we must seek to identify how race is conceptualized in the theory, the nature of 
those conceptions, and how the conceptions are supported in the theory. In the pages that 
follow, I will examine how race is engaged within the various areas within critical theory 
of education. Specifically, I will examine theorists from critical race theory, Afrocentric 
pedagogy, critical multiculturalism, and critical pedagogy and attempt to demonstrate 
how the problem of reification materializes in their work. 
The Problem of Reification in Critical Theory in Education 
Critical Race Theory: Race and Culturally Relevant Teaching 
One of the most common ways in which the problem of reification emerges in 
critical theory in education occurs when theorists apply racial boundaries to constructs 
such as ethnicity or culture. This takes place even as the theory attempts to understand 
and confront the relationship between race and power in the classroom. We find an 
example of this with critical race theorist, Gloria Ladson-Billings.  
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In the book The Dreamkeepers: Successful Teachers of African American 
Children, Ladson-Billings attempts to address the low performance of African American 
students in the classroom. She maintains that little scholarly attention is given to the 
academic needs of African American children. Among the primary reasons for this, she 
asserts, “…is the stubborn refusal in American education to recognize African Americans 
as a distinct cultural group. While it is recognized that African Americans make up a 
distinct racial group, the acknowledgement that this racial group has a distinct culture is 
still not recognized.”
 27
 Consequently, the possibility that race and culture play a role in 
the learning of African American students gets ignored and
 
as an added consequence, 




Ladson-Billings points out that studies show that African American students 
perform better in schools that attend to their socio-cultural needs. These schools prevent 
them from being deprived of their culture and minimize the possibilities that students will 
be judged racially or intra-racially for their positive performance. Furthermore, studies 
also suggest that in schools where cultural groups are different than the dominant culture, 
that certain social and cultural incompatibilities can exist that could hinder a child’s 
progress.
29
 In response to these conclusions, Ladson-Billings proposes that teachers 
practice what she calls “Culturally Relevant Teaching.” This teaching strategy, she 
explains, “uses student culture in order to maintain it and to transcend the negative effects 
of the dominant culture.”  She goes on to say that the “primary aim of culturally relevant 
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teaching is to assist in the development of a ‘relevant black personality’ that allows 
African American students to choose academic excellence yet still identify with African 
and African American culture.
30
   
Here we see that Ladson-Billings advocates an approach to teaching in which 
culture not only expedites success for the black student in the classroom, but also affirms 
that student’s racial and cultural identity. Her postulation that African Americans are a 
cultural and racial group is supported here by her use of a conception of culture that 
encompasses both African and American culture. So, a clear vision of the problem of 
reification emerges first as she deems the blacks/African Americans to be a fixed racial 
group, an affirmation of race in itself, and secondly, by including African culture to 
affirm black racial identity. If we consider African American racial and cultural 
boundaries to be distinct, as she does, then we can infer that borders of the black racial 
group, for Ladson-Billings, extends beyond our borders to the native continent of its 
origins. Both this substantive account of race and her normative position that teachers 
assist in strengthening that racial identity with racially fixed culture are affirmations of 
the reified racial concept. 
Ladson-Billings is dismissive of teachers who employ color-blind approaches in 
the classroom, arguing that to ignore “race and ethnicity” is to the detriment of those 
students situated in negatively disparate positions and circumstances in relation to the 
dominant group in society. So, it is important that teachers engage the factors that 
underlie the inequity in their lives.
31
 She adds, “If teachers pretend not to see students’ 
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racial and ethnic differences, they really do not see students at all and are limited in their 
ability to meet their educational needs.”
32
   
I agree with Gloria Ladson-Billings that it is important to integrate relevant 
cultural aspects into teaching and to attempt to understand the racial or cultural 
circumstances of their student’s lives. However, by asserting that she considers African 
Americans to be a distinct racial group with a distinct culture that corresponds to its set 
boundaries Ladson-Billings is not only reifying race, but also conflating it with culture. 
She offers no justification or explanation to ground these claims of the distinctness of 
race and culture of African Americans. To send teachers into the classroom with an under 
theorized conception of race and culture grounded by the un-critical societal culture that 
affirms it, is to activate those teachers as agents of racial affirmation. Furthermore, these 
inadequate notions could result in the non-color blind teacher becoming culture-blinded 
by color as she fails to recognize and identify a student’s actual cultural makeup. This 
would seemingly undermine the platform of culturally relevant teaching. 
In truth, the defining of racial groups has always been contingent upon temporal, 
spatial, and social circumstances. These definitions typically do not escape the broader 
racial paradigm, but they sometimes demonstrate a grounded variability within it. For 
instance, a person with one white parent and one black could be considered black or 
African American, while in other places they are considered “mixed” or “biracial.” They 
might even be able to “pass” as white. So, a problem that needs to be addressed within 
Ladson-Billings’s theoretical framework is what to do when racial categories merge, as 





they often do, and how to approach race, given the diverse “racial” ancestry of many 
blacks in this country.  
Another problem is that Ladson-Billings uses race and ethnicity in conjunction as 
if they are indicative of the same thing. Racial designations, however, do not necessarily 
correspond to one’s ethnic designation. It is possible for one to carry the racial 
designation “black” or “African American” and have an ethnicity that is not typically 
associated with a black racial designation, e.g., Haitian American. 
Finally, the claim that the black racial group has a distinct culture is a claim that 
requires an argument that Ladson-Billings neglects to provide. However, if we imagine 
the ethnic or cultural groups whose members are comprised of many persons assigned the 
black racial designation, we can see that a claim that there is a distinct black culture is an 
overgeneralization. Some examples are Louisiana creoles, the Gullah people of South 
Carolina/Georgia, Puerto Rican Americans, Dominican Americans, Cuban Americans, 
Jamaican Americans, Kenyan Americans, and the descendents of slaves and freedmen 
scattered throughout various rural, urban, and suburban regions of the United States. All 
of these groups are situated in a society in which there is a significant degree of inter-
marriage and cultural syncretism.  
To try to describe “African Americans” or “blacks” as a distinct cultural group 
merely offers a notion of culture in which cultural members and their culture are 
impervious to interactive influence. Moreover, it would make culture a racial-
metaphysical birthright, instead of something learned, engaged, and shaped.  
The operative conception of race in American culture has always packaged racial 
designations and selective cultural productions together. This is carried out with 
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indifference to how people actually live. Ladson-Billings’s shared belief in this 
conception, her using it to ground her theory, and disseminating it for normative action in 
schools is codifying it institutionally. If we, as critical scholars, are going to make use of 
such racial reifications then it is important that we provide evidentiary support for them 
and their place in our theory. Unfortunately, this grounding does not always occur, as I 
shall now show as we move to an examination of Afrocentric education. 
Afrocentricity In Education: Constructing Diasporas 
 Over the last several decades, theorists from within the field of education have 
increasingly begun to mount strong challenges to the prevalence of Eurocentricity within 
the American educational system. Philosopher of education, Molefi Kete Asante is one of 
the most influential and well-respected scholars spearheading this movement. Asante’s 
position is that the Eurocentric paradigm that currently dominates education is inherently 
white supremacist. This is because the substantive content distributed to students reflects 
the histories and perspectives of white students. Non-white students are taught to center 
white narratives in their own lives. Narratives reflective of their own perspectives are 
either ignored or treated as something akin to bit part characters in the story of whites—
as objects in which white subjects come into contact and “act upon.”
33
 For the African 
American student, this ultimately means having to engage the content of education 
through the eyes of white persons, some of who are responsible for committing atrocities 
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against their ancestors. African and African Americans who may have resisted their white 
oppressors are suppressed within the discourse.
34
 
Given these consequences for African American students, Asante posits that the 
Eurocentric paradigm must be dismantled. He holds that the only way to accomplish this 
task is through multicultural education because it is best suited to de-stratify and equalize 
cultural narratives. However, he contends this multicultural education must be directed 
by an Afrocentric approach if it is to effectively undermine Eurocentricity.
35
 Asante 
describes Afrocentricity as  
“a frame of reference wherein the phenomena are viewed from the perspective of 
the African person. The Afrocentric approach seeks in every situation the 
appropriate centrality of the African person…this means that teachers provide 
students the opportunity to study the world and its people, concepts, and history 
from an African world view.”
36
   
The Afrocentric approach is intended to have application to all major subjects 
within liberal education. However, Asante states, it is not the goal of Afrocentricity to 
operate as a facsimile of Eurocentricity, nor is it intended to assume the hegemonic 
positioning of Eurocentricity in education. Rather, he asserts, the goal of the Afrocentric 
approach is to disrupt the white supremacy endemic to Eurocentric paradigm.
 37
 It is to 
accomplish this as,   
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1) ”It questions the imposition of the White supremacist view as universal 
and/or classical. 
2) It demonstrates the indefensibility of racist theories that assault multi-
culturalism and pluralism. 
3) It projects a humanistic and pluralistic viewpoint by articulating 
Afrocentricity as a valid, nonhegemonic perspective.”
38
   
At first glance, we can see how Asante’s Afrocentric approach could loosen the 
tight grasp the Eurocentric paradigm has on the various levels of education. For example, 
if we were to visit the world of academic philosophy, we would find that European 
philosophers such as Plato, Aristotle, Thomas Hobbes, Immanuel Kant, J.S Mill, David 
Hume, John Locke, St. Augustine, Sartre, and Foucault are considered the Great 
Thinkers. It is from the theoretical vantage points of European philosophers, or American 
philosophers inspired by them (the Pragmatists), that textbook content and classroom 
discourse is often framed, and from where the majority of contemporary philosophers 
construct their analyses. African and African American-related philosophies are, at best, 
relegated to minimal status in textbooks and as result remain largely invisible within 
mainstream philosophy. As I mentioned in the preceding chapter, works by philosophers 
of race, even those that rigorously employ methodologies from “the Western tradition” to 
examine the social and/or moral status of blacks or who provide analyses of frameworks 
in which race and racial identity are constructed, are typically marginalized from the 
content. As the relevance of such works get diminished in the canon, so do, in many 
ways, the lives and conditions of the people that these works attempt to address.  
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It is not impossible to imagine how a successful implementation of Asante’s 
Afrocentric Idea could, in theory, yield positive benefits for the discipline of philosophy 
and its members, especially those regarded as African American. A new African center 
that acts as the frame of reference by which we do philosophy could mean a re-evaluation 
of philosophers treated as moral universalists in the classroom, but whose devaluation of 
the moral status of blacks (e.g. Kant) is typically omitted in the classroom and in 
textbooks. Such philosophers’ works would likely be subject to deeper, richer, and 
consequently less abridged analytical and interpretive exegeses within the theory and in 
the classroom. An Afrocentric approach to philosophy could also result in race and 
racism receiving broader consideration and being met with a sense of urgency within the 
discipline. The introduction of African philosophies might finally result in their epistemic 
and methodological entry into and influence within the larger philosophical conversation. 
 Among the primary goals of Afrocentric education is the placement of African 
American students inside of the educational content--to permit them to see themselves as 
an integral part of the discourse.
39
  Thus, a re-situation of African and African American 
philosophy could allow persons of African descent, like so many of those of European 
descent, to have their lives and circumstances reflected within the content, which could 
permit them to finally “see themselves as the subjects, rather than the objects of 
education.”
40
   
I agree that the current state of education at secondary and higher levels 
necessitates that we provide effective and holistic alternatives to the Eurocentric 
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paradigm. Heuristically, as I have shown, Asante’s approach can have great value. 
However, upon deeper scrutiny, Asante’s Afrocentric approach maintains the problem of 
reification. The way in which Asante reifies race is, on one hand, a reaffirmation of the 
white supremacist model of the Eurocentric paradigm. On the other hand, it is a 
reinvention of the reified conception of race found in American societal culture.  
We first find Asante’s affirmation of race with his validation of the traditional 
racial category of “white” as he corresponds it to the content within the Eurocentric 
education. While it is certainly possible that the subject matter of the traditional 
Eurocentric narrative entails parts of the lives or histories of some of the persons 
designated “white,” it is certainly not the case for all whites within this country. 
Considering the ethnic diversity of “white” people in the US, persons whose ancestries 
may extend from Sicily to Zimbabwe, a claim that the traditional canon even represents 
this wide spectrum is, at best, an overstatement. By Asante’s own description, the 
Eurocentric model has historically reified the content of its selectively chosen narratives 
and facilitated their attachment to the “white” racial category while omitting non-
European content. Asante, however, appears to follow the lead of this model, only he 
designates Eurocentric education “white” while simultaneously ignoring the actual 
ancestral and historical diversity of those assigned to that category. This is an example of 
back-end and front-end affirmation. His “diversity omission” allows him to affirm race 
by placing a broad group of people into the Eurocentric model fixed by the white racial 
boundary. As a result, the “white” productions that make up the Eurocentric model 
become theirs. This, in turn, permits us to look to the Eurocentric paradigm’s content to 
affirm racial categories. 
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The problem of reification also emerges as Asante attempts to link the white 
racial group to a particular culture and its products. He states, “…teachers do not have to 
think about using the white child’s culture to empower the white child. The white child’s 
language is the language of the classroom. Information that is being conveyed is “white” 
cultural information in most cases.”
41
 It is important to recognize here that Asante’s 
position is not that teachers are promoting the language as white, nor is he claiming that 
teachers are disseminating cultural products to students as white culture. Rather, he is 
asserting that the language and culture of the classroom are white. In doing this, Asante is 
both affirming the concept of race and applying the boundaries of its reification to 
include linguistic and cultural productions.  
Asante’s racial affirmation of the black racial category differs from the treatment 
that he gives to the white racial category. Asante’s reification of “African American” 
shows a historical basis as he attempts to connect the lives of contemporary African 
Americans to greater Africa via ancestral lineage. Asante states, “Naturally, the person of 
African descent should be centered in his or her historical experiences as an African.”
42
  
However, this treatment also suggests an essentialist element to his belief that there is 
something that should connect the African-American child to Africa and in his belief that 
this something is ideal. It appears that, for Asante, this idealized element should exist for 
African Americans in spite of the intentional ethno-cultural genocide committed against 
sub-Saharan Africans. This genocide meant the enslavement, devaluation, and 
displacement of peoples from a variety of ethnic backgrounds followed by the deliberate 
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destruction of their cultural productions (language, social and moral communities, 
spiritual practices, values, customs, etc.). Furthermore, it is clear that he believes that this 
essentialist element should exist regardless of the linguistic and cultural indoctrination of 
post-slavery African Americans carried out by Eurocentric education and by the white 
supremacist societal culture. Even if African Americans were a people, they were not 
culturally the same people as their African ancestors. However, Asante’s model 
diminishes the content of the actual lives of African American students while elevating 
an abstracted historical Africa.  
Asante’s essentialist conception of race cuts quite deeply into who African 
Americans supposedly are intrinsically. When explaining the cultural dislocation of 
contemporary African Americans from their African ancestry, he offers the following 
psychological account of what he calls the “African American psyche”:  
“The African person was physically separated from place, from culture, and from 
traditions. In the Americas, the African person was punished for remembering 
Africa. Drums were outlawed in most of the colonies soon after the arrival of 
large numbers of Africans. And since the drum was an instrument intimate to the 
cultural transmission of values and traditions, its disappearance was one of the 
great losses in the African-American psyche.”
43
 
Here, Asante presents an account of race in which the cultural productions are 
inherently tied to a distinct ontology. The oppression of African slaves—the suppression 
of their cultural products, has a consequence in the psychology of the contemporary 
African American. Asante fails to ground these consequences to the physical or social 
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world. He provides no account of what constitutes the African American psyche, much 
less an account of how the loss of drums and the cultural content for which they act as a 
conduit constitute a loss for this psyche. There is certainly little doubt that a loss of 
culture would have a psychological impact on the persons who actually practice that 
culture. However, to state that this loss amounts to a psychological deficit in descendents 
generations removed is to suggest the presence of a deeper metaphysics at play--
something beyond the physical that links past and present psycho-metaphysical 
dispositions and that links those dispositions to culture. 
It could be argued that Asante is simply providing a rich account of ethnicity. He 
certainly speaks of larger groups, whites and African Americans as if they were 
ethnicities. I contend, however, that it is more probable that he is conflating race, 
ethnicity, and culture. His use of culture and over-generalized ethnicities ultimately hold 
up the concept of race because they are structurally congruent to race. This is supported 
by Asante’s synonymous usage of Black with African/African American and White with 
European. Africa and Europe are not places that have distinct cultures. Rather, they are 
continents made up of many countries with large numbers of ethnic groups, languages, 
and cultures. Asante’s use of these designators is more consistent with the traditional 
account of race in the United States, where African descent is all that is required to 
determine black personhood. Indeed, he makes no mention of persons with both 
European and African ancestries. Consequently, there is no explanation of how one’s 
“Africanness” gets positioned qualitatively in relation to one’s “Europeanness” (or any 
other “ness”). However, given Asante’s adherence to the traditional axioms of race for 
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both whites and blacks, it is safe to infer that African ancestry overrides all other 
ancestry.  
Asante’s designation “African-American” entails an essentialist component that 
constitutes what we are intrinsically. His underlying assertion is that this component is 
suppressed within blacks by white supremacist hegemony, even if blacks are unaware of 
this suppression. In other words, they are being alienated from their true selves as blacks. 
The implicit goal of Afrocentric education is to replace this component in ontologically 
deficient blacks. Thus, race for Asante is not simply substantive in that it constitutes what 
blacks are intrinsically, it is also normative inasmuch as it determines what people should 
be ideally. So, Asante’s reification of race would permit teachers, as it does with him, to 
have the theoretical ground to say to their students, “That culture is your culture” to 
students who do not practice, understand, or know about the existence of that culture or 
the socio-historical formation of that culture. 
  It follows from Asante’s metaphysical account of the African American psyche 
and from his normative claim that blacks should be centered as African, that there must 
be a correct way to be black or a correct way for blacks to be—a substantively mandated, 
normative blueprint for ideal racial action. If “black” or “African” were an ideal 
metaphysical ontology, then it would make sense that blacks educated under a “white 
supremacist paradigm” would likely deviate from Asante’s racial blueprint, therefore 
violating the demands of their ontology. This is in essence what Asante is suggesting. 
Further evidence that Asante adheres to this view emerges as he discusses 
consequences of European universalism that he believes to accompany the Eurocentric 
paradigm. He explains that this universalism is why “some scholars and artists of African 
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descent rush to deny their Blackness,” and prefer “European art, language, and culture 
over African art, language, and culture”—people who “believe that anything of European 
origin is inherently better than anything produced by or issuing from their own people.”
44
  
Here Asante’s Afrocentricity reveals an axiomatic racial essentialism in which persons of 
“African descent” who may prefer “European” forms of art are accused of denying what 
appears to be a true fixed racial ontology--blackness. This shows, once again, that race, 
for Asante, constitutes personhood and the properties of that personhood are extended to 
particular cultural productions. In this case, black personhood is attached to black cultural 
productions. The implication is that one’s “blackness” should govern particular actions, 
specifically those toward or against particular cultural products. So, Asante’s Afrocentric 
approach appears to be more than a challenge to the Eurocentric paradigm as socializing 
system. It is a challenge to the Eurocentric paradigm as a white paradigm that suppresses 
black racial ontology. 
Both the Eurocentric model and Asante’s Afrocentric remedy impose value-laden, 
racial truths. The Eurocentric approach selectively places values on some European and 
European-influenced knowledge—knowledge that affirms its superior positioning. It 
marginalizes knowledge that problematizes or fails to affirm it. As a consequence, it 
devalues those persons assigned racial identities associated with that excluded knowledge 
and forces their adherence to Eurocentric values and epistemology. Thus, it affirms both 
white and Eurocentric as the standard for all.  
Asante’s strategically oppositional approach is more overt as it creates the 
problem of reification. As it tries to dismantle white supremacist education, it constructs 
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ethno-racial identities as ideal types for black students. It is African-centered or more 
succinctly, “black-centered,” and it creates racial axioms for “black authenticity” and 
“black performance.” So, the ultimate qualitative deviation of Asante’s Afrocentric 
education from Eurocentric education is that it is not an interracially hegemonic paradigm 
that facilitates the structuring of races hierarchically. Instead, the Afrocentric paradigm 
makes Afrocentricity, itself, the authority for an intra-racial hegemony for blacks. It 
structures blacks that fall under it hierarchically based on their adherence to its 
ontological dictates.  
 One reason I chose Asante’s Afrocentric education for this analysis is because his 
conception of Afrocentricity is quite influential within critical theory in education. 
Additionally, as we have also witnessed with Ladson-Billings, the way in which the 
problem of reification surfaces in his work represents both a trend and tendency reflected 
within critical theory. In particular, this includes the affixing of racial categories to 
particular ethnicities and/or cultures and the treatment of ethnicity and culture as static 
entities fixed by racial boundaries and made up of racial properties. These tendencies are 
present even as the theory itself attempts to escape essentialist conceptions of race. Such 
is the case with critical multiculturalists, Joe L. Kincheloe and Shirley R. Steinberg, who 
oppose essentialist Afrocentric approaches, but still fail to avoid reaffirming and 





Critical Multiculturalism: Race and Affirmation 
In the book Changing Multiculturalism, Joe Kincheloe and Shirley Steinberg 
present a view of critical multiculturalism that is suspicious of the essentialism found in 
some leftist multicultural theory in education, such as Afrocentric theory, to address 
oppressed groups. They state that  
“left-essentialist multiculturalists often connect differences to a historical past of 
cultural authenticity where the essence of a particular identity was developed – an 
essence that transcends history, social context, and power. Such essences can 
become quite authoritarian when constructed around a romanticized golden era, 
nationalistic pride, and a positionality of purity that denies competing axes of 
identity….”
45
   
   So, already we find that the Afrocentricity of theorists like Molefi Asante would 
come under this critique as he firmly roots the essentialist ideal of blackness in similarly 
essentialized, historical Africa. Moreover, the axiomatic aspects of Asante’s reification of 
blackness reflects a diminishing of other possible identities that may be in competition 
with the Afrocentric identity, such as the one that could explain why a black individual 
may have a preference for European cultural products. Indeed, Kincheloe and Steinberg 
further contend that the tendency to romanticize essentialist multicultural theories can 
lead to various intra-group issues. Groups privilege some forms of knowledge and 
identity over others, even as groups are bound together by circumstances. So, for 
example, Afrocentric essentialist theory, might not allow the Afrocentric GLBT (gay, 
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lesbian, bisexual, transgender), gender, multi-racial knowledge to share the same status 
as, let us say, an Afrocentric, gender-neutral, heterosexual based knowledge. As a result 
this would create a selective and incomplete version of an African-centered worldview. 
The voices and socio-historical knowledge of “bi-racial,” homosexual, females would be 
subjugated and therefore take on inferior status within the theory.
46
   
  Kincheloe and Steinberg also argue that the romanticization in these types of 
essentialist theories show a propensity to offer authoritative privilege to identity itself, 
leaving group members to have to fight for what is or should be considered the authentic 
identity.
47
  They maintain that critical multiculturalists show suspicion of this one-
dimensional authority and thus make it a priority to understand the internal arrangement 
of identities within groups. Moreover, they assert that a goal of critical multiculturalism 




In describing aspects of their vision of critical multiculturalism, Kincheloe and 
Steinberg stress that it is the job of critical multiculturalism to produce a curriculum that 
attempts to know and understand the subjugated knowledge of oppressed groups. 
Furthermore, it is important for this curriculum to explore the consequences of that 
subjugation and the relationship between the knowledge of the oppressed and the 
knowledge of the oppressors.
49
 To accomplish this task, Kincheloe and Steinberg argue 
that a critical multicultural curriculum must escape the dominant Eurocentric frame of 
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reference that has diminished and brought harm to the lives of those in marginalized 
groups. Therefore, a critical multicultural curriculum is centered from the perspectives of 
these marginalized groups to mitigate the damage and diminishment they have incurred 
as oppressed people within American society.
50
  
As I have stated, Kincheloe and Steinberg are suspicious of Afrocentric theory 
because it can exhibit a type of essentialism that privileges some forms of knowledge 
over others. This does not mean, however, that Afrocentrism has no place in their critical 
multiculturalism. While they do not advocate a strategic paradigm shift from the 
Eurocentric to the Afrocentric framework, they consider Afrocentrism a valuable 
resource to garner knowledge that exposes the real life circumstances of blacks as an 
oppressed group.
 51
 In their view, Afrocentrism is deeply tuned in with what is taking 
place for black people as it “understands the intimate connection between the economic 
and social stresses that afflict black communities in Western society” as well as having 
and understanding knowledge of the “the crises of knowledge and human meaning that 
subvert the culture’s ability and/or willingness to respond to the chaos.”
52
 For Kincheloe 
and Steinberg, people such as rappers, reggae artists and critical black economic theorists 
act as the voices of Afrocentrism that convey information through their creative 
“protests” and pointed analysis. These Afrocentric agents are able to inform critical 
multiculturalism of circumstantial and psychological effects of racism of black youth and 
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as well as show them how to create countercultural students who are able to disrupt the 
institutionalized status quo that harms them.
53
  
Furthermore, Kincheloe and Steinberg also believe that, as a marginalized 
perspective, Afrocentrism can prove useful in informing the content of what they call a 
“curriculum of affirmation” for blacks.
54
 They state, 
“As a critical multiculturalist curriculum explores the degradation of Africanness 
in Western societies, it concurrently looks at the genius of things African for the 
purpose of providing affirmational experiences for black students. Critical 
multiculturalists want children of African descent (and children from other 




In addition, Kincheloe and Steinberg hold that a critical multicultural curriculum 
can draw from the African tradition and “diasporic tradition” to “affirm individuality and 
collectivity” and to provide uplifting narratives from the past that will help contemporary 
black youth contend with the conditions of their oppression.
56
 This curriculum also looks 
towards contemporary activities and productions for black affirmation. They state that 
this curriculum of black affirmation operates as “a black studies programme that overtly 
forges connections between academia and everyday black life, black cultural productions. 
Drawing upon the collective experience in life and literature, the curriculum induces 
students to re-examine their lives from an Afrocentric perspective.”
57
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Kincheloe and Steinberg also operationalize what they refer to as “the black 
aesthetic” for this curriculum. This aesthetic encompasses creative forms such as jazz, 
hip-hop, “black literature,” and “black film.”
 58
 According to Kincheloe and Steinberg, it 
can operate as an affirmation agent as it facilitates for black youth the ability to 
experience the world through an African vantage point. Furthermore, this aesthetic is able 
to convey types of collective sentiments; examples are hip-hop as an expression of “black 
rage” and jazz conveying “black pain.”
 59
  
While Kincheloe and Steinberg acknowledge the realness of race in American life 
and its centrality to the lives of many people, they reject race as a legitimate biological 
entity, insisting, as I have, that these essentialized categories are maintained by political 
and social structures.
60
 Unfortunately, however, their critical multiculturalism appears to 
betray these sentiments. If we look closely at the theoretical implications of their critical 
multiculturalism, we find that their treatment of blacks provides affirmation and 
reconstitution of the race concept.  
We first find the problem of reification in Kincheloe and Steinberg’s approach as 
they set boundaries around racial identities. Now, as I have shown, they are quite mindful 
of how theory can constrict and privilege knowledge when engaging marginalized 
groups, such as blacks. The way in which they sidestep this problem is by constructing a 
conception of race, for blacks, that is seemingly inclusive of a broader amount of content. 
Prima facie, their use of the racial category “black” does not necessarily reflect anything 
other than a socially constructed designation. However, their knowledge about blacks as 
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an oppressed group is informed by what they consider Afrocentric voices. I have shown 
that Kincheloe and Steinberg believe that Afrocentricity, given the authoritative nature of 
its essentialism, can privilege identity, limit knowledge, and set standards for 
particularistic forms of authenticity. It is, therefore, questionable that they would use 
Afrocentrism as the primary reference to learn about the lives and situations of black 
people given that the sources of this knowledge (rappers, reggae artists, jazz musicians) 
would theoretically be of an ideologically constricted type. In doing this, Kincheloe and 
Steinberg, themselves, are privileging ideological intermediaries to gain knowledge about 
the existential lives of blacks, writ large. They are, in essence, filtering knowledge and as 
a result, creating a deceptively broad, essentialized narrative of black existence. In this 
regard, Kincheloe and Steinberg’s approach does not deviate from left essentialist 
theories as they too allow particular identities to represent a diverse group. In privileging 
the knowledge gathered and expressed by these Afrocentric voices as representative of 
blacks, that knowledge affirms the racial boundaries of that group. 
So far, I have described what I regard as Kincheloe and Steinberg’s inadvertent 
affirmation of race through their reification of the circumstances of blacks. Taken alone, 
it is plausible that this may not provide conclusive evidence of these theorists’ deep 
entanglement with the problem of reification. One could argue that my criticism only 
reveals a miscalculation in strategy as they attempt to account for the experiences of a 
more diverse array of black persons. To this, I respond, that while certain theory 
constricts the terms of group identity and membership for blacks, this primarily bears 
relevancy to intragroup and intergroup dynamics. These dynamics have always been in 
flux and possess minimal impact on the structure of race itself. Kincheloe and Steinberg’s 
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approach presents a conception of race as a diverse, yet fixed category that affirms what 
the reified conception of the black racial group has always been--a broadly encompassing 
biologically grounded, fixed category with a diverse membership. So, the structure of 
race in their theory remains relatively stable. Where these theorists fall short in this 
regard is by essentializing the conditions of some blacks and extending the essence to 
encompass all blacks. This mirrors the treatment of the black racial concept within 
societal culture, where we apply the lives, activities, and circumstances of some to the 
whole, for better or worse. 
It is certainly possible that Kincheloe and Steinberg would also rely on other 
sources of knowledge to inform critical multiculturalism about the existential conditions 
of blacks. However, in their treatise on critical multiculturalism, Kincheloe and Steinberg 
overwhelming privilege Afrocentric conduits of knowledge to report these conditions. 
Furthermore, as they continue to utilize Afrocentrism to address these conditions as they 
relate to black students, a deeper affirmation of race emerges from their theoretical 
framework. There is a broadening in function of Afrocentrism as Kincheloe and 
Steinberg lay out the curriculum of black affirmation. We discover this shift as they 
provide the framework for this curriculum, which incidentally is very similar in structure 
and purpose to Asante’s Afrocentric approach. Both approaches operate from the view 
that Eurocentrism has damaged black students in some regard and that as a result, black 
students are in need of affirmation. Furthermore, the nature of their remedies is an 
implementation of Afrocentric education that will affirm the black student, as black.  
In the previous section, I demonstrated how Asante’s Afrocentric education is 
implicitly intended to correct an ontological deficiency in black students. We can infer 
 
 56 
from Kincheloe and Steinberg’s position that black students should be affirmed with 
African curriculum, that there already is some ontological connection with an abstracted 
Africa. This also represents a conflation between race (black) and ethnicity (African). It 
is similar to what arises in Asante’s Afrocentrism where a person’s “blackness” 
necessitates their connection to Africa, African knowledge, and culture. However, in this 
regard, Kincheloe and Steinberg go further than Asante. Not only do they regard African 
content as ideal for a curriculum of black affirmation, they also employ reified concepts 
such as “the black experience” and “black productions” toward this end. So, while 
Kincheloe and Steinberg’s goal may be to affirm black students to help strengthen and 
better equip them to overcome the harms that they have incurred, their project 
inadvertently affirms ethno-racial ontology and extends that ontology to cultural 
productions. 
  An aspect of Kincheloe and Steinberg’s curriculum that further undermines their 
resistance of essentialism is found in their referencing of “the black aesthetic” or “black 
pain” and subsequent treatment of these abstractions as things in themselves. These 
reifications are comparable in nature to Asante’s transcendent, African/African-American 
psyche. The primary difference is that Asante’s psyche extends chronologically starting 
with Africans of the past to present day African Americans. Kincheloe and Steinberg’s 
reifications are more generalized racial abstractions that capture essentialized collective 
sentiments and productions, to which black students are supposedly able to relate by 
virtue of their racial ontology. So, while critical multiculturalism’s curriculum of black 
affirmation rejects the legitimacy of essentialist, biological races, it manages to ground 
persons by their biological, phenotype (skin color) and genotype (African ancestry) and 
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assign them reified racial dispositions and cultural abstractions. What does this mean for 
black students and non-white students? This “knowledge” about racial aesthetics, 
dispositions, and feelings, constructs an epistemological and ontological barricade around 
black people that prevents others from fully entering. With their production-end 
otherization of blacks, Kincheloe and Steinberg ignore that in reality these things are 
constructed in dialogue with others and are therefore unreflective of the actual social, 
cultural, ethnic, and even biological syncretism that may lead to their production.  
This reductionist sentiment is further illuminated as Kincheloe and Steinberg 
assertion that rap is “Truly a black art form” and therefore “cannot be easily ‘covered’ 
(appropriated) by white musicians-the short-lived career of Vanilla Ice being no 
exception.”
61
 The obvious implication of this argument, and quip about Vanilla Ice, a 
white rapper, is that there is some metaphysical ownership over cultural products because 
they act as reflections of a “black aesthetic.” Furthermore, it suggests that it is easier for a 
person who shares the “black aesthetic” to change art forms within this racial diaspora of 
productions, as long as that newly chosen art form is fixed by black racial perimeters. For 
instance, a black jazz pianist who decides to become a rapper will require less effort than 
a white person in the same position, because rap and jazz contain the same essentialist 
black aesthetic. On the other hand, If we follow Kincheloe and Steinberg’s logic, a white 
person who appreciates rap music will have a more difficult time participating in that art 
form because it is “truly black” and she is not.  This implanting of essence into cultural 
products constructs a reified conception of race that is self-affirming. As it embeds the 
racial essence into a type of aesthetic production, that production subsequently gets 
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assigned to that corresponding racial group. Racial members own its production and thus 
when they produce it, it becomes a reflection of their race. 
Racial reifications are like attempted snapshots of reality--abstractions. When 
they fail, there are often consequences. Kincheloe and Steinberg’s assertion that rap is a 
“truly black art form” is a prime example of this failure. As Peter McLaren more 
accurately points out “rap music developed among relocated black [Caribbean] and 
Puerto Rican male youths of the South Bronx….”
62
 As a consequence of the racial 
reification of this particular cultural product, various individual and socio-cultural 
influences are suppressed in the abstracted narrative. The result is students from 
marginalized groups, such as Puerto Ricans, perhaps in need of affirmation, are forced to 
vie for entry into a narrative locked by race. Kincheloe and Steinberg’s racial 
essentializing is subject to the same criticism that they offer left-essentialist 
multiculturalism in that it suppresses “competing axes” of knowledge and identity. 
Kincheloe and Steinberg, like all critical theorists, are attempting to examine and 
engage the circumstances of marginalized groups within complex and rugged political, 
socio-cultural terrain. Thus, it is understandable that there is a tendency to address the 
conditions and consequences with politicized conceptualizations of these groups. 
However, the problem of racial reification that permeates our society makes it difficult, 
as I have shown, for theorists to separate the essentialist conceptions of race from those 
politicized conceptions of race. By politically (diasporically) essentializing sentiments, 
dispositions, experiences, and creative forms using the traditional racial boundaries and 
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rules (inclusion of certain forms under a racial fixed umbrella), Kincheloe and 
Steinberg’s affirmation of race acts as a demonstration of this difficulty. 
Politicizing The Racial Binary 
As I have stated, the penchant of critical theory to present politicized conceptions 
of marginalized groups is understandable. However, there is a tendency to politicize the 
mundanity of life using well-intentioned, agenda-driven racial narratives. In some 
contexts, ordinary acts such as going to work, working at home, taking care of children, 
going to jail, having sex, playing music, get filtered through a critical ideology and thus 
get characterized as representative expressions of broader essentialized political themes 
such as: “feminist struggle,” “class resistance,” or the “demonstration of the communal 
bond of the African American family.” 
We find examples of this as critical pedagogist, Peter McLaren, offers analysis 
from his semiotic investigation of hip-hop. He states, 
“Rap helps to communicate symbols and meanings and articulates    
intersubjectively the lived experience of social actors. The ontological status of 
the gangsta rapper resides in the function of the commodity of blackness, but a 
certain quality of blackness that is identified through the expressive codes of the 
rapper is the “inner turmoil” of the oppressed black subject of history.”
63
  
This example demonstrates a unique departure from Kincheloe and Steinberg’s 
treatment of the black rapper in that McLaren recognizes that the ontology of the rapper 
is contingent upon a commoditized blackness—a prepackaged construct with the intent to 
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sell. Kincheloe and Steinberg fail to acknowledge this potential aspect of their black 
rapper and arguably they, themselves, commoditize the blackness of their subject as they 
authorize her position as a medium of knowledge about racial circumstances and as a 
conduit to express to black students “black pain” and “black rage.”  However, McLaren 
appears to re-converge with Kincheloe and Steinberg as he, too, identifies the rapper as 
expressing sentiment through his blackness, in this case, the “inner turmoil” of a broader 
black racial group. 
It is certainly possible that cultural forms and their expressions, even when 
racially reified, can provide useful information about real life, as they have with the three 
aforementioned theorists. However, these reifications can hinder the gathering of 
penetrating and nuanced insight into the complex lives of individuals. This is because the 
expressed knowledge and its human medium(s) get dispersed within the political 
narrative of that reification’s essence. So, McLaren’s gangsta rapper (and expression) 
gets enveloped into “the inner turmoil of the black subject of history” in the same way 
that Kincheloe and Steinberg’s rapper (and expression) become enclosed in “the black 
aesthetic.” The actual individual and the complexities and nuances of her life get 
diminished while her essentialist racial category gets affirmed. 
What often gets ignored as a consequence of this political essentializing of 
knowledge are the multiplicity of variables that push people towards particular cultural 
products—ordinary reasons such as boredom, trends, curiosity, racial authenticity, peer 
pressure, countercultural expression, etc. Consider, for example, the 1980’s, when rap 
was beginning to gain acceptance in mainstream venues like MTV, but often promoted as 
racialized content (black music). As gangsta rap was introduced into my relatively small, 
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semi-rural, hometown in Tennessee so were the behaviors, attitudes, and fashion 
displayed in its music and/or its corresponding music videos. Responding to these 
images, many young black males started to emulate Los Angeles gangs like the “Crips” 
and “Bloods.” It became “cool” to carry guns, sell drugs, display misogynistic attitudes, 
and even go to jail (which became a badge of honor). These cultural products were 
marketed as belonging to them, as black, despite their not residing in circumstances 
similar to those in inner city Los Angeles.  
In this example, the broader socio-political circumstances, both in its maintenance 
of a racial paradigm that assigns races to particular cultural products and its 
commodifying of blackness (among various other related factors), no doubt facilitated the 
establishment of new axiomatic identities for black authenticity. However, the actual 
taking up of these identities was usually no more of a political expression than following 
any other cultural trend. In fact, it was likely the ordinariness of all of these 
circumstances that made it easy to transition into these identities and that made it difficult 
for their parents to address effectively. Narratives like this one are likely too close to the 
ground for encapsulation by politicized, racial abstractions, which typically speak and 
interpret for persons, rather than let those persons speak for themselves.  
Another issue is that “black identity” has been interpreted through what I would 
call an “American Freedom Narrative.”  A freedom narrative, in its most positive form, 
centers blacks always within the context of liberation, Emancipation and the Civil Rights 
movement, etc. This narrative has been exemplified by the critical theorists that I have 
covered thus far, where black peoples’ lives are never presented as ordinary, but rather, 
as inherently or ideally political—always struggling or always in need of racial 
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affirmation to struggle harder for freedom. McLaren’s rapper’s expression of blackness, 
serves as an example of this narrative. 
Critical theory can sometimes play a game of opposites when it comes to race. In 
his book, Life In Schools: An Introduction to Critical Pedagogy in the Foundations of 
Education, McLaren engages the concept of “whiteness.” In addressing the tendency 
within education theory to focus on diversity, he asserts that the focus of multiculturalism 
be turned towards “the analysis of white ethnicity, the destabilization of white identity, 
specifically white supremacist ideology and practice.”
64
 Whiteness, he describes, is a 




McLaren’s more detailed outline of whiteness represents an overwhelmingly 
active and negative portrait of whiteness. It is, in sum, a malleable, ethnic, hegemonic 
type of consciousness that otherizes, dominates, and demoralizes non-whites, 
homosexuals, and women and that facilitates capitalist exploitation. Thus, he regards the 
taking up of this identity as to situating oneself at the top of the white supremacist 
hierarchy. Moreover, for a white person to attempt to take up a raced identity (black or 
brown), in McLaren’s view is to deny one’s responsibility for white supremacy.
66
 He, 
therefore, recommends that we move toward the “denial, disassembly, and destruction of 
whiteness as we know it and advocate its rearticulation as a form of critical agency 
dedicated to social struggle in the interests of the oppressed.”
67
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Before continuing my analysis of McLaren’s treatment of race, it is important to 
note that he considers race a social construct, even cautioning against using it as “an 
analytic category without qualification because race has no biological basis or 
philosophical legitimacy.”
68
 He states that race should always be problematized and even 




  That being said, an interesting aspect of his description of whiteness, a conception 
that appears frequently within critical theory, is that it treats it as something occupied—
something that can be taken on, taken off, manipulated, and reconfigured for particular 
ends. “Whiteness” is a useful device that helps persons reflect how their own social 
ontology might privilege them and how their identity might make them active 
participants of a larger paradigmatic white supremacy. As a powerful tool, it resonates 
with students. So, there is sometimes value in using reified conceptualizations as devices 
to help us comprehend and explain the social and political circumstances of groups.  
Like any other reification, however, there is a risk of using racial reifications, 
even for heuristic purposes. This is because they can fail to fully connect with what is 
actually taking place on the ground. It is true that in the United States races have been 
organized asymmetrically and in opposition to one another. McLaren’s political 
reification of whiteness effectively captures these aspects of the race construct as they 
can operate between the white and black racial groups. It does not, however, 
acknowledge that people are typically situated accidentally. No one chooses his or her 
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place within the racial hierarchy.
70
  The acquisition of privilege and oppression are like 
games of chance--matters of luck; this is the case even if the dice were loaded by some 
evil genius prior to the players coming to the table, or in this case, their birth. No matter 
how unfair and asymmetrical reality actually is, employing reified oppositional identities 
places intent at the table. Thus, racial opposition itself gets affirmed and justified because 
these identities permit the accidental to appear intentional.  
Being part of a non-raced groups means that many whites do not see themselves 
as privileged or as affirming the status quo. Most are likely unaware of it. They do not 
realize that the dice are loaded, so they keep rolling and often, depending on their own 
socio-economic circumstances, win. Similarly, many blacks may feel that whites are 
cheating them or benefitting at their expense. Many whites, not understanding that they 
benefit from their designation, feel like they are being unfairly accused. The 
consequences are unbalanced, but both of these viewpoints and positions within the 
paradigm are unfair. 
Both the fetishizing and devaluing of particular racial identities by scholars 
maintains the status quo by treating the racial categorizations themselves as valid. 
Furthermore, it underestimates the nuance of racial identity by failing to address the 
potentiality for non-whites socialized within the same paradigm to internalize and affirm 
oppressive values. Students, white and non-whites, are victims of the racial circumstances 
supported by their surrounding social, political, and cultural environment. The political 
essentializing of race carried out by many critical scholars neglects this victimization.  
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I contend that the omission that blacks and whites are victims of white supremacy 
is precisely how race gets reaffirmed and reconstituted in McLaren’s works. If we look at 
the way that race is constructed and viewed in our society, this becomes clearer. Whites, 
for instance, are treated as though they are rational, with a broad range of choices, 
desires, and emotions. Moreover, whites can operate in society with a high degree of 
racial anonymity because they are racially unlinked to the aforementioned variables. This 
is because “white” is the default racial category that acts as an indicator for a collective of 
individuals. If a white person becomes a scholar, she is not considered a white scholar, 
white musician, or white politician. When a white person commits a crime, it is not seen 




Blacks on the other hand lack this variability and anonymity. They are not viewed 
as individuals, but as a group. Thus, they are treated as representatives of the black race. 
As a result, their actions are often considered expressions of their blackness if those 
particular expressions are in keeping with how society links those expressions or their 
means of expression. This is likely the reason why some blacks feel as though they to 
have to regulate their thoughts and emotions around whites for fear of being labeled “an 
angry black man/woman.”  
These are important elements found within the mainstream conception of race. 
McLaren simply problematizes the value system. However, aside of assigning 
responsibility to whites for their whiteness, assigning the negative aspects of society to 
whites, he maintains a mirror image and internal structural blueprint of traditional racial 
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ontology. Whiteness is treated as something that one rationally occupies or chooses not to 
occupy, while blackness, as shown with his gangsta rapper, is treated as something 
expressed, something intrinsic, something representative of the whole. 
Assigning politicized identities and narratives to racial groups reinforces, instead 
of problematizing the legitimacy of their boundaries. In addition, it inserts meaning 
within boundaries to share space with the properties already accompanying race. 
Applying reified political content to racial groups, thus, is no different than assigning 
fixed cultures or fixed ethnicities to racial groups as they both reinforce the idea that 
races are monolithic groups. They all require the invoking of essence when reifying 
already reified groups. 
Conclusion 
In this chapter, I investigated the problem of reification as it emerges from within 
critical theory in education. As we have seen with each of the theorists I have examined, 
there is difficulty in fully disengaging from the reified conception of race found within 
American society. Most often this was found where there was an ambiguous relationship 
between race and ethnicity or culture, or where race is assigned ethnicity or culture, or 
where there is politicization of race that mirrors the traditional race concept. In the next 
chapter, I show that a significant reason why the problem of reification arises within 
critical theory in education in the manner that it does is directly related to important 






HISTORICAL UNDERPINNINGS OF THE PROBLEM OF 




In Chapter Two, I examined how the problem of reification arises within critical 
theory in education. As I have demonstrated, this occurs within often-confused 
relationship between race, ethnicity, and culture and through the employment of political 
reifications of race that are not fully extricated from our culturally reified conception of 
race. While the problem of racial reification is prevalent in educational theory, it is not a 
new problem. After all, only in recent decades have we had the scientific tools available 
to investigate the biological soundness of the race concept. Historically, education 
theorists often operated under the assumption that race is a biological reality or they 
regarded the question of whether race is real inconsequential to the real life 
circumstances facing blacks at the time. So, some degree of maintenance of the race 
concept was unavoidable. 
A troubling aspect of today’s critical theory in education is that is has not 
managed to disengage from the aforementioned theory, despite what we currently know 
about the race construct. Indeed, the contemporary approach to race actually reflects the 
discourse taking place within the first half of the 20
th
 century. In this chapter, I attempt to 
show that the problem of reification as it emerges from contemporary critical theory in 
education is a consequence of the historical trajectory in liberatory black education that 
preceded it. I will accomplish this task by 1) examining important events and 
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developments in the history of black education, 2) investigating the theoretical 
underpinnings that shaped these events, 3) exploring the theoretical and active responses 
to these events and 4) showing how aspects of these events and the responses to them 
informs and influences critical theory in education as it attempts to address similar 
problems related to the education of blacks. 
I further contend that considering the historical foundations of black education 
that I shall present, critical theory in education must begin to extricate itself from these 
foundations. I argue that this disengagement is necessary in order to gain a richer, more 
updated, and nuanced understanding of the race concept that will provide a more in-depth 
view of how or whether it should permeate contemporary theory. To begin this 
undertaking, let us first examine black education coming out of the Reconstruction era of 
America history. 
The Hampton Approach 
Soon after the Civil War and the abolishment of slavery in southern states, former 
slaves began to seek universal education that would include blacks. Within a short period 
of time, this idea had gathered an irreversible momentum as it gained support not only 
from blacks but also from white Southerners. This development worried members of the 
Southern white planter class facing a potential socio-economic shift brought about by the 
emancipation of black slaves who once tended their lands for planter profit. The question 
became, if blacks become educated, how would this labor vacuum be filled?
72
 The 
answer to this question buttressed one of the most important events in the history of black 
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education; that is, Samuel Chapman Armstrong’s, a Northern white philanthropist, 
founding of the Hampton Normal and Agricultural Institute in 1868 in Virginia.
73
   
Hampton was a school intended to train potential teachers to provide black children with 
an industrial education, a curriculum that would have students learning various trades and 
forms of manual labor.
74
 Historian James D. Anderson states that the main task of the 
school  
“was to work the prospective teachers long and hard so that they would embody, 
accept, and preach an ethic of hard toil or the ‘dignity of labor.’ Then, and only 
then, believed Armstrong, could his normal school graduates develop the 




Hampton-educated teachers would essentially act as Armstrong’s ideological 
ambassadors to the black populace. Teacher success in this capacity means that the 
Hampton model would appease both the needs of white planters and blacks. On one hand, 
blacks would have their right to universal education. On the other hand, the planter class 
would have new obedient, hardworking black laborers with a strong commitment to the 
value of work, thus maintaining some degree of the pre-existing socio-economic caste.
76
  
It is important to note, however, that Armstrong’s philosophy of education went 
beyond the needs of the planter class. His conservative agenda also discouraged blacks 
from taking part in any important aspects of public life, such as participating in politics, 
                                                 
73
 Ibid., 33. 
74
 Ibid., 34. 
75
 Ibid., 34. 
76
 Ibid., 28- 36. 
 
 70 
voting, or any other activities that could facilitate the disruption of the social order. 
Hence, the Hampton ideology fulfilled a broader purpose; to continue the subordination 
of blacks for the political, economic, and social desires of whites.
77
  
Armstrong’s beliefs regarding racial ontology were crucial to the foundations of 
the Hampton ideology. As a consequence of both subjugation and pre-enslavement 
practice of what he regarded as “paganism,” blacks were a morally deficient race. In 
contrast, Armstrong considered whites superior to blacks because they were permitted to 
develop morally over generations. He estimated that it would take centuries for blacks to 
become a moral and civilized race. Moreover, the white race’s superiority mandated that 
they continue to govern over blacks while this development progresses. Hence, in 
Armstrong’s view, the ontological status of black was sufficient enough justification to 




Incidentally, Armstrong’s contention that slavery had caused moral defect in 
blacks contradicts his remedy to correct it. He believed that labor had instilled what 
limited moral virtue blacks had acquired. Thus, a Hampton-based industrial-moral 
education as James Anderson states, would “ultimately prepare blacks for self 
government.”
79
 However, for Armstrong, “the right industrial training would make them 
an economic asset instead of a burden to the south.”
80
 So, it is evident that, for 
Armstrong, labor would be the saving grace for blacks. Moreover, the value of blacks 
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rests with the fruit of their toil--moral fruits in which he felt ripe enough that Southern 
whites should take advantage.
81
   
In sum, for Armstrong, the moral inferiority of blacks justified the following: 
servitude, disenfranchisement, education aimed towards strengthening moral sentiment 
toward labor, industrial training, redeployment into the southern labor force, and the 
preservation of white rule. This justification was predicated on a temporally and socially 
contingent conception of a morally compromised black ontology. Taken together, the 
implicit claim of the Hampton idea encompassed by Armstrong’s philosophy of 
education is that racial subjugation against blacks is a moral necessity. Armstrong’s goal 
was to embed this morality into the psyches of black students of Hampton, who would in 
turn spread this philosophy as a black ideology. This ideology was to shape how blacks 
conceive of work and ultimately, how they conceive of themselves as persons. The 
Hampton ideology involved the creation of a self-affirming and self-regulatory 
conscience in blacks. Its purpose was to keep blacks in their place—out of the way of 
whites while simultaneously remaining at their disposal. Moreover, it was to make blacks 
love their place in society and prepare them to go out into the world and teach other 
blacks to honor that place.
82
 
The ideological and ontological exportation of Armstrong’s philosophy to other 
educational institutions marked another important development in black education. 
Underscoring this is the fact that the transmission of this white supremacist model was 
broadcast, facilitated, and endorsed with the help of a black man, Booker T. Washington. 
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Washington was a former student at Hampton who had been transformed by the values 
(self-organization, self-sufficiency, etc.) instilled in him by its praxis. He shared 
Armstrong’s belief that blacks are morally underdeveloped and Armstrong’s view that 
blacks remain excluded from social and political position. However, Washington’s 
reasons for promoting the Hampton ideology were not for the purpose of benefiting 
whites. Rather, he saw this philosophy as a means to improve the circumstances of blacks 
in American society; it was remedy that would progress the moral development of blacks 
just as he felt that it had done for him.
83
  
Washington’s emergence as the poster child for Hampton ideology and his 
willingness to become a fervent vehicle for it demonstrate the ideological effectiveness of 
its schema. In fact, it had so inspired Washington that, according to William H. Watkins, 
“he developed a philosophy of racial uplift that accommodated existing racial or 
economic relations.”
 84
  This philosophy included components of “self-help, hard work, 
and character building”—all crucial elements of the Hampton ideology.
85
 However, 
perhaps a more telling example of Hampton’s impact on Washington was his founding of 
the Tuskegee Normal Institute in Alabama in 1881, an institute that he modeled after 
Hampton.
86
 Tuskegee’s students were given an intellectually non-rigorous liberal 
education in favor of a trade based, labor-intensive education. According to James 
Anderson, for Washington, even a minimalist intellectual education was superfluous to 
the needs of black students. At one point, he even shared responsibility in pushing an 
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initiative to further reduce their education. Tuskegee’s goal under Washington was the 
same as Hampton’s under Armstrong; that is, to create teachers who will spread the word 
about the importance of labor.
87
  
One of the major precedents that this model set for black education was the 
increasingly widespread commitment within education to the idea that the collective-
interest of blacks was to be constituted by and for the self-interest of whites. This is 
demonstrated by the fact that the Hampton idea garnered a great amount of supporters. 
The supporters included the Northern industrialists who, along with many Southern 
whites, shared a desire to maintain the social and racial order by relegating blacks to 
basic fieldwork to further white interests. Thus, the Hampton and Tuskegee models 
necessitated a push to spread the model beyond those two campuses. It was to become a 
quiet, ideological, social movement.
88
  
This proved successful as a broader and stronger surge of black endorsement of 
the Hampton model began to grow, thus strengthening its societal legitimacy. “Racial 
uplift” in the Hampton form, became regarded as in the best interest of many blacks and 
the white powers-that-be in the north and south. This growing sentiment, however, 
entailed an equally influential occurrence in black education; that is, the rise of a counter-
contingency that did not see the Hampton model as something substantively different 
than modern slavery. 
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Liberal Education  
 While there was a growing popularity for the Hampton/Tuskegee idea of 
education, it was not the only educational ideology implemented in the South in the late 
1800’s to early 1900’s. White missionaries and black religious leaders funded black 
universities such as Fisk, Howard, and Virginia Union. These institutes implemented a 
liberal curriculum that was quite different from the Hampton model—a curriculum 
geared towards strengthening and broadening the intellect of black students. Instead of a 
pro-labor curriculum, blacks were taught literature, mathematics, philosophy, natural 
sciences, and foreign language. The intended purpose of this education was the 
production of new, stronger leaders for black people.
 89
 
The missionaries’ granted blacks a broader degree of equality than Armstrong. 
However, Anderson states,  
“Equality was carefully defined as political and legal equality. They [the 
missionaries] consented to inequality in the economic structure, generally shied 
away from questions of racial integration, and were probably convinced that 
blacks’ cultural and religious values were inferior to those of middle-class whites. 
Their liberalism on civil and political questions was matched by their 
conservatism on cultural, religious, and economic matters.”
90
   
In this regard, the missionaries shared both similarities and differences with 
Armstrong. The missionaries were different insofar as they were willing to share some 
social and political power with blacks. However, they were ideologically unified with 
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Armstrong inasmuch as their conception of race also presupposed blacks as morally 
deficient due to socially contingent factors (slavery and religion). This is highlighted in 
both cases by the concerted attempt to construct the lives and characters of black people 
by acculturating them with the “right” qualities that suited the appropriate purposes and 
expectations of whites. To the missionaries, blacks were still considered as childlike, but 
not so much that they could not be expeditiously socialized by a liberal education. This is 
in contradiction to the multi-generational approach to black education implicit in the 
Hampton model. Moreover, blacks were not considered so uncivilized and morally 
bankrupt that they were discouraged from participating in political life. In this way, 
liberal education for blacks was an approach that is antithetical to the desires of the 
Hampton model, the industrial philanthropists, and the Southern planter class who all 
wanted a structure more akin to the pre-civil war status quo—where social harmony 
means one group’s total dominance over another.
91
 
The liberal education model found some success in empowering black students. 
When the Hampton model all but failed, the philanthropic industrialists attempted to 
salvage its basic ideology. Theoretically, it suited their needs despite the fact that 
Hampton was unsuccessful in meeting the contemporary, required, academic standards of 
education. Moreover, Hampton and prospective students began to reject the 
subordination as education model. 
92
 Thus, the philanthropists began to pour their 
resources into other black institutions for purposes of implementing the Hampton idea 
and recreating a new subordinate class of black leaders that would assist in furthering its 
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agenda. Eventually, they were able to gain a foothold at Fisk University and put their 
support behind the university’s similarly minded president, Fayette McKenzie. With 
philanthropist backing, McKenzie offered what amounted to a totalitarian grip on the 
liberally educated black students at Fisk. James Anderson states that McKenzie 
“attempted to repress student initiative, undermine their equalitarian spirit, and control 
their thinking on race relations so as to produce a class of black intellectuals that would 
uncomplainingly accept the southern racial hierarchy.”
93
  However, a successful rebellion 
on the part of the black student body and community against the newly instituted 
oppressive policies procured McKenzie’s resignation.
94
 
These actions by the students were no doubt the type of black leadership that their 
liberal education was supposed to evoke. Unfortunately, the philanthropists were not 
deterred and eventually gained a stronger influence on black colleges, which in turn 
allowed them to employ their retrograde, racist agendas. As a result, students on black 
campuses did not maintain the type of spirit that liberal education was meant to instill in 
them.
 95
 Anderson states, there began to emerge a “certain amount of compromise, 
indifference, apathy, and fear among blacks students.”
 96
 These students (and their 
teachers) were heavily criticized for what was perceived as an acceptance of the social 
status quo, internalizing the values of white benefactors, and their failure “to think and 
act on behalf of the interests of black people.”
97
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The significance of this criticism relates back to the Hampton model. While 
blacks students tried to flourish and get an education in a society that wanted neither for 
them, there was a desire on the part of those who control their lives and shape their 
conception of self. Both the Hampton and liberal philosophies attempted to engineer 
students as active instruments intended to re-enter and shape black society towards the 
desired ends of their educators. Blacks students were being treated as means to an end. 
Under the Hampton ideology, they were political mouthpieces for white hegemony. The 
missionaries’ liberal model of education told a similar story. Only its aim was not 
intended to benefit the white race, but rather make possible the betterment of the black 
race.  
The aforementioned examples demonstrate the willingness within education 
ideology to construct, substantiate, and activate politicized ontologies along racial lines. 
In other words, the goal of these models was to reconstruct the concept of “blackness” or 
“black identity” as a moral and/or political agency (whether for the benefit of blacks or 
whites). This is a characteristic that has been maintained by critical theorists such as 
Ladson-Billings, Asante, and Kincheloe and Steinberg as they put forth their constitutive 
content for black identity; content that is not necessarily reflective of the lives of black 
students, but rather idealized content intended to alter the socio-political order. As I 
continue this analysis, it should become apparent that the conceptualization of black as a 
reified political identity is a constant throughout the history of black education.  
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New Black Intelligentsia 
W.E.B. DuBois 
 The events within liberal education (and its conflict with the formidable Hampton 
ideology) produced two important intellectuals whose influences are still felt both in and 
outside of the academy. The first of these scholars is W.E.B. Du Bois. Du Bois was a 
crucial figure in the struggles that were taking place within liberal institutions, even 
having an active role in such events as the student rebellion against McKenzie at Fisk.
98
 
However, he was better known as a vocal critic of Booker T. Washington, even debating 
Washington publicly over their differing philosophies of black education.  
Du Bois often criticized Washington for his willingness to push the industrial 
education philosophy to the extreme and for his acceptance of black subservience to 
whites, which Du Bois regarded as an accommodation of the white notion of black 
inferiority. Additionally, he took issue with Washington’s advocacy of particular aspects 
of the Hampton philosophy that would bring harm for blacks. These included political 
disenfranchisement, lessening of social standing, economic marginalization, and the 
degradation of black positioning within higher education.
 
He felt that Washington’s 




Du Bois was a strong advocate of a liberal black education for students because, 
as Jacqueline Fleming points out, he felt “liberal arts curriculum best fit the needs of 
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 This was most evident as he pushed the idea that a select group of 
black students should be educated as leaders for the black race. In examining those 
educated blacks that he felt had already contributed to uplifting blacks from their 
circumstances, he describes the role of the leader: 
“he is, as he ought to be, the group leader, the man who sets the ideals of the 
community where he lives, directs his thoughts and heads its social movements. It 
need hardly be argued that the Negro people need social leadership more than 
most groups; that they have no traditions to fall back upon, no established 
customs, no strong family ties, no well defined social classes. All of these things 
must be painfully and slowly evolved.”
101
 
Working from this idealized conception of black leadership and this view of 
blacks, Du Bois felt that the appropriate aim for education is the creation and nurturing of 
what he referred to as the “Talented Tenth.”
102
 These were the black individuals who 
were to be educated and trained with liberal education in universities to become new 
leaders of the black community. They were to go out in the world and help lift the black 
race out of its oppressive circumstances.
103
  
Du Bois believed that among the greatest deficiencies of the black race was a lack 
of “knowledge about life,” poor moral character, and insufficient tools and skills to help 
blacks facilitate their own survival. The education of black children must attend to these 
concerns. He believed that Hampton’s industrial education was insufficient for “civilizing 
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a race of ex-slaves.” Moreover, simply attempting to build up their characters or provide 
them liberal education without inspiring them to appropriately use their knowledge was a 
futile endeavor. Du Bois felt for these types of educations to find success amongst black 
children, members of the Talented Tenth should serve as teachers to oversee this 
education. Furthermore, Du Bois held that members of the Talented Tenth be the ones to 
educate teachers about how and what to teach children. This is because these educated 
elites, by virtue of their rigorous study at liberal institutions, are best equipped to address 
the deeper needs of the black race.
104
  
However, over time, Du Bois would reconceptualize and broaden what he 
regarded as liberal education. Indeed, Du Bois’s most influential and long lasting 
contribution to black education was his development and promotion of what is now 
commonly known as Afrocentric education. He believed that American education had 
provided blacks negative stereotypes of Africa. This resulted in a disconnect between 
blacks in America and blacks in Africa. He, therefore, began to advocate a diasporic, 
Pan-African view of the world for the purpose of uplifting the black race and believed it 
was the obligation of black intellectuals to draw a connection between black America and 
Africa. This Pan-Africanism eventually became central to his approach to pedagogy.
105
 
Derrick Aldridge points out that, for Du Bois, Pan-African education “was the obvious 
strategy for addressing the misinformation about Africa and for helping people of African 
descent around the world unite politically to overthrow oppression.”
106
 We can get a 
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sense of how Africa fits into Du Bois’s Pan-Africanism as he explains his own 
connection to it in his famous essay “What is Africa to me?”
107
 He states that, 
“…the physical bond is least and the badge of color relatively unimportant save as a 
badge; the real essence of this kinship is its social heritage of slavery; the discrimination 
and insult; and this heritage binds together not simply the children of Africa, but extends 
through yellow Asia and into the South Seas. It is this unity that draws me to Africa.”
108
 
 This quote is revealing, as it does not suggest a racialist basis for connection to 
the African continent. It also does not offer a declaration of extended cultural ownership 
as a foundation of connection. Rather, it offers a conception of Pan-Africanism that is 
founded on a commonality of oppression, one that extends beyond the confines of skin 
color, ancestry, and ethnicity—a diaspora of the suffering. This is a point in which I will 
later return.  
W.E.B. Dubois was among those who expressed disapproval for the actions of 
black students once the influence of Hampton had embedded itself into black colleges. 
He considered these students unappreciative of the education offered to them and 
regarded their partaking in debauchery and indulgences more common of white college 
students.
 109
 He began to believe the “Talented Tenth” that he, the missionaries, and the 
other black leaders put their hopes and resources behind were beginning to negate their 
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Carter G. Woodson 
It was not just Du Bois who felt this way about the state of black education. A 
growing contingent of black intelligentsia shared Du Bois’s sentiment.
111 
 Among these 
intellectuals was Carter Woodson, a famous historian of black pedagogy and founder of 
the Journal of Negro History. He shared his feelings on what he considered to be the 




Woodson’s position on black education diverged from black education advocates, 
like Du Bois, who believed that the aim of education should be the training of future 
black leaders. In fact, Woodson argued for the de-emphasizing the goal of leadership 
because he believed that it undermines a spirit of cooperation and community. He felt 
that leaders are typically contentious in their ambition and often attempt to usurp the 
authority of other leaders. Moreover, the ambition to lead places blacks in competition 
with one another.
113
 Woodson, therefore, argued for service rather than leadership as a 
central aim of black education. He states,  
“If the Negro could abandon the idea of leadership and stimulate a larger number 
of the race to take up definite tasks and sacrifice their time and energy in doing 
these things efficiently the race might accomplish something. The race needs 
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workers not leaders. Such workers will solve the problems which race leaders talk 
about and raise money to enable them to talk more and more about.”
114
 
Woodson further claimed that under the leadership model, the economic situation 
of blacks had actually worsened and so had their conception of themselves and their 
capabilities as a race. Moreover, blacks were used to satisfy the agendas set by leaders 
instead of being encouraged to address their own actual circumstances. Woodson 
believed that service would put persons in a better position to attend to their 
circumstantial needs as blacks in addition to facilitating the improvement of black 
Americans as a group and preparing them to “contribute to modern culture.”
115
 
Despite this divergence from Du Bois on leadership, Woodson shares credit with 
Du Bois as being among the first and most influential proponents of Afrocentric 
education. He held that current model of education portrays blacks as sub-persons who 
operate without rational ability. Woodson considered Africa a missing component of 
American education. African contributions to language, art and science to the world were 
subject to exclusion from the educational narrative. When Africans are spoken of they are 
minimized to object and savage status. He further claimed that black teachers educated 
under this model tend to do nothing to change this portrayal of Africans. This means that 
these teachers are using the same racist tools and praxis as white teachers consequently 
making them as ineffective as racist white teachers.
116
  
Woodson also maintained that education harms blacks by failing to include their 
lives and histories into classroom content. This, he believes, undermines the notion of 
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interracial cooperation because blacks are educated to feel as though they have nothing to 
offer anyone and whites are educated to feel that blacks have nothing to offer them.
117
 To 
correct this “mis-education,” Woodson believed that blacks must have the opportunity to 
acknowledge their history’s ups as other races had been permitted to do. Moreover, they 
should be taught that the accomplishments of the black race were equally as good as 
those made by any other group. If this is achieved, he asserted, then blacks “will aspire to 
equality and justice without regard to race.”
118
  
As we can see, both Du Bois and Woodson’s Afrocentric frameworks are very 
similar. Both aimed to supply what they felt was missing from the black race to better 
help it succeed. However, the ultimate goal of that success was different for these 
theorists. Afrocentric education under Du Bois would permit blacks to connect with the 
oppression of oppressed people. This is quite similar with Kincheloe and Steinberg’s use 
of Afrocentric knowledge to provide black students with inspiration to arise from their 
circumstances. Woodson, however, wanted blacks to see both good and bad aspects of 
African history so that they could connect with others and contribute to humanity writ 
large. It is also apparent that Afrocentric thought informs the affirmative education that 
Gloria Ladson-Billings desires for blacks as she uses what she regards as African and 
African American culture to help foster a “relevant black personality” in African 
American students.  
Another aspect of Du Bois and Woodson’s philosophies is the collective 
responsibility and black solidarity inherent in their work. These aspects come to light not 
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only as they hold black students and teachers accountable for the progress of the black 
racial group, but also as they ultimately challenge black individuals who they feel fail to 
demonstrate proper allegiance to certain content. These are themes emanating from the 
work of Asante, both in his view of what should constitute black culture, but also in his 
criticisms of those that he feels are “denying their blackness” by showing preference to 
European cultural productions. Indeed, Du Bois and Woodson were the progenitors of 
Asante’s Afrocentricity. Asante even cites Du Bois as an inspiration for his approach in 
his book The Afrocentric Idea and credits Woodson’s Afrocentric pedagogy put forth in 
The Mis-education of the Negro as the “impetus” to his own approach in “The 
Afrocentric Idea in Education.”
119
   
The Afrocentric, political, and nationalists themes of W.E.B. Du Bois and Carter 
Woodson would emerge in later years within the Civil Rights movement. Let us now 
discuss a more contemporary series of historical events in the history of black education 
that further reflect the influence of both of these theorists. 
Black Power and Black Studies 
In 1954, the Supreme Court overturned Plessy v. Ferguson putting a legal end to 
“separate but equal” in the case of Brown v. Board of Education. The court ruled that 
segregation had an ill effect on black students because it instilled in them feelings of 
inferiority.
120
 This landmark case would eventually lead to widespread desegregation in 
public schools, which subsequently changed the college landscape forever. By the late 
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1950’s, blacks slowly started to matriculate onto the newly integrated white college 
campuses. A rising sentiment amongst black intellectuals and black nationalists began to 
surface--one that echoed the critiques of racially hegemonic American education in the 
early part of the 20
th
 century. Proposals for a new type of studies also began to emerge. 
Black Nationalist groups like the Revolutionary Action Movement (RAM) spawned 
proposals for curricular reform that would include Black Studies in universities.  
In the mid 1960’s, two of RAM’s members, Bobby Seale and Huey Newton, went 
on to found a group called the Soul Students Advisory Council and the Black Panther 
Party, groups that undertook efforts to get students to advocate for Black Studies. RAM 
had generally used low-key tactics and demonstrated a willingness to work with 
mainstream groups. The Black Panthers offered fairly direct approaches to accomplish 
their goals such as attempting to spark conflict with the police “in order to attract 
attention and establish their credibility as a group that would not back down from white 
power.”
121
 The Black Panther’s and their strategic tactics would soon prove instrumental 
in bringing about the highly sought after change that had eluded Black Studies 
proponents. 
According to sociologist Fabio Rojas, there were three conditions that made Black 
Studies possible. These included: 1) “disappointment with civil rights and an 
unwillingness to wait for white assistance, which was linked to calls for militancy and 
black controlled education, 2) the rise of groups such as the Black Panthers, in which 
individuals could learn the intricacies of movement tactics and forge strong 
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identifications with nationalist values, and 3) the creation of foot soldiers, the newly 
admitted black students who were willing to fight on college campuses.” 
122
   
In 1966, these circumstances were firmly in place when the Black Panthers sent 
one of their agents, Jimmy Garrett, onto the campus of San Francisco State College. His 
goal was to enroll in the college and organize students by converting “the black student 
club into a platform for revolutionary action” to instill in black students a sense of 
nationalism.
123
 He carried this mission by holding off-campus meetings to talk about race 
and identity, and to enlighten the students about racism present at the SFSC campus. In 
conjunction with this was the expressed need to establish curriculum that addressed these 
and other concerns of black students.
124
 These initiatives were further advanced by 
students participating in the activities of the Tutorial Center and San Francisco State’s 
Experimental College. The Tutorial Center was a student-run program in poorer 
neighborhoods that offered both experience in academic leadership and additional 
exposure to groups like the Black Panthers that emphasized black identity. The 
Experimental College was a program with student-taught courses, including those of the 
“Black Arts and Culture Series” that would become a platform for the eventual 
development of a formal Black Studies department.
125
 
This increased involvement of these black-led organizations as well as protests by 
black students at San Francisco State and throughout California began to create tension 
within the academic ranks. However, the so-called Gater incident and its aftermath 
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heightened the unrest and culminated in the Third World Strike that lasted from 1968-
1969. The Gater incident occurred following escalating disagreements between white 
students working for the student newspaper, the Daily Gater, and students of the Black 
Student Union (BSU). These disagreements eventually spiraled into a physical altercation 
when a group of black students, including BSU and Black Panther member, George 
Murray, confronted Daily Gater employees. This, and other controversial incidents, 
resulted in Murray’s suspension from San Francisco State College.
126
   
The suspension of Murray was only successful in igniting further controversy. 
Students of the BSU and the Third World Liberation Front (TWLF) threatened to strike if 
Murray was not reinstated into the college. Furthermore, they demanded the 
establishment of Black and Ethnic Studies programs, and increased minority enrollment 
at the college.
127
 The protracted clash that followed between these student groups and the 
college administration led to numerous protests and eventually the temporary closure of 
the college.
128 
However, the strike ultimately succeeded in causing the administration to 
acquiesce to some of the demands of the BSU and TWLF. Among the concessions made 




The success of groups like the Black Panthers in bringing about the installation of 
Black Studies inspired those at other schools around the country to follow suit. Similar 
successes began to occur at schools where strong Black Nationalist sentiments eventually 
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lead to the implementation of Black Studies departments.
130
 Today, Black Studies are a 
part of the structural fabric of higher education. These events were important to the 
history of black education because they mark recognition on the part of universities of the 
accuracy of the substantive critiques on education made by theorists such as W.E.B. Du 
Bois and Carter Woodson. They also demonstrate the broadening, ratification, and 
formalization of their early Afrocentric remedies to these problems. 
However, this acceptance of Afrocentrism on the part of critical theory bears 
ontological importance. As I stated earlier, how to constitute a particular black identity 
was always the underlying question answered within Hampton and liberal philosophies of 
education. Moreover, their competing conceptions of this identity were political in nature. 
Industrial education intended to create a black labor identity to maintain the socio-
economic order and liberal education advocated black identity as an agency for racial 
reform and uplift. At the end of the day, the liberal conception of black identity prevailed. 
The materials intended to construct this identity (African and collective black American 
culture, history, and collectivism) did not necessarily reflect how black people lived and 
thought, but rather reflected a Pan-African vision for what is ideal for blacks. The Black 
Nationalist and Black Power movements were, in essence, an activation of a radicalized 
conception of this political black identity.  
The establishment of Black Studies as a permanent part of the academy meant the 
formalizing and encoding of this particular political conception of identity and its 
constitutive materials into the academy. This black ontology has effectively shaped the 
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views of blacks within societal culture. This is apparent not only as the identification for 
the black racial group that transitioned from Negro to African American—from race to an 
ethno-race, but also as a broad range of cultural productions continue to get assigned to 
this broad but rigidly defined racial group. 
The History of Black Education and Critical Theory: A Synthesis  
When disciplines are accepted into the academy, they, and their way of doing 
things, get adopted as well. Once they are allowed into this space, these disciplines most 
often present themselves and are accepted as the authority on their subjects. So, if we 
want to know about biology, we look to academic biologists and journals. If we want to 
know about how people of particular socio-economic and cultures are living, we rely on 
the academic disciplines of sociology or anthropology, because they are thought to house 
the experts and specialized knowledge on such matters. Thus, it makes sense that the 
installation of Black Studies within institutions of higher education, like the 
aforementioned disciplines, means that its cultural, historical, and epistemological 
content are often the authoritative resource for information about black people for other 
disciplines within the academy. Moreover, most disciplines within higher education 
selectively privilege narratives, histories, and epistemologies in their content. So, it is 
comprehensible why Afrocentric and nationalistic conceptions of blackness and black 
education are reflected to varying degrees within some critical theory in education. After 
all, as I have demonstrated, Afrocentrism and Black Nationalism were integral parts of 
the development of Black Studies. 
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Unfortunately, however, there are immediate consequences that follow from the 
acceptance of politicized conceptions of blackness by critical theorists in education. 
These are consequences that can skew and obscure how we, as theorists, approach race in 
our work and how race gets deployed within the classroom space. The first is the 
privileging of a particular black narrative. It is as obvious now as it was for Du Bois, 
Woodson, and Black activist groups inspired by their vision, that the identities and the 
content that they were proposing was not reflective of the actual lives of black people. 
Rather, such content was intended to accomplish such tasks as providing affirmation and 
solidarity for and amongst blacks, or it was meant to act as remedy to correct for what 
some considered black moral deficiency.  
Employing these visions of black education by critical theorists today devalues 
competing and contradictory narratives. More importantly, it diminishes the lives of all 
those assigned to the black racial group, and all of their diversity, as they actually exist. 
Moreover, the inadequately problematized extension of flawed and outmoded normative 
conceptions of blackness treats blacks as deficient as it renders the content of black 
individuals’ own lives, their interpretation of self, ethnic or racial identity inconsequential 
to discourse intended to impact their lives.  
Critical theory in education often accomplishes the aforementioned inadvertent, 
but rather comprehensive, devaluation of black people as it elevates universalized and 
idealized standards of blackness. Within these standards, blackness manages to become 
inherently political, while maintaining its ontological realness historically assigned to it. 
In other words, the political content of what is to constitute blackness becomes 
encompassed by the traditional reification of blackness.  
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The historical development of this identity from Hampton to critical theory is the 
story of the process of reification, indeed, the problem of reification in operation. The 
acceptance of the Pan-African/Afrocentric conception of blackness by critical theorists is 
simply an uncritical settlement on a particular conception of race. However, given that 
this conception is founded upon the traditional reified notion of race, insofar as it is 
supported by assumptions of phenotype and an idea of a dominant genealogical African 
(black) descent, it is ultimately an affirmation of the race concept. 
The final consequence of this acceptance of reified conceptions of blackness is the 
ontological reconfiguring of race done on the part of critical theory in education. The 
conception of blackness as it progressed throughout the history of education was a 
normative vision; that is, it was not an “is” but rather a “should be.” In deferring to this 
vision of blackness, some critical theorists in education have transformed the normative 
into the substantive. In other words, blackness the remedy is treated as thought it is 
blackness the reality. This is evident for the theorists examined in Chapter Two, as 
Asante, Ladson-Billings, Kincheloe and Steinberg, and Peter McLaren as they grant 
slightly varying degrees of diasporic ownership over sentimental, cultural, social, and 
historical products to all black Americans. Moreover, they grant epistemic privilege to 
political (or politicized) voices, and authorize those voices to act as representative of an 
entire socially constructed and engineered racial group. In doing so, they are treating the 
long fought war for the ontology of blacks as a decided conflict with a clear and distinct 
victor. Subsequently, these theorists are applying the winner’s ontology to the lives of 
students. These actions by critical theorists in education goes beyond simply reaffirming 
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the traditional reified conception race; it is the reconstituting of a racial monolith as it 
adds and ratifies new substantive materials and internal rules for black ontology. 
Conclusion 
In this Chapter I provided a brief sketch of the history of black education in 
America. I attempted to show that some critical theorists of education utilized broad 
source material written by black scholars to ground their approach to race. Furthermore, I 
argued that these critical theorist have reified race by transforming normative conceptions 
of racial identity, meant to address specific sets of circumstances at particular moments in 
history, into substantive conceptions of blackness. Taken alone, I believe these to be 
compelling reasons for those of us within critical theory in education to cease and desist 
using these reified conceptions of race and to step back and re-evaluate how we approach 
race in the theory. In the chapter that follows, I continue to expand on significant 
consequences that occur for the black individual as a result of critical theorists in 
education operating as agents for racial affirmation. Specifically, I argue that continuing 
to proceed without reflection and regard to the problem of reification can bring about real 










Critical theory in education is not a neutral endeavor. It is deliberately political 
because it actively tries to do what other theoretical areas within education often neglect; 
it attempts to recognize, expose, and mitigate the harms created by hegemonic paradigms 
as they present themselves in the classroom. Thus, that some critical theorists in 
education have adopted black affirmation strategies intended for the same liberatory 
purposes is as understandable as it may have been inevitable. However, as I attempted to 
establish in the preceding chapters, many of these theorists have not freed their 
conceptions of race from the reified concept of race that is so pervasive in American 
society. Given that race is not a passive concept and has real life consequences, the 
failure to disengage from an essentialized race concept prior to deploying raced-based 




In this chapter, I argue that the instituting of political conceptions of race risks 
bringing harm to black students. This, I will show, is because these strategies affirm the 
race construct and rely upon it for their success. While I believe that there is the potential 
for various sorts of harms that could occur as a consequence of the affirmation and 
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reconstitution of race with diasporic content, I will limit the focus of this argument to 
harm against the black student’s personal autonomy. Specifically, I attempt to show the 
various ways in which political conceptions of race, once validated by teachers, can 
undermine the autonomy of black students at both the personal and social level.
132
 
One reason that I have chosen to focus on the autonomy of the black student is 
that the existential conditions created by the harms to her autonomy (as a consequence of 
the validation by teachers of political conceptions of race), are the types of preconditions 
that will facilitate more destructive harms. A second reason that I believe that the 
autonomy of the student is important to consider is because the United States is a liberal 
democracy. Political philosopher Will Kymlicka points out that polls have shown that in 
democratic societies, “[t]he commitment to individual autonomy is deep and wide” and 
this sentiment spans across “ethnic, linguistic, and religious lines.”
133
 I also believe that 
autonomy is an implicit value that underlies the views of justice put forth by critical 
theorists regarding the education of black students. After all, it makes little sense to 
critique white supremacist or Eurocentric education as inhibiting the success of black 
students, if there is no concern about the manner in which these frameworks control those 
students. This is a point to which I will return later in this chapter.  
I will rely on two versions of autonomy, as I believe that they capture the 
sentiments regarding the matter of personal autonomy in the United States. The first is 
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philosopher Marina A. L. Oshana’s overview of autonomy. She describes the 
autonomous or “self-guided” person as someone who: 
“…formulates certain goals, as relevant to the direction of her life, and is able to 
pursue these goals and make them effective in action. Moreover, she formulates 
these goals according to values, desires, and convictions that have developed in an 
uncoerced and conscious fashion. Such values can be described as the agent’s 
own even while they reflect the influence of factors external to her. Additionally, 
an autonomous person is able to meet her goals without depending upon the 
judgments of others as to their validity and importance. Though the autonomous 
individual may require the assistance of others in meeting these goals, she decides 
which of them are most important.”
134
 
The second view of autonomy that I will use is Will Kymlicka’s description of 
autonomy as “rational revisability” which refers to one’s capacity to revise “one’s own 
inherited conceptions of the good.”
135
  While I believe that this view is implicit in 
Oshana’s explanation of autonomy, I think that Kymlicka’s version provides some 
clarity, given that the subjects of these diasporic strategies will most often be persons 
situated within the K-12 classroom. So, where such students might not be of age to 
rationally engage the conceptions of the race that are presented to them, they assumedly 
will reach that cognitive juncture at some point. In fact, persons revising their 
conceptions of the good are typical occurrences in the United States. It is common, for 
example, for people to reject their childhood religions. Sometimes, doing so is not a 
                                                 
134
 Marihna A. L. Oshana, “Personal Autonomy and Society.” Journal of Social Philosophy. 29 (1998), 81, 
82. 
135
 Kymlicka, Contemporary Moral Philosophy, 243. 
 
 97 
popular decision to one’s parents or religious community. However, in the broader social 
context it is regarded in American society as a right, both socially and legally.  
Following the discussion of harms to the black student’s autonomy, I will argue 
that considering the harms facing black students, we address race as a problem in and of 
itself. Let us now begin this analysis with a discussion of race as an axiomatic system. 
Race as an Axiomatic System 
 
Before we examine harms that may emerge from activating political conceptions 
of race in the classroom, let us briefly return to the race concept, itself. As I have stated, 
race plays such a central role in how we conceive of ourselves as individuals that even 
those who acknowledge its construction have a difficult time fully freeing themselves 
from its essentialist entanglements. The critical theorists in Chapter Two serve as an 
empirical testament to this point as their own analyses and remedies situate the black 
racial group monolithically. The problem is that race is an axiomatic entity and its nature 
as such presents itself in a multilayered fashion. We tend to regard race, its internal 
parameters, and its guidelines for determining racial membership as self-evident truths. 
Moreover, we treat people as though their actions are and should be governed by race. 
Race, as we conceive of it in the United States, is not simply a matter of being. Rather, its 
racial ontologies often require performance by the individuals to whom they are ascribed. 
These performances can encompass a wide range of actions such as the perception, 
interpretation, and treatment of persons or objects. 
I believe that the idea of race as a performative ontology is crucial to any 
discussion regarding the deployment of reconstituted or reconfigured racial ontology into 
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the classroom. I have shown that critical theorists in education sometimes fail to unpack 
the race concept before re-implementing it for use. So, it is quite possible that the way 
these conceptions get repackaged with our traditional notions of race will affect the way 
they are interpreted and disseminated by teachers and, consequently, processed and 
performed by students. Before we move forward in our discussion, it may prove useful to 
extract a few of the relevant axiomatic principles that govern race, specifically those that 
concern the assignment of racial identity. It is my hope that this will provide a stable 
frame of reference that will show us the types of axioms that can merge with these 
refurbished racial ontologies as they intersect with the lives of black students.  
Let us first briefly look at some of the principles I refer to as Racial Identity 
Axioms.
136
 We can start with a very basic axiom, 
I. x is an R, therefore x performs r1 (or performs r1 in a particular way). 
With this postulate, there is the presupposition of race, its assignment to a 
particular individual, and a presumed causal connection to a particular type of action. It 
captures how race creates the anticipation for action. Examples of this axiom are 
statements such as “Black people are athletic,” or a valuated performance of ontology, 
“Black people play basketball well.” These examples help reveal an important aspect to 
racial axioms; that is, the type of performance may be highly contextual (e.g., ethnic, 
geography, culture, religion) yet it is still broadly applied across a racial group. In other 
words, the typical ways in which racial axioms are articulated allows the performance of 
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race to be simultaneously particular and universal. The following axiom captures the 
metaphysics that undergirds race as a performative ontology: 
II. x is an R, therefore x’s performance of r1 is a reflection of x’s Rness. 
This Racial Identity Axiom treats race as something real and something 
expressible. When performed by individual members of a race, the action is regarded as 
both a display of one’s connectedness to the racial group and an expression of the 
collective racial group as a whole. Its transcendent metaphysics emerges, first, from the 
reification of race itself. We also see this transiency appear as racial essence assigned to a 
particular action, a consequence of being marked as inherently racial or as a consequence 
of the performer’s race. Finally, there is the individual whose racial ontology allows her 
to express its essence through a particular action. We can find an example of this type of 
axiom at work with Peter McLaren’s black gangster rapper expressing a trans-historical, 
collectivist essence of blackness through the rapper’s art form.
137
 
A third Racial Identity Axiom enables us to see how racial principles can get 
expressed or interpreted as though validated empirically: 
III. If x is an R, x will perform r1 because r1 is a performance of R. 
As with the second postulate, this axiom assumes the existence of race and a 
person’s racial identity predisposes her to a particular form of action. However, while the 
first axiom merely assumes this predisposition to perform a particular action, this axiom 
treats it as more or less verified. This is a common way of talking about race in American 
society--as if its performance are matters of probabilistic assessment. Ultimately, 
however, this axiom requires the same types of metaphysical assumptions as our first 
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axiom. Namely, it assumes that race is ontologically connected to the performance of 
particular types of action. Furthermore, the action is assigned to an entire racial group. 
Given the size, biological, and cultural makeup of racial groups, even if one constricted 
one’s judgment to racial groups within the United States, such a designation would 
require the positing of racial essence. Finally, the action, when performed, would still act 
as an expression of that person’s race. So, while this axiom might appear different than 
the second on the surface, ultimately they are quite similar.  
Axiom III also allows us to see how race works through action, meaning that an 
action that is racialized (or that is bound to a raced object) creates the anticipation of its 
performance by the individual with the corresponding racial identity. Examples of the 
axiom in this type of manifestation are “whites play hockey because hockey is a white 
sport” or “Blacks support President Barack Obama because Barack Obama is black.” 
These three Racial Identity Axioms represent expectations of the performance of 
race. They express the performance of the raced individual in a categorical way. Race is 
often conceptualized in terms of expectations within societal culture, especially now, as 
society progresses technologically giving people access to knowledge that deconstructs 
previously held notions about racial groups. While the expectation of racial performance 
is obviously problematic by itself, the situation becomes precarious when the 
performance of racial ontology shifts from expectation to requirement, meaning these 
axioms transition from asserting what raced individuals do, to telling those with racial 
identity what they should do. In other words, axioms of expectation often become axioms 
of requirement: 




If x is an R, x should perform r1 because r1 is a performance of R. 
This transition occurs when axioms of expectation are subject to authoritative 
validation. By authoritative validation, I mean the acceptance or affirmation of racial 
identity axioms of expectation as substantive truth by those who maintain a degree of 
power or control over individuals with racial identities. The authorities can include 
family members, teachers, religious leaders, politicians, social and political institutions, 
etc. The legitimacy of the validation is dependent on the how much the raced individual 
(or other raced individuals) values or is forced to value the authority as such. In the 
United States, the belief in races and their racial ontologies is so widely held that the 
authoritative validation of racial identity axioms comes from large segments of societal 
cultural itself. Thus, the standardization of axioms of expectation, i.e. their acceptance as 
mandates, is more the norm than the exception. It is, for instance, not uncommon for 
people to believe or assert that blacks should not marry whites, blacks should prefer blues 
over country music, or blacks should practice Christianity not Judaism.  
Race’s axiomatic schema is often quite complicated. Sometimes, its axioms of 
requirement yield axioms that affirm their performative ontology. These types of Racial 
Identity Axioms act as principles by which a person, assigned a particular racial identity, 
is judged for the performance, manner of performance, or lack of performance of her 
racial ontology. Consider, as examples, the following axioms: 
A. If x, who is an R, performs r1, then x is affirming x’s Rness. 
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B. If x, who is an R, does not perform r1, then x is denying one’s Rness.
138
  
Axiom A operates as a sub-axiom. Implicit within it is the claim of the 
requirement formulation of Axiom II, that a person’s performance of a required racial 
action is a reflection of her race’s essence. However, this axiom goes farther as her 
performance of that action is not simply a reflection of her race, but also a demonstration 
of allegiance to its ontology. Axiom B differs from Axiom A because if the person fails 
to carry out her ontological commitment, she is rejecting her racial ontology. Axioms of 
this nature can create harmful situations for those with racial identities, because they are, 
in effect, axioms of authenticity. The failure to perform the necessary action is the raced 
individual not being who she really is; she is not being authentic to her true self. We see 
this type of example in American society quite commonly with claims such as “Middle 
class blacks are abandoning their responsibilities to their race by moving into the 
suburbs” or “You’re white, you are supposed to listen to ‘white music.’”
139
  
Now that we have examined some of the types of axioms that often emerge from 
the race concept, the pervasive schema in which some critical theorists in education have 
inadvertently attached their own drafts of race should appear more lucidly. Our 
discussion on the history of black education showed us how its philosophical arbiters 
attempted to instill in black students value systems that would influence how they 
conceive of themselves, others, their place in the world, and the manner in which they 
conduct their lives. The goal was that these normative value systems would become 
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substantive conceptions of blackness that would achieve the desired ends (black student 
success, racial uplift, racial contributions to humanity). The diffusion of these values 
systems was to occur through teachers.  
In Chapter 2, I argued that critical theorists in education have taken diasporic 
conceptions of race and adopted them as substantive forms. Additionally, many of these 
theorists, such as Asante, Ladson-Billings, and Kincheloe and Steinberg call for the 
employment of Afrocentric strategy and/or content to help facilitate the success and 
improve the circumstances of black students. The problem is that to complete these tasks 
in the manner in which these theorists do, would require the affirmation of race itself. 
Specifically, it would require an upholding of the black racial group that extends 
biologically and metaphysically to persons outside of the United States. In taking African 
and black diasporic content (cultural practices, products, history, and experiences) and 
assigning it to the entirety of the black racial group, not only do such theorists affirm 
race, but they also help structure it as a pan-ethnicity. 
The purpose of critical theory in education is to operationalize strategies and 
distribute content within the classroom by teachers for particular outcomes. 
Unfortunately, because this content is bound to an unpacked supposition of race, it will 
be communicated to students as categorical within the classroom. In other words, in the 
K-12 classroom (or the university classroom), the content will not be introduced as 
elements of a theoretical strategy, as one conception of race amongst possible others. 
Rather, broadly construed African content will be presented to blacks as though 
belonging to black students. Rap music will be presented as their music. The expressed 
pains of other blacks will be presented as their pain. The struggle of people or a particular 
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people in Africa will be presented as though ontologically connected to their struggle, as 
blacks, in the United States. Even where ontological association will be expressed 
explicitly, an unmitigated reification of race sets the conditions in which such 
connections are inferable.  
These political revisions of race, encapsulated black racial ontology, will thus be 
intertwined with its axiomatic physiology. Let us now move our focus to possible 
consequences of this entanglement for black students. 
Autonomy and the Black Individual 
 
As an ontological system, race operates as if prior to the person. In essence, it 
creates a person by defining for them who and what they are and who and what they 
should become. I have shown how, as an axiomatic system, race produces guidelines by 
which people are to perform their racial ontology—axioms that tell persons how they 
ought to be in relation to their racial identity. The potential for harm to the autonomy of 
the black student largely rests on how powerfully theorists attach their politicized racial 
ontologies to the race concept. These critical theorists in my analysis actually nourish 
race with ethno-cultural content for black students. In doing so, they are merely providing 
the specific meanings of R and r1 for race’s axioms and allowing teachers, as respected 
conduits of knowledge, to provide authoritative validation for these axioms.  
The relationship between race, its critical revisions, and teachers are of key 
importance in understanding how the autonomy of the black student is at stake. That is 
because this relationship can impede the student’s ability to recognize politicized 
formulations of race as what they inherently are; that is, revisions of the race construct. 
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This can occur as these revisions are packaged and presented as black student’s racial 
ontology—as, by racial association, what she is and what she does. Afrocentric content, 
for instance, will get taught to black students as black. Thus, the content is not likely to 
be interpreted by black students as content with which she may choose to identify. 
Rather, the axiom-cooperative conditions encourage the black student to interpret these 
materials as facts about her.  
A presentation of the history of the Swazi ethnic group of southern Africa as 
connected to the black student, whose African ancestors may have been Yoruba or Igbo, 
coheres with what the race concept already provides for us in American society, that 
blackness is grounded in biology and that Africa is the bio-geographical locus of that 
blackness. Given the teacher’s ratification of this sentiment, there is significant likelihood 
that knowledge about Swazi will shape how the black student envisions and evaluates 
herself. Indeed, when employing diaspora-based strategy, critical theorists are relying on 
the student’s identification with the black racial group to achieve the ends anticipated in 
their accounts. The question is, does this influence inhibit her ability to create values, 
desires, and ends for herself or does the presentation of content as ontologically relevant 
create values for her? Moreover, does the presentation make it difficult for her to see that 
teacher as an authority and as someone trying to influence her ontology? 
We must remember that the race construct to which theorists attach their 
revisions, is a value system. As such, race itself is a conception of the good. It designates 
value to groups that shapes how we view ourselves and how we view one another (as 
blacks, as whites), and it guides action amongst and within those groups. However, 
although similar in some ways, race is not a conception of the good like a religious or 
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philosophical ideology. We treat those types of ideologies as ones to which you 
volitionally bind or unbind yourself. They are still treated as matters of choice, even if we 
are indoctrinated with them from birth. We permit people to switch and reject religions.  
Race is a different type of conception of the good, because its categories are 
biological and metaphysical ontologies--ontologies to which you are bound. We do not 
consider it as a matter of choice. Rather, we regard it as something intrinsic. Moreover, 
race’s axiomatic directives are constitutive of race; they are not independent axioms in 
competition with alternative conceptions of the good.
140
 Thus, race is an ontological 
ideology; the revisions of this ideology are merely denominations of it. We typically do 
not rationally revise that which we do not consider revisable. It is certainly possible that 
we may revise how we perform race or even choose not to perform it. However, the 
pervasive assumption of a bio-metaphysical union between race and its performance, 
hinder even the modification or rejection of performance. It clouds our ability to see race 
or performance as revisable or at best places limitations to degrees in which they are 
revisable. The treatment of political conceptions of race as categorical reality by teachers 
would only serve to enhance the illusory notion of non-revisability for the black student. 
The difficulty of revisability is likely further complicated when the student re-
enters her social environment. Here, she might actually witness the performance of race 
at a level where the requirement axioms of race are more contextually stringent. So, for 
example, teachers may present rap music as an authentically black performance, thus 
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validating for the black student that rap music belongs to her—is part of who she is. If the 
student looks to her surroundings through this racial and pan-ethnic lens, she may find 
some empirical legitimacy for this validation. As a result, the choice of appreciating, 
declaring allegiance to, or taking part in rap music as an artistic form might require that 
she evaluate herself through race’s axioms of authenticity. A failure to act in accordance 
with her ontological demands could mean that she judges herself as inauthentic. She can 
internalize the guilt associated with this betrayal or she may choose to perform the 
required racial actions placed upon her as a black person. Thus, her desire to perform her 
assigned racial ontology was not of her own construction. Rather, it was generated by the 
axioms of her externally validated racial ontology. 
A similar harm arises as a consequence of critical theorists in education failing to 
acknowledge the ethno-cultural and genetic diversity of the black racial group. In doing 
so, such theorists maintain the tunnel vision inherent in the traditional taxonomy of race. 
This sets the conditions for the reduction of competing value systems by restricting the 
black student’s own life, values and experience. 
 Let us imagine a student whose ancestors consisted of individuals that fall under 
the black, white, and Native American racial group.
 141
 They included African slaves, 
Black freedmen, Cherokee and Chickasaw Indians, English Americans, and Irish 
Americans. The diversity of this ancestry is something that was openly acknowledged 
amongst his family members. Most of his family’s cultural practices were random, rarely 
                                                 
141
 It may be of importance to recognize the inconsistency in our racial categorizations. Native Americans 
are treated as a race. It is quite common to hear persons refer to themselves as “white and Native 
American” or as having “Native American blood.” I will not explore inconsistency within this dissertation, 
but I do believe that it is something that is worthy of exploration. 
 
 108 
uniformly shared, and typically were never made reference to in terms of race or 
ethnicity. For instance, their individual religious and spiritual beliefs range from various 
forms of Christianity (mainstream and unorthodox) to “Hoodoo” to atheism. They listen 
to broad ranges of music from country to hip-hop to heavy metal. American society 
designates his family black, because of their appearance or their known African ancestry. 
Thus, most family members have accepted black as their racial identity, including family 
members who are able to physically “pass” as white. While some individuals in his 
family affirm many performative racial axioms, a significant number neither endorse nor 
organize their lives around them. Thus, there is a fairly wide variation in the ways in 
which family members have constructed their lives. 
A teaching strategy that attempts to connect the black students to the sentiments, 
cultures, cultural products, and experiences of others based on the presumption of a 
shared racial ontology, could present a serious challenge to this student’s autonomy. 
While it is clear that race has some effect on how this student sees himself, given his 
background, he would likely enter the classroom with a relatively loose conception of 
race. However, the teacher is validating the notion, common to strategies for black 
affirmation, that one’s blackness is (should be) the central aspect to persons assigned to 
the black racial group. This could diminish this student’s own value system—one that 
acknowledges the ethnic and cultural plurality that makes up not just himself as an 
individual, but also his family and the black racial group writ large. Moreover, inherent in 
the teacher’s validation is that the type of performance that should matter for blacks are 
performances of that ontology.  
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Diasporic revisions of race can convey to the student that the content of his actual 
life is too broad to fit the axiomatic parameters of black identity. So, the student has a 
seemingly credible mandate to regard aspects of his own experience, knowledge, and 
history as inconsequential to his true black self. Thus these revisions can decide for the 
student the relevant identities, values, and performances and in doing so eliminate choice 
where choice could have been present for him. In this way, political conceptions of race 
can accomplish what the racial ontology that undergirds them already attempts do; that is, 
they invalidate or supersede competing conceptions of the good. 
The final potential harm to the student at the personal level that I would like to 
discuss involves the activation of the black student as an ideological activist. This harm 
relates back to attempts to instill in blacks particular types of agency advocated by such 
figures as W.E.B Du Bois, Carter Woodson, Henry Armstrong, and Booker T. 
Washington. While the desired ends in those cases ranged from laudable to deplorable, 
there is little question that the achievement of these ends required placing the personal 
desires, values, and conceptions of the good aside. Indeed, the purpose behind their 
education strategies was to mold these facets of the student’s character and in some cases 
mold them in such a way that these students would set their own desired ends aside. 
Thus, personal autonomy itself was treated as trivial in relation to the ends of the big 
picture. 
It seems that some critical theorists in education are also setting aside the 
autonomy of the black student in a similar manner to the aforementioned philosophers of 
black education. The fact that many black students are hindered and demoralized as a 
consequence of their positioning within America’s racial paradigm is no doubt as 
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probable now as it was in the days of Du Bois and Woodson. The remedies that critical 
theorists in education advocate today do not diverge very far from those of Du Bois and 
Woodson. There is little difference between constructing a type of black student for the 
purpose of black service and black leadership and attempting to create a “relevant black 
personality,” or to reinstate Africa to into the psyche of the African American student, 
even if the desired end is the success of the black student. All of these visions require the 
actuation of political conceptions of blackness within the black student.  
Once again, the problem surfaces with the teacher’s presentation of this 
knowledge as truth. The black student is denied the opportunity to assess these 
conceptions as political because of the assumption or reconstitution of a racial ontological 
connection to the actors, creators, and practitioners of the content of her affirmation. As 
she embodies the axioms of these particular conceptions of the good, she becomes an 
unwitting poster-child for a political conception of the ideal black individual. So, like the 
black students of our historical analysis, black students of today may have their own 
autonomies set aside to achieve an end that they have not desired, planned, or 
constructed. 
In this section, I put forward some of the personal harms facing the black student 
once indoctrinated with the diasporic revisions of race advanced by some critical theorists 
in education. Unfortunately, the validation of these revisions by teachers can produce 
significant impediments for the student that go beyond his psychological life. Let us now 
explore some the possible harms to the autonomy of the black student at the social level. 
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Autonomy and the Black Social Self 
 
Race is a deceptively social ontological system. We unknowingly create it. 
Moreover, we act through it, often unconsciously. We determine its values: its content, its 
axioms, and its internal borders. In return, it acts through us. One of the ways that it does 
this is by assigning us our racial ontologies. In our discussion of the axiomatic structure 
of race, I explained how principles that emerge from the race construct create 
expectations and requirements for racial performance. The relationship between race and 
performance is a relationship between the individual and his assigned racial ontology. 
The individual’s performance of that ontology is a demonstration of his allegiance to it. 
 What does it mean to demonstrate an allegiance to a racial ontology? At the 
individual level, it means affirming, through performance, his assigned racial identity. It 
also requires that he evaluate his own performances from an external perspective as 
though he were a fellow member of his race. In this sense, race creates for the individual 
an internalizable racial community to which he is accountable—a moral community. So, 
even at the individual level, through a kind of mimicry, race is social. Through its identity 
axioms, race tells us to whom we are accountable in the social world. It tells us that the 
moral community for whites is the membership that makes up the white racial group; for 
the black individual, it is the black racial group. Race tells us that the white moral agent 
is rational, individualistic, and has a wide range of performative actions that are not 
functions of his race. It also tells us the black moral agent acts from blackness and 
therefore has limited rationality, is communitarian, and that his performative actions are 
consequences of race and indicative of his race.  
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Examples of what I am asserting here, that race assigns moral community, are 
easily found in American societal culture. It surfaces in our social interactions through 
our various forms of segregation. It emerges from our pop culture where whites are 
presented as diverse individuals and blacks are presented as bound to type. It plays out in 
political media, where whites have no spokespersons as they are shown to embody 
various ideologies and platforms, but where blacks are typically only present when 
considered representing the views of blacks.  
Unfortunately, the diasporic conceptions of race offered by critical theorists in 
education are a further example of how race constructs races as moral communities. The 
reason is found not only in the sense that their strategies advocate the ontological 
connection between blacks, but also in the supposition that underlies them—that black 
students should be affirmed, because of their race, by content deemed black. By itself, the 
concept of race already impedes the autonomy of blacks by assigning moral community 
to them, thus denying them the authority to decide for themselves who, if anyone, they 
value as persons. However, the teacher who impresses upon black students the view that 
the characters of a Ghanaian folktale, for example, should mean something to her because 
Africa is the continent of her relevant (black) ancestors, is reinforcing this racial view of 
moral community. This form of indoctrination on the part of the teacher validates for the 
student that black people should matter most because she shares their racial ontology. 
The circumventing of the autonomy of the black student has some serious 
implications. One consequence is that it may determine the nature of her interactions with 
others in her social life. For instance, it may mean that the black student does not see 
non-blacks as being relevant to her life. This can go beyond simple social interactions 
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and extend into how she eventually comes to regard her moral commitments in our 
participatory democracy. The validation of the notion of a black moral community might 
mean that the only social and political performances that matter are those carried out on 
behalf of or in respect to this community. This is not without precedent. Black persons in 
the United States have consistently been victims of moral exclusion on the basis of their 
race socially, institutionally, and politically throughout the history of this country. 
Indeed, this is the reason why critical theorists in education attempt to address the 
circumstances of blacks, because in a white-centered country, the lives of black people 
are and continue to remain of secondary importance. 
The final two harms to the autonomy of the black student relate to this validation 
of race as a moral community and the actuating of students as ontological activists. As I 
have stated, the internalization of race means that a person judges herself by how she 
imagines that other members of her race would judge her. This is, in essence, the 
acceptance of her race, as her moral community. However, a moral community does not 
always simply constitute the people whom you value, the people whom you assume share 
your values, or the people to whom you hold yourself accountable. It can also mean those 
who hold you accountable for your moral actions. While it may vary depending on the 
type of agency your morality assigns, you typically expect other moral agents to carry out 
the mandates of your shared morality. For race, the mandates of morality are racial 
identity axioms like the ones that I provided in this chapter. As mentioned earlier, race 
creates black agency as tightly bound to its racial ontology. Thus, the race construct sets 
the conditions for the black individual to be activated as, not only the demonstrative 
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activists, but also as enforcers of the racial identity axioms of her black moral 
community.  
I also stated that the political revisions of race supported by critical theory just fill 
in the “who” and “what performance” for those axioms. Authoritative validation by a 
teacher provides the black student with a seemingly objective mandate to enforce and 
judge the performances of others sharing the black ontology. So, the autonomy of the 
black student can be hindered in the sense that she is indoctrinated with a value system 
that puts her into action as a social enforcer of a critical theory’s diasporic draft of 
blackness. In other words, in creating and assigning moral community, it permits her to 
act upon others. 
On the flipside of this, the teacher’s validation of these political revisions in these 
conditions can create other activists that act upon the black student. For this reason, once 
again, it affirms that the black racial group is a moral community. Then, by assigning the 
student and all other blacks to this community, it makes her accountable to it, even if she 
does not assent. This is because it provides a mandate for other blacks students to enforce 
the axioms of these political revisions of race on her because she is black. It permits these 
students to say things to her akin to Asante’s criticism of black scholars that I presented 
in Chapter Two; that is, her preference of things not designated black is a denial of her 
blackness. It gives other black students the authority to say that what should matter is her 
blackness, not her actual racial, ethnic, and cultural life content. It allows them to act as 
social constraints against her autonomy. They can inhibit her capacity (psychologically, 
socially, culturally) to pursue her own constructed conception of the good life because 
critical theory has bound her to both traditional racial ontology and revisionist ontology. 
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Finally, the teacher’s presentation of diasporic conceptions of race may mean 
their validation for all of those present, black or otherwise. This facilitates the activation 
of non-black students as activists that can police ontological performances of the black 
student. This is, in part, because diasporic strategies verify for students the determinate 
racial boundaries. The teachers validation also legitimizes the notion that there is 
collectively shared content, agency, axioms, and thus ontology amongst black persons. In 
other words, it affirms for non-blacks that blacks are a moral community. However, in 
doing so, it also validates the legitimacy of their own assigned racial groups as moral 
communities.  
Depending on the particular agency assigned to the non-black group, the teacher’s 
affirmation of racial moral communities provides the non-black student reason to enforce 
her own racial identity axioms and axioms of the black racial group. For instance, the 
white moral agent, as a member of the most-powerful racial group in the United States, 
has relatively broad societal authority over groups. White students are thus permitted to 
protect performative boundaries of their racial group by asserting to the black student, 
through various performative means, “this is ours” and “this is what we do.” Moreover, 
white students will also have the authoritative validation to declare to the black student 
through voice or action “that is yours” or “that is what you are supposed to do,” thereby 
acting as social constraints similar to the previously mentioned intra-racial constraints. 
Thus, the political conceptions of race offered by some critical theorists risk harming the 




Engaging the Problem of Race in Critical Theory in Education 
 
One of the primary critiques made by critical theorists in education concerns the 
elevation of Eurocentric or “white” content in the classroom and the ignoring of the lives, 
histories and achievements of black persons in the United States and Africa. The 
consequence of the invisibility of black people in education is that students are 
indoctrinated with the same sentiments that asserted about black people throughout the 
history of the United States--that white people are relevant, intelligent, and important and 
black people are none of these things. Thus, the black student often adopts this as 
something intrinsic about her, which impedes her desire and success.  
The aforementioned critique made by critical theory is consistent with the 
arguments that I have put forth regarding the autonomy of the black student and the 
political conceptions of race inherent to diasporic teaching strategies. The white 
hegemonic establishment is impeding the black student’s chances for success with its 
selective, self-affirming content. With the traditional axioms of race in the backdrop, the 
validation of this content by teachers leads to the subsequent internalization of the 
implicit claims within the content itself. The student’s education encumbers her capacity 
to guide her own life because it creates for her a particular conception of race—one that 
devalues her. Thus, American education undermines the autonomy of the black student 
because what it is to her (a social impediment) and what it does to her (creates an 
ideological impediment). 
While, I agree with the above critique by critical theorists in education, I also 
believe that it should apply to their theories as well. My analysis has shown that the racial 
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circumstances that rest in the background are the same, only that the notions of blackness 
that are offered by critical theorists in education are such that once employed within the 
classroom they will evoke in the black student that she is indeed valuable as a black 
person. While the ends of white hegemony and critical theory in education (in regard to 
race) are different, the means are the same (indoctrination), and the consequences to the 
child’s autonomy are the same. 
The history and advancement of the problem of reification and the harms for the 
black student necessitate that we re-evaluate our path as we move forward in our attempts 
to make the classroom a just environment. My analysis in this and the two preceding 
chapters has demonstrated that race has not simply been a part of the problem. Rather it is 
and has been the problem all along. It is causally antecedent to the problem of racial 
reification in critical theory of education and if its conceptual core is maintained, it will 
be the causal antecedent for harms to the black student. 
So, moving forward for critical theorists in education requires that we attempt to 
understand the race concept, so that we can grasp what it is, how it operates, and why it 
operates the way it does. We need to understand why and how it entangles us, as 
theorists. Then we will better comprehend why it is that even those of us who 
acknowledge its social construction still act from it as though it were biologically and 
metaphysically real when we attach our revisions to it and we rely on its axioms for our 
strategies to work. Most importantly, we need to gain a deeper understanding of how race 
defines life outside of the classroom, and then we can grasp more fully how it can, will, 
and does affect students within the classroom. This means that we must attempt to know 
race as comprehensively as we can. Once we gain this understanding we can create 
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strategies that address related issues for the student and environment around us more 
holistically and effectively. 
Conclusion 
 
In this chapter, I have explored how political conceptions of race offered by some 
critical theorists in education, once deployed by teachers in the classroom, can present 
serious harms to students personally and socially. I have argued that this is a consequence 
of these conceptions being supported by the axiomatic, ontological value system that is 
the race construct. I have asserted that it is our responsibility as theorists that we attempt 
to confront and understand race as a problem in and of itself. In the chapter that follows, I 
argue that a theoretical and strategic alliance with race theory emerging out of the 









The notion that the race concept is neglected within critical theory in education 
(or education theory writ large), while not widely held, is certainly not new. Some of the 
critical theorists that I have examined in this work acknowledge that it is a concept in 
need of exploration given its importance both in and outside of the classroom. For 
example, in “Toward A Critical Race Theory of Education,” an article examining the 
intersection between race and property, Gloria Ladson-Billings, along with co-author 
William F. Tate IV, emphasize that race, as a social construct, has not garnered 
theoretical attention from critical theorists in education, especially when compared to 
other factors such as gender.
142
  
It is relatively rare in critical theory in education circles that there is an attempt to 
engage race on a meta-level. Exceptions are Cameron McCarthy and Warren Crichlow 
who argue that the concept of race is under-theorized in critical theory in education. Their 
anthology, Race Identity and Representation in Education, is intended to fill this 
theoretical gap, by offering various analyses on race from a variety of analytical theorists. 
In its introductory article, “Introduction: Theories of Identity, Theories of Representation, 
Theories of Race,” McCarthy and Crichlow reject discourse within education 
(specifically, Afrocentric theory) that treats racial groups as monolithic, as though 
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members of these groups collectively share biological and cultural characteristics.
143
 
Moreover, McCarthy and Crichlow highlight the tendency of radical pedagogists to 
approach issues of race in such a way that “conceptions of racial inequality can be 
described as essentialist and reductionist” because they “effectively eliminate the ‘noise’ 
of multidimensionality, historical variability, and subjectivity from their explanations of 
racial differences in education.”
144
  They also point out that race theory in education 
tends to treat social groups like “Asians,” “Latinos” and “Blacks” as if each group 
contained essences that “set them apart from each other and from whites.”
145
 McCarthy 
pursues similar analyses independently in his other works, such as with his article, “The 
Problem of Origins: Race and the Contrapuntal Nature of the Educational Experience,” 
where he challenges essentialist theorists such as Molefi Asante and further confronts the 
notion that racial groups fit tidily into cultural categories.
 146
 
Unfortunately, the overarching essentialist and diasporic narratives of race are so 
pervasive within American education, that ethno-racial affirmative theory usually 
overshadows critiques offered by theorists like McCarthy. Challenging our notions about 
race, even in contemporary times, is radical work. It is radical because we do not view 
race in the same way as we view class and gender—as concepts that are as mutable as 
they are psychologically and socially ubiquitous and sometimes subtly insidious. We 
have difficulty recognizing that race is not just a means to hegemony, but that it is a 
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hegemonic paradigm in itself. This failure to recognize race as problematic is in part a 
consequence of the obvious and seemingly benign, constitutive meaning that we derive 
from it on a personal, social, and even political level. It is also a consequence of race’s 
gradual encapsulation by the ethnic paradigm in both societal culture and the academy. 
At the end of the day, however, race has exhibited itself historically and culturally 
through power arrangements within and across its groupings. As I stated in Chapter Four, 
as liberatory theorists, it is our responsibility to understand how the concept of race 
contributes to these relations and to do this, we must approach the concept of race in a 
theoretically holistic manner. 
There are lots of disciplines in the arts and sciences that engage the race concept 
in ways that can benefit our theoretical approaches. However, in this chapter, I draw 
attention to the discipline of philosophy where we find the philosophy of race, or what is 
often termed “the metaphysics of race” taking place. I believe that philosophy of race 
offers useful tools and analyses that can help us understand what it means for race to be a 
social construct, as it is often referred to, but not always treated as, within critical theory 
in education. The metaphysics of race will help us make sense out of race by allowing us 
to see how race is essentialist, why and how it is ontologically powerful, and how we can 
deconstruct it in a way that allows us to avoid its internal metaphysical and axiomatic 
entrapments. 
In this chapter, I examine four prominent philosophers of race, Charles Mills, 
Kwame Anthony Appiah, Naomi Zack, and Jorge J. E Gracia. I will place them on a 
conceptual, methodological, and strategic map that shows how they engage the problem 
of race. I examine how these theorists approach (or suggest that we approach) issues 
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related to race such as racial and ethnic identity, racism, and white supremacy. I also 
show several ways in which these theorists implicitly and explicitly converge, diverge, 
and build upon one another’s works methodologically and theoretically. Following this 
analysis, I will pull out some of the important aspects of their work that I believe will 
benefit critical theory in education as it moves forward in its own analyses. 
Theoretical Positions within the Philosophy of Race 
 
 Before beginning this examination, let us briefly look at some of the various 
underlying theoretical views found within the philosophy of race. This will assist in 
understand how the theorists in our examination are situated within in the discourse, thus 
making it easier to make sense of their respective approaches to the concept of race. 
Charles Mills suggests that there are three primary theoretical positions that emerge from 
philosophy of race. These are, “realism, otherwise known as naturalism (race is a natural 
biological kind, and is real), eliminativist constructivism, (race is socially constructed, is 
unreal, and should be eliminated as a theoretical term), and anti-eliminativist 




While there are philosophers of race who attempt to restructure or re-
conceptualize the traditional biological conceptions of race, these positions are 
increasingly rare and do not reflect of the majority of race theory taking place in 
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 Most philosophers of race are in keeping with the majority 
of the scientific world; they reject the biological realness of human races (at least as we 
generally conceive of them).
149
 In other words, they contend that race is a social 
construction. Of course, taken alone, this position is not necessarily at odds with the 
theory coming out of many non-philosophical disciplines where race is considered a 
relevant variable in social life. Many of these disciplines, including critical theory in 
education, tend to focus specifically on issues concerning racism, discrimination, and the 
epistemic gaps that have occurred as a consequence of white supremacy. The philosophy 
of race, on the other hand, centralizes the deep epistemological, normative, and 
descriptive content of race, and its circumstantial consequence. It maintains a strong 
commitment to understanding the way(s) in which race is framed conceptually and 
ideologically within societal culture. In other words, if race is a social construct, then 
philosophers of race attempt to understand what kind of construct it is (“what is race?), 
how its ontology impacts life (personally, ideologically, socially, and politically), and the 
possible avenues available to mitigate or eliminate the negative consequences of race.  
Jorge J.E. Gracia posits that there are two primary challenges to the race concept 
within the philosophy of race and ethnicity in his article “Race or Ethnicity: an 
Introduction.” First, there is what he terms the “Factual Challenge.” Central to this 
challenge is the breadth of scientific evidence that shows races are not definable or 
distinguishable on the basis of an individual’s genetic make-up. A second challenge to 
                                                 
148
 Jorge J. E. Gracia, “Race or Ethnicity: An Introduction,” in  Race or Ethnicity?: On Black and Latino 
Identity. ed. Jorge J. E. Gracia. (Ithaca: Cornell, 2007), 1. For an examples of philosophers who attempt to 
maintain biological notions of race, see Kitcher’s, Philip. In Mendel’s Mirror: Philosophical Reflections of 
Biology. Oxford University Press, 2003. and Outlaw, Jr., Lucious, On Race and Philosophy. (New York, 





race is the “Epistemic Challenge.” This challenge often highlights the contextually 
contingent (localized) and inconsistent properties (i.e. skin color) that are often applied to 
relegate an individual to a racial group. Due to these problems, there are no concrete and 
discernable properties that are applicable to races.
150
 Gracia also presents several 
positions found in the philosophy of race that attempt to respond to these challenges. 
Among these are the 1) substituting of race for ethnicity, 2) replacing race with racial 
identity, 3) reframing of race and ethnicity as hybrid concepts, and 4) re-conceptualizing 




The philosophers that I examine in this chapter draw from philosophy’s broad 
methodological arsenal and knowledge from other disciplines (e.g., genetics) in order to 
conduct the analysis to make or engage challenges and responses like the ones above. So, 
with Mill’s and Gracia’s descriptions of philosophy of race in mind, I will explore the 
metaphysics of race conducted by Charles Mills, Kwame Anthony Appiah, Naomi Zack, 
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The Problem of Race  
Charles S. Mills 
Charles Mills puts forth his treatment of race in the book Blackness Visible, He 
seeks to produce a philosophical schematic of the ontological and operative structure of 
race--a metaphysics of race. Before accomplishing this task he offers a descriptive 
comparison to illuminate the basic structure of the American system of race.
153
 In the 
chapter entitled, “But What Are You Really?,” Mills asks us to imagine a system, called 
“quace,” in which each member of society is designated to be a member of one of three 
“quaces”: Q1, Q2, or Q3. The assignment of one’s quace is purely random, no different 
from being given a name chosen from a hat. Quacial categories themselves are 
superficial. They are not connected to phenotype, economic status, family, or any other 
socially relevant variable. Furthermore, quacial membership is disconnected from one’s 
future socio-cultural positioning. Thus, it provides no basis for valuation, oppression, 
discrimination, privilege, or wealth, nor is it governed by axioms that determine one’s 
inter-quacial and intra-quacial interactions.  
Given the nature of this system, it should not be surprising that if one were to 
inquire of another’s quacial designation that the answer would have no ontological 
import. There would be no need for a more incisive inquiry in hopes of revealing any 
deeper meaning—no reason to ask “But what are you really?” out of suspicion that one 
may be withholding the real truth about one’s quace. Being a member of a particular 
quace simply means that one just so happens to have received a particular arbitrary 
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 Mills describes the basic structure of quace as a horizontal system 
due to inconsequential positioning of its categories and “because it has no present or 
historical link with political power, economic wealth, cultural influence.” It is a system 
that is “completely disconnected from patterns of discrimination.”
155
  
It should be evident by now, that Mills’s description of the hypothetical system of 
quace differs substantially from our actual system of race. It is true that race is not like 
quace as it is “morphologically/genealogically grounded.”
156
 This distinction is, for the 
most part, cosmetic. By itself, phenotype or genotype would not necessitate a claim that 
race is not a horizontal system. What makes race substantively distinct from quace is that 
racial groups of this system are stratified circumstantially and ontologically. Races are 
situated in such a way that one group, whites, are regarded as superior to all other racial 
groups. Whites are the privileged group socially, historically, economically, and 
politically, while other races are relegated to comprehensively subaltern statuses.
157
  As a 
result, it is a vertical white supremacist system, rather than a horizontal racial system.  
Charles Mills’s description provides a basic blueprint that shows the structure of 
race--one of a “white supremacist polity.” This description neither tells us what 
constitutes that system, nor how that system constitutes us. However, according to Mills, 
a person’s “racial category has been taken as saying a great deal about what and who one 
is, more fundamentally.”
158
  The next step, then, is to attempt to understand the deeper 
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metaphysics of this system so that we can ascertain “to what extent and in what ways…is 
race real, and how deep is this reality.”
159
   
Mills proposes that a metaphysics of race can assist us in uncovering the realness 
of race. Borrowing from philosophy of science and meta-ethics, he offers a taxonomy of 
available positions on what metaphysics of race may look like. Mills suggest that there 
are two primary types of racial theories, objectivist and anti-objectivist. A racial 
objectivist theory would affirm the proposition that the existence of race is not contingent 
on whether we believe or affirm it to be true.
160
 There are two types of objectivist 
theories, realist and constructivist. Realism assigns a valuation of a thing or action. This 
valuation would be true regardless of what we think or how we feel about that thing. On 
the metaphysics of race, a realist would claim that races are objectively real.  
According to Mills, a stronger version of racial realism would stress the belief that 
“differences between races are not confined to morphological characteristics of skin and 
hair types and facial features, but extend to significant intellectual, characterological, and 
spiritual characteristics also, that there are racial essences.” 
161
  Mills acknowledges that 
the racial realist view is the most pervasive view in our society. Most people believe in 
the existences of races as natural human divisions as well as such peculiarities, as Mills 
notes, as racial blood and the one-drop rule.
162
 This point is evidenced by the fact that 
black ancestry is still the determining factor of black racial membership and that absence 
of black ancestry is required for white racial membership. 
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Racial constructivism, like racial realism, asserts that race is real. However, there 
are stark differences between these two positions. Where racial realism supports the 
notion that race is biologically grounded, racial constructivism asserts that it is a 
constructed taxonomy. Mills states, “racial constructivism involves an actual agreement 
of some under conditions where the constraints are not epistemic (getting at the truth) but 
political (establishing and maintaining privilege); the idealization is pragmatic, 
instrumental to the best way of achieving this end.”
163
     
When Mills speaks of the “idealization” within social constructivism, he is 
referring to the type of agreement that holds the racial system together. He asserts that 
this agreement is dependent on idealized intersubjectivity.
164
  To better understand what 
this means, let us apply the constructivist perspective to Mills’s system of quace. Let us 
imagine that we, as societal members under the system of quace, were given those 
particular designations of Q1, Q2, and Q3. By our participation in the system, we are in 
effect agreeing to its operation even if in actuality we do not believe in the legitimacy of 
its markers. Our participation is our consent and that operative consent gives the system 
legitimacy. By our treatment of Mills’s hypothetical system as real it takes on a kind of 
realness. The racial constructivist position would therefore be that race has been 
constructed this way—only the vertical nature of its racial positioning was intentional and 
idealized social consensus provides its continued maintenance. 
There are three anti-objectivist positions on the metaphysics of race:  
subjectivism, relativism, and error theory. Racial subjectivism proposes that one’s race is 
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whatever a particular individual wants it to be.
165
  The racial subjectivist views race as 
something similar to quace in that it has no objectively true ontology. Mills argues, 
however, that the subjectivist position is in error because race is contingent on any one 
person’s belief about races. For example, a person may believe that races are false, but 
that would not negate the fact that people within the racial polity believe that races are 
natural kinds.  
The position of racial relativism is similar to subjectivism. The difference is that 
for the racial subjectivists, race is dependent on the beliefs of the individual, but for the 
racial relativists, the status of race is contingent on the “decisions of a sub-community of 
like-minded people within a larger population.”
166
  Mills acknowledges that 
constructivism has some element of relativism insofar as the realness of race is dependent 
upon the vertical system. However, the ontology of this system does not permit the status 
of race to be dependent upon “sub-communities.”  R2’s or R3’s, for instance, can hold 
the belief that races do not exist or that all races are equal. Unfortunately, however, 
holding this position does not negate that fact that within that system races are thought to 
exist and to be inherently unequal. So, the racial relativist is in error because it does not 
reflect the nature of the race system.
 167 
Finally, error theory of race would reject the propositions of both the realist and 
the constructivist in asserting that race is biologically and socially unreal.
168
  Once again, 
the verticality of the system of race and the social, historical, ontological significance of 
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racial assignment is testament to the social realness of race.
 169
  Race, in other words, 
means something within societal culture. 
The realist position is the primary opponent in Mills’s analysis because as stated 
earlier, it is the most pervasive view on the metaphysics of race—the view held by most 
societal members. However, Mills argues that race is socially, contextually, and 
historically contingent. This is demonstrable by the lack of universality of racial 
designations. For example, the race system in the United States is different than race in 
Puerto Rico or Brazil. Furthermore, the scientific community does not support the racial 
taxonomy nor do they support peculiarities like the one-drop rule.
170
 In this sense, race is 
unreal because racial realism is false. However, race is quite real inasmuch as race is 
given operational consent by the social members whom it governs. Mills, therefore, 
endorses the racial constructivist view because it accounts for both the biological falsity 
of race and social realness of race—a view that acknowledges the intersubjective-
objectivity of race while placing itself in opposition to racial realism.
171
   
Kwame Anthony Appiah 
Kwame Anthony Appiah is an analytical philosopher who, like Charles Mills, 
challenges the position of the racial realist while attempting to provide an answer to the 
question “what is race?” The difference between these theorists, however, is that Mills is 
interested in understand the “social ontology” of race as a white supremacist system, 
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while Appiah is concerned with understanding the development and legitimacy of race as 
a concept.  
In his essay,” Race, Culture, and Identity:  Misunderstood Connections,” Appiah 
posits that “America’s social distinctions cannot be understood in terms of the concept of 
race:  the only human race in the United States is the human race.” 
172
 To prove this 
claim, Appiah makes use of two methodologies borrowed from the philosophy of 
language and the philosophy of science that allow him to play the role of critical race 
investigator. The first method is called the ideational view of meaning. It involves 
collecting people’s ideas or “criterial beliefs” about the meaning of a word and finding 
what, if anything, corresponds to those beliefs. For Appiah’s purposes, the ideational 
method will allow him to answer a conceptual version of the question “What is race?”; 
that is, “What is it that we mean when we speak of race or races?”
173
  One potential 
problem using an ideational method in contemporary society is the variable and 
sometimes conflicting nature of beliefs about race. Over time, race has come to mean 
many different things to many different people. To account for this, Appiah uses what he 
calls a vague criterial theory in conjunction with his ideational method. Under this view, 
once Appiah has collected criterial beliefs, race will be “something that satisfies a good 
number of those beliefs.”
174
 In other words, the goal is to find what is common to all of 
the criterial beliefs.  
It is important for Appiah, however, to obtain the strongest criterial beliefs about 
race. Since our current ideas about race are the weaker remnants of the ideas held by 
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those before us, this necessitates that his ideational analysis look to the past where beliefs 
about races were the strongest. Thus, an ideational analysis for race must also be a 
historical analysis. He argues that collecting criterial beliefs of those who are responsible 
for our current ideas about race, specifically those who existed at a time in which there 
was “more full-blooded discourse,” will provide greater clarity.
175
  He states that, “We 
can explore the ideational structures of which our present talk, so to speak, is the shadow, 
and then see contemporary uses of the term as drawing from various different structures, 
sometimes in ways that are not coherent.”
176
   
Once Appiah is able to collect the ideational criteria for race, he will then employ 
the second method, the referential view of meaning. This position asserts that if we want 
to discover the meaning of a word, then we need to find the thing to which that word 
refers.
177
  Appiah uses a version of this view utilized by the philosophy of science called 
the “causal theory of reference.”  According to this theory, we must “find that thing in the 
world that gives the best causal explanation” of a word.
178
  So, Appiah’s referential 
method asks that he use the criterial beliefs about race gathered from his ideational view 
to find the referent that caused our beliefs about races.
179
     
Appiah explains that our common criterial beliefs about race are generally 
assumed by most to be grounded in science. Questions about race have been deferred to 
the experts—scientists. So, for the purposes of his analysis, Appiah uses persons who 
would have been considered the experts of their respective times. One of the persons, 
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Thomas Jefferson, was an instrumental participant in the racial discourse that took place 
in the United States in the early 1800s.
180
   
For Jefferson, characteristics such as hair, intelligence, creativity, courage, 
disposition, beauty, smell, skin color, were naturally distributed among racial groups. 
This means that whites, for example, had more physical beauty, a greater propensity to 
produce great art, literature, and were intelligent, while the natural makeup of blacks 
caused them to smell unpleasantly and lack intellectual ability.
 181
  So, for Jefferson, race 
is “a concept that is invoked to explain cultural and social phenomena, it is also grounded 
in the physical and psychological natures of the different races; it is, in other words, what 
we would call a biological concept.”
182
   
Appiah draws a similar conclusion when investigating criterial beliefs of famous 
late 19
th
 century British literary critic, Matthew Arnold. Unlike Jefferson’s criterial 
beliefs, Arnold’s beliefs about race were not based on a black/white racial binary. Rather, 
his races included groups such as the Saxons, Normans, and Celts. He believed that each 
race carries with it an essence that contains certain positive and negative characteristics. 
For example, he attributes tendencies such as spirituality or “love of beauty” to the Celts 
and tendencies like vigorousness and insolence to the Normans. These essences were 
heritable and therefore could be combined with other essences through the biological 
intermingling of races. Such essences could even present themselves in the creative 
products of their biological owners. Indeed, according to Arnold, the existence of 
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different moral characteristics in the British literature was a consequence of the mixing of 
racial essences of the Celtic and Saxon essences.
183
   
Both Thomas Jefferson and Matthew Arnold’s beliefs about race constitute what 
Appiah calls racialism. It is a view that is homogenous with Mills’s description of the 
realist position of the metaphysics of race (an equivalence that Mills acknowledges in his 
work).
184
  Appiah states that it is the belief that “we could divide human beings into a 
small number of groups, called ‘races’, in such a way that the members of these groups 
shared certain fundamental, heritable, physical, moral, intellectual, and cultural 
characteristics with one another that they did not share with members of any other 
race.”
185
 Appiah points out the scientific dubiousness of their claims. Thomas Jefferson, 
for example, espoused his views of biological races before there was an actual field of 
biology. During Jefferson’s time, there was only a field of natural history, which would 
not have been able to account for a biological notion of race.
186
 Thus, there would not 
have been strong empirical grounding for the belief that races were biological entities nor 
any reason to presume that “talents” or character traits were heritable. Where Jefferson’s 
racialism was unfounded, Arnold’s was incomplete. Appiah points out that Arnold’s view 
has no inheritance theory that can explain the biological interactions and racial diffusion 
of essences, nor does he provide an account of “how we balance the effects of nature and 
the effects of culture.”
187
 Appiah attests that Darwin’s work detailing his theory of 
evolution had been published years before Arnold was presenting his beliefs about 
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 Arnold’s usage of the term race did not cohere with the scientific meaning of 
race of his time period. So, where Arnold was speaking about a conception of race in 
which racially distinct essences were transmitted biologically, Darwin was speaking 




Appiah argues that the criterial beliefs of Jefferson and Arnold fail on the 
ideational view. These beliefs do not cohere with what is currently known about human 
biology. Biology, simply put, does not account for moral and cultural traits, nor does it 
support the existence of human essences thought to entail characteristics. However, what 
contemporary science does support is that humans are genetic creatures subject to the 
circumstances of our surrounding environment. Furthermore, Appiah points out that even 
the actual biological traits that were attributed to races by Jefferson could not be captured 
by just one classificatory system. There are multiple biological classifications that could 
be created to account for these traits in human beings. Therefore, under the ideational 
view, there are no races.
190
 
Under the referential view, the concept of race does not fare any better. Appiah 
looks to two possible referents to fit the biological criteria. The first referent is a 
“population,” a “community of potentially interbreeding individuals at a given 
locality.”
191
 Appiah offers two senses in which the term populations could potentially be 
appropriate. The first is a more technical usage of the term, used by population 
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geneticists, in which populations could denote isolated, genetically diverse groups that 
are able to interbreed with one another. Appiah notes that this usage of the term 
population is more applicable to plants and animals where one will find different strains 
and breeds. However, this is not true of humans.
192
  For example, the difference between 
what we consider black and white race is not like the differences between the Cairn 
terrier and the Yorkshire terrier breeds in dogs. Rather, humans are more like one of 
those breeds, only genetically isolated, because there are no other human breeds.  
Another view of population could be a “relatively reproductive” isolated 
community within a given locale. Appiah contends that there are isolated groups in the 
US, such as the Amish, that could qualify. However, this conception of populations fails 




Appiah proposes that a second possible referent for the biological criteria of race 
could be “groups defined by skin color, hair, and gross morphology, corresponding to the 
dominant pattern for these characteristics in the major subcontinental regions….”
194
 He 
argues, however, that given the human variation of phenotype and morphology amongst 
Americans, sometimes a result of biological intermingling, categories may or may not 
provide for a perfect fit for everyone, if at all. Furthermore, he asserts that this referent 
offers no biological or social import.
195
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He concludes his analysis by asserting the futility of the concept of race. Not only 
does it fail under the ideational view, but he states that “you can get various possible 
candidates from the referential notion of meaning, but none of them will be much good 
for explaining social or psychological life, and none of them corresponds to the social 
groups that we call ‘races’ in America.”
196
 So, in regard to the traditional race concept, 
we can say that Appiah is an eliminativist. 
So far, I have presented an overview of the theories of two philosophers of race. 
To review, social and political philosopher Charles Mills offers a theoretical framework 
that, in opposition to the realist position, proposes that race as white supremacist polity 
maintained by idealized intersubjective agreement. The realist is also posited as a 
dominant false position held within the context of that system. Analytical philosopher 
Kwame Anthony Appiah provides a conceptual analysis of race that attempts to 
demonstrate that our contemporary conception of race is based on racialism (realism), 
and that racialism is false. In Appiah’s theory, the realist position gets framed causally. 
I will later show how both of these theorists center their accounts of race in their 
analysis of issues such as racial identity and racism. For now, however, let us turn to a 
brief discussion of another theorist--a philosopher of race who is perhaps known for 
offering a comprehensive engagement of the race concept. 
Naomi Zack 
As stated earlier, Mills and Appiah are attempting to provide a theoretical account 
of what race is (although for Appiah it is a necessary antecedent step). Philosopher 





Naomi Zack, however, seeks to demonstrate what race is not (in this sense she 
reconverges with Appiah). To accomplish this, she makes use of a wider set of 
philosophical approaches ranging from general methodologies in the philosophy of 
language, philosophy of science, existentialism, and traditional philosophy. 
In the book Philosophy of Science and Race, Zack takes up an analytical 
argument against the biological conception of race. She argues that most people are 
committed to a position of minimal realism. It is the belief that,  
“There is a world that exists independently of thought, sensation, perception, 
language, and other symbolic representation. Information about this world is 
accessible through the human senses. Similar sensory conditions and sensory 
equipment result in the same or equivalent symbolic descriptions among different 
observers. The sensory information thus agreed upon can be combined in agreed-
upon ways to result in knowledge.”
197
  
The “world” that exists independently for the minimal realist would include the 
physical world.
198
   With that being said, Zack’s argument can be summarized as follows:  
Most people [within the context of the American public] believe that scientists are the 
primary authority on knowledge of this world. Most people also believe that races are 
natural kinds and that this position is scientifically grounded. If it is not the case that 
science supports the existences of human races as biological entities, then it is not logical 
to maintain the belief in human races.
199
  So, in Philosophy of Science and Race, Zack’s 
methodology, arguing from the realist position, attempts to show that there is no 
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biological basis for race, by challenging positions defending a scientific basis for race—
positions that argue that traits like skin color are the products of races.  
There is some interesting overlap between Zack’s theory and both Mills’s and 
Appiah’s. To some, Zack taking up a realist position may seem in contradiction to Mills’s 
constructivist position. However, I argue that Zack’s argument from the realist position 
illuminates an implicit realism inherent in Mills’s and Appiah’s theories; that is, like 
Naomi Zack, they both rely on science to prove the falsity of the racial realist position. 
Thus, there would have to be a commitment on both of their parts to a position of 
minimal scientific realism.  
It is also worth noting that there are methodological and conceptual parallels 
between Appiah’s and Zack’s analysis. Indeed, Zack’s analysis could be considered an 
expanded and more scientifically exhaustive version of Appiah’s analysis. Zack’s starting 
point, like Appiah’s, is the belief in racialism found in those who preceded us. She 
examines the racialism of philosophical thinkers Immanuel Kant and David Hume (as 
opposed to Thomas Jefferson and Matthew Arnold).
200
  She furthermore suggests a 
causal connection to contemporary racial realism. She states, “Hume and Kant’s kind of 
unquestioning belief in the existences of races in private folk belief and in many quasi-
empirical and “soft” intellectual areas, which include: defenses of anthropological 
typologies and critiques of these typologies…; claims of race-based links in the 
habitability of intelligence.”
201
  It is these racialist beliefs that she seeks to overturn by 
demonstrating that there is no scientific basis for them. Thus, the parallels between Zack 
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and Appiah are vivid. It serves as an example of how philosophers of race are in constant 
dialogue with one another. Moreover, it shows how these theorists attempt to refine each 
other’s positions. In Zack’s case, she is doing what Appiah’s conceptual analysis using 
the philosophy of language does not require; that is, she is placing the conceptual battle 
more firmly in the territory of the sciences, the last line of defense for the racial realist, to 
make a more complete case for why we need to abandon the race concept. 
Now that we have examined how three of our theorists approach the problem of 
race, we will now turn our attention to these theorists’ engagement of race as it relates to 
factors such as identity and ethnicity. I will also introduce the race theory of Jorge Gracia 
as he attempts to engage some of the positions that follow. Let us first begin, however, 
with Charles Mills as he engages racial identity. 
Race and Identity 
 
Mills on Racial Identity 
Charles Mills’s question “But what are you really?” represents a very complex 
conundrum for most anti-realist or anti-racialist philosophers of race. Even though race is 
biologically false, it has ontological implications in social life. One of the problematic 
characteristics of race is that it is not an ideal system. An ideal system of race would 
“have rules that regulate its interstructure and guarantee as far as possible its 
reproduction…every person in the system should have a designation, R1, R2, R3….if 





  He goes on to say that in an ideal system, the rules must be concise and 
account for all potential ambiguities, intra-racial offspring, the offspring of those 
offspring, newcomer to the system, etc.
203
  
Since race lacks concise and lucid internal rules to govern, then attempting to 
ascertain the criteria that could determine one’s racial identity can be problematic. How 
then can we know who we are in the ontologically deep sense?
204
 Mills demonstrates this 
by testing criterion to see how they could measure up as indicators of one’s racial 
identity. One of these candidates encompasses standard criteria for determining race, 
phenotype and morphology. The problem with phenotypic traits, like skin color, for 
example, is that it is not a failsafe criterion for determining one’s real metaphysical 
status. It is possible that someone who “looks white,” lives her life as a white person, is 
therefore taken to be intrinsically white. However, in American society, a revelation that 
she has some “black blood,” would mean that she was never really white, but instead an 
ontologically black person pretending to be white.
205
  The one-drop rule, therefore, 
undermines physical bases for race, as criteria for racial identity. 
Another candidate for racial identity is culture. Mills contends that under the 
realist metaphysics that culture would be a result of one’s racial biology. This means that 
there would be a biological commitment to use one’s own cultural products. To carry out 
this commitment would be to be true to one’s ontological self. On the other hand, to use 
the cultural products of another race would be an act of true-self negation. Thus, playing 
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both the banjo and the guitar should cause a metaphysical dilemma within that person. 
Mills correctly points out, however, that American culture is a composite made up of a 
multiplicity of cultural influences from every continent. This is not generally 
acknowledged within the broader context of American culture, even though it is true at its 
most basic levels. The vertical white supremacist system facilitates a selective racial co-
opting of the products of cultural syncretism--one that, to use my previous example, 
allows the African banjo to become a white cultural product.
206
  Mills’s analysis reveals 
that other potential criteria for racial identity, ancestral awareness, experience, and self-




Zack on Mixed Race Identity   
These sentiments are echoed in Naomi Zack’s Race and Mixed Race, her critique 
of the exclusive nature of a binary concept of race. She asserts “the American biracial 
system does not permit the identification of individuals, in the third person, as mixed 
race. If individuals cannot be identified, in the third person, as mixed race, then it is 
impossible for them to have mixed race identities, in the first person.”
208
   
Through an existential analysis, she shows how a racial “kinship schema” that 
accompanies the race concept requires one to ask Mills’s question, “But what are you 
really?” as “what are they?”  That is because one’s racial identity is contingent upon the 
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racial identities of one’s forebears.
209
 The kinship schema structures whites and blacks as 
two separate families, each with its own particular guidelines to claim an identity within 
those families. According to Zack, white identity is closely connected with our folk 
concept of race (racialism). The white family scheme follows the one-drop rule—a rule 
meant to maintain white racial purity. The white family schema, however, goes beyond 
the one-drop rule, which limits itself to ancestry. For a person to have a white identity 
under the white family schema not only can she not have any black ancestors, she also 
cannot have any black descendents or spouses, as they too will act as a basis by which to 




According to Zack, the black family schema is the same as the white family 
schema, except it encompasses a broader notion of what is considered white. The black 
family schema uses phenotype for racial designation. Thus, people who belong to groups 
that normally considered “white” (some Latinos, Turks, Sicilians, etc.) by the white 
family schema may be considered non-white in the black schema. So, in the black 
schema, for someone to be considered white, she must satisfy both the descent condition 
and the phenotype condition.
211
  Zack asserts that, in general, blacks do not share the 
same biological conception of race as whites, meaning there is no necessary belief that 
they are ontologically inferior to whites or that whites have better intrinsic qualities. 
Sometimes, black identity entails an oppositional view towards whites because they feel 
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that whites are in control.
212
 However, this does not negate the fact that the physical 
concept of race is central to the binary racial family model. The black schema affirms the 
white schema by excluding others from white racial membership and by assigning black 
membership to those whose race is ambiguous. In other words, a person must be 
designated either white or black, even if she has black and white ancestors, thereby 
leaving no room for a mixed race identity.
213
 
Mills and Zack’s visions appear compatible. Mills frames the issue of racial 
identity in the context of a vertical political framework--one that positions identities 
hierarchically but also, as a consequence, in opposition to one another. Zack’s existential 
presentation provides a demonstration of how a race-based white/black family framework 
inhibits the emergence of mixed identity. It could be argued that Zack’s analysis shows 
the non-idealness of the vertical race system. We will now see how Appiah moves his 
discussion of identity into more normative territory, offering an analytical re-conception 
of racial identity that is sensitive to the biological falseness and social realness of race. 
Appiah on Racial Identity 
Appiah, like Mills, rejects culture as a suitable replacement for the concept of 
race, if what is meant by culture are shared values, products, and beliefs. He asserts that 
the belief that the black racial group has a common culture-a culture that is universally 
held amongst blacks within the United States is something that is in need of proof. He 
points out that the common contention regarding blacks and culture is that if x is assumed 
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to be a member of the black racial group, then x is assumed to have a particular culture 
regardless of whether or not it reflects x’s experienced culture.
214
 Appiah refers to this 
spurious view, that cultural is disseminated to individuals biologically, as “cultural 
geneticism”—a view that he likens back to Matthew Arnold’s racialism. 
215
 Appiah also 
points out that diasporic notions of culture treat blacks as though there is an “authentic 
self” and Africa American cultural identity as though constructed independently of white 
society.
216
  Appiah rejects this view. He states, 
“African-American identity…is centrally shaped by American society and 
institutions: it cannot be seen as constructed solely within African-American 
communities. African-American culture, if this means shared belief, values, 
practices, does not exist: what exists are African-American cultures, and though 
these are created and sustained in large measure by African-Americans, they 




So, for example, it would be difficult to speak of cultural products that are 
typically attributed to black people (Christianity, gangster rap, or “soul food,”) without 
understanding the role white persons, white-favored institutions or conditions played in 
the creation of racially designated cultural ownership. 
Appiah argues that racial identity may be the most optimal replacement for the 
concept of race. Racial identities are generally already ascribed to us and labels can have 
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a significant effect on how we look at ourselves and how we live our lives. In general, 
labels affect the process called “identification.”  He describes this as “the process through 
which an individual intentionally shapes her projects---including her plans for her own 
life and her conception of the good—by reference to available labels and available 
identities.”
218
  He contends that sometimes labels can come with the expectation that we 
perform a particular way in a particular context. For example, the label “professor,” as 
generally perceived in the university setting, may compel us to present ourselves with a 
degree of authority, to dress a certain way, or to modify our common way of speaking. 
These types of labels are more superficial. There would be little expectation that a 
professor perform her identity to her friends, family, or sales clerk. They ask nothing of 
us other than to act in a particular ways, in particular times and places.
219
 
Racial labels, on the other hand, have a deeper dimension. They are different from 
labels like “professor” because their expectations are ontologically mandated. To borrow 
the phrase from Mills again, the labels are expected to provide the answer to “but what 
are you, really?” and prescribe actions in deference to that answer.
220
  Appiah states that 
“because ascription of racial identities—the process of applying the label to people, 
including ourselves—is based on more than intentional identification that there can be a 
gap between what a person inscriptively is and the racial identity he performs:  it is this 
gap that makes passing possible.”
221
  
                                                 
218
 Ibid., 78. 
219
 Ibid., 78-79. 
220





Appiah further insists that identification is not always voluntary, as some 
identities are ascribed to us by general consensus, but we are able to control how much 
those identities shape our lives. Racial identity is an example of this. However, the 
physical bases, social realities, consequence, and consensus for racial ascription make 
controlling the centrality of the racial identity more difficult.
222
  Historically, the 
recognition of racial identity has been based on the tendency to focus on the body as a 
basis for collective identity. So, one conceives of herself as connected to others based on 
something ontologically shared:  “I am black, that person is black, and therefore, we 
share blackness.”  The result has led to a reaffirmation of racial essences. This has been 
the mistake in the politics of identity—to look to the body for the answers. 
223
  
Appiah’s proposal is that we decentralize the body, in this regard, and instead 
conceive of racial identities in terms of the label, itself, as it has always been what 
determines the terms and consequences of racial membership. Recognizing the 
importance of identity in the politics of identity, Appiah offers this re-conception of racial 
identity as,  
“R, associated with ascriptions by most people (where ascription involves 
descriptive criteria for applying the label); and identifications by those that fall 
under it (where identifications implies a shaping role for the label in the 
intentional acts of the possessors, so that they sometimes act as an R), where there 
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is a history associating that label with an inherited racial essence (even if some 
who use the label no longer believe in racial essence).”
224
 
Under Appiah’s view, one’s racial identity does not suppose racial essence, but 
also does not have to deny that an essence was historically attached to it; it is racial 
without being racialist. I can conceive of that identity as being connected with others 
who share that designation, without having to affirm what is designated. As a result of its 
ontological disentanglement, I can, if I desire, regard that identity as any other—of some, 
little or no importance in regard to how I choose to live my life. It can be arbitrary or it 
can be an ethical identity. This allows for identities to have political import, without the 
ontological import. Appiah’s proposal of racial identity can therefore provide a response 
for those who resist Mills’s system and Zack’s schemas. That is because it allows one to 
acknowledge the constructedness of the designated racial labels, without having to 
endorse the ontological content that usually accompanies those labels.  
Jorge Gracia on Race, Ethnicity, and Identity 
Jorge Gracia attempts to respond to the challenge of making sense out of race 
while responding to the critiques of theorists such as Appiah. Gracia rejects racial and 
ethnic essentialism “not only because it is false but also because it freezes groups of 
people in certain states and circumstances preventing them from adapting to different 
situations in order to satisfy effectively the conditions imposed on them by their 
environment.”
225
  However, he believes that Appiah (and many scientists) are acting too 
hastily in concluding that race is incoherent because it fails to correspond to anything that 
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actually exists in the world. Gracia maintains that even if race is a social construct, it has 
properties that make it distinguishable from other human categorization systems.
 226
  For 
example, we typically understand that “black” denotes race while “Haitian-American” 
denotes ethnicity and that Haitian denotes a nationality.  
Gracia also takes issue with the assumption that if something is a social construct 
then it is automatically dangerous. After all, he asserts, we group each other in multitudes 
of socially constructed ways (e.g. height) all the time with seemingly little consequence. 
Another problem for theorists who side with Appiah is that there are some scientists who 
assert that there is some genetic variation between groups of humans that may indeed fall 
within the boundaries of the traditional concept of race. Gracia further points out the fact 
that there is broad agreement amongst scientists that humans can be grouped genetically. 
While he is not claiming to advocate for the traditional concept of race, he does believe 
that the aforementioned issues are sufficient enough for showing some restraint in regard 
to dismissing race as a concept.
227
  
Like Appiah, Mills, and Zack, Gracia believes that attempting to understand race 
is a valuable undertaking. He, thus, attempts to offer a nuanced, heuristic presentation of 
race that attempts to free its essentialist metaphysics and that also disentangles race from 
the ethnic paradigm. Gracia believes that leaving race and ethnicity untouched is 
dangerous. He believes that it is necessary to provide adequate explanations of the 
concepts of race and ethnicity that will make it possible to make sense of what it is that 
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we are referring to when we talk about race or ethnicity. Let us look first at Gracia’s 
formula concerning ethnicity, the “Familial-Historical View.” He states, 
“An ethnos is a subgroup of individual humans who satisfy the following 
conditions: (1) they belong to many generations; (2) they are organized as a 
family and break down into extended families; and (3) are united through 
historical relations that produce features that, in context, serve (i) to identify the 




Ethnicity, for Gracia, is simply the relation(s) that binds individuals within the group to 
one another. In other words, an individual’s ethnicity consists of her having whatever 
particular feature or features connect her to that ethnos.
229
  
To summarize Gracia’s view, for a group to be considered an ethnos it must have 
a period of development that lasts over multiple generations. To understand Gracia’s 
second condition, it is important to recognize how he conceives of the notion of family. 
There are several types of families, including the nuclear family, which would include 
what we tend to consider our immediate family (partner, spouse, children, etc) and the 
extended family which could include those family members not residing with you or who 
perhaps have their own families (cousins, in-laws, step-cousins, etc). For membership in 
a family, it is not necessary that a family be related genetically. For instance, if x marries 
y, then x becomes part of y’s family and y becomes part of x’s family. X’s father, for 
example, become’s y’s father-in-law. If x and y adopt a child, then that child becomes 
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part of both x’s and y’s family. One’s membership in a family might be the result of 
being x’s adopted son, and another’s membership might be a consequences of marrying 
that son. Thus, as in the case of nuclear and extended families, there does not have to be a 
common feature binding for all members of the family.
230
 
Gracia maintains that an ethnos consists of similarly variable, historical 
relationships to the aforementioned types of families. He uses as an example, what he 
considers a Hispanic ethnos. There are a wide variety of available features that allow a 
person to have a Hispanic ethnicity. Examples of this are, a person who was born in 
Puerto Rico, or who was born in Germany but grew up in Spain, or who is the child of 
someone whose mother grew up in Mexico. In all of these cases, these people would be 
regarded as Hispanic because of their particular relationships to the ethnos. For Gracia, 
all that matters in regard to an individual’s ethnicity is that the individual has a feature(s) 
that is distinct to her ethnos. This does not mean that the individual shares that feature 
with all other Hispanic persons, only that she shares a feature that is considered 
distinctive to that particular group. Those historical features might be filial (mother-
stepdaughter), social, linguistic (language), cultural (shared customs), and even biological 
(blood relative). These factors are contingent on the historical development of a particular 




An important aspect to Gracia’s Familial-Historical View is the overall 
contingency of an ethnos and its membership. Gracia states that “[e]thne are fluid, open, 
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and changing; members come and go, enter and leave, as they forge themselves and with 
members of other groups depending on particular and contingent circumstances.”
232
 If a 
person from Denver, Colorado is Hispanic because she resides in Puerto Rico after 
marrying someone who is Puerto-Rican, then it is possible that she can leave that ethnos 
by simply moving back to the Denver. This is because moving away for Puerto-Rico 
would sever the historical relation that connects her to members of the Hispanic 
ethnos.
233
 It is also quite possible for an individual to have multiple ethnicities. For 
instance, someone might be a member of Gracia’s “Hispanic” pan-ethnic group, but have 




We are able to see here how Jorge Gracia’s description of ethnicity escapes the 
type of essentialism that is often applied to ethnic and ethno-racial groups. An essentialist 
concept of ethnicity would mean that there is some fixed property that the individual of 
an ethnos shares with all members who share that ethnicity. Gracia’s Familial-Historical 
View, recognizes that 1) the development of the ethnos is historically contingent, 2) the 
relations within the ethnos vary from person to person, 3) the properties used to 
determine membership are historically and contextually contingent, and 4) that the 
individual is not bound to that ethnos as its membership is always in flux either as a result 
of either the actions of the individual (e.g. severing ethnic relations) or the evolution (e.g. 
changing criteria for membership) or possible dissolution of the ethnos.  
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Now that we have examined Gracia’s account of ethnicity, let us investigate the 
concept of race, another type of family.
235
 Gracia calls his theory of race the Common 
Bundle View.
236
 It states, 
“A race is a subgroup of individual human beings who satisfy the following 
conditions: (1) each member of the group is linked by descent to another member 
of the group who is in turn also linked by descent to at least some third member of 
the group; and (2) each member of the group has one or more features that are (i) 




In Gracia’s Common Bundle View, race, like ethnicity, is a matter of the 
individual having the appropriate historical relation that binds him to other members of 
his racial group. However, the primary divergence from ethnicity is that links such as 
marriage, language, or cultural practices bear no metaphysical import for racial 
membership. Instead, for Gracia, the defining aspect of race is the historical, genetic link 
between racial members; this is an aspect that would have only been sufficient, but not 
necessary for some ethnicities (depending on the properties that emerged from an 
ethnos’s development). To be linked by descent means that the pertinent relationships are 
matters of birth. For instance, x might be an R because x’s mother is an R. If x also has a 
phenotypic feature considered indicative of x’s race, such as black hair, then x as has 
satisfied the second condition thereby making x an R. 
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In the three stipulations for the second condition, we see several ways in which 
Gracia’s racial metaphysics attempts to avoid the essentialism of our traditional notion of 
race; that is, there is some essential property each member of a racial group has that 
makes her of that race. First, his view does not posit a feature (or set of features) that 
could be construed as a collective essence. Rather, he is asserting that an individual need 
only have one of the collectively assigned, but not collective held features. As with 
ethnicity, there is no feature that is common to all members of a race. Thus, Gracia is 
acknowledging the high variability of persons who were assigned to racial groups. 
Secondly, it is clear that, for Gracia, these features designated to a particular race are 
socially determined, as they are “generally associated” with a particular race as opposed 
to being properties intrinsic of the individual. 
A third way in which Gracia’s Common Bundle View avoids essentialism is by 
responding directly to Naomi Zack’s contention that the racial identity schema is 
asymmetrical and therefore does not permit mixed race identities. Gracia agrees with 
Zack on this matter, but argues that under the criteria that he has provided, the one-drop 
rule for racial identity has no place in his model precisely because of this asymmetry, 
which favors the notion of white purity. In other words, with the traditional model of 
race, not only are the features of the bundle different, but the rules for determining racial 
membership are also dissimilar from race to race. Gracia holds that the Common Bundle 
View provides an objective way to determine what race and racial identity entails. As 
was the case with ethnicity, it is quite possible for an individual to have multiple races. 
All that would be required is that a person can share one or more distinct descent links 
(even if that link is from the same parent or grandparent) and have observable features 
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considered indicative of those races. That means a person could theoretically be white, 
black, and even a member of any other group that qualifies as a race.
238
 Thus, Gracia’s 
conception of race is able to avoid the existential problems regarding mixed identity that 
concern Zack. 
As we have seen, race and ethnicity do share some aspects in common such as 
both being predicated on historical and familial relations and no common feature-
requirement for membership as well as sharing differences. Namely, there is the descent 
link that acts as a necessary feature for a race, while it is only one of many possible 
sufficient, but not necessary, features for an ethnos. Moreover, there are also  “genetically 
transmittable,” socially designated, phenotypic features of races as opposed to the 
variable types of features of ethne that emerge from its historical development. 
Gracia takes issue with those who strategically attempt to posit ethnic races or 
racial ethne, which, as I pointed out earlier, is one of the responses to the factual and 
epistemic challenges to race. He claims that this view is based on the assumption that the 
ethnicity and race are now intrinsically bound together, and thus “1) one cannot speak 
sensibly about race apart from ethnicity, or vice versa, and 2) one cannot classify 
someone as a member of a race and not of an ethnos, or vice versa.”
239
 
Gracia offers several reasons why we should not confuse race and ethnicity. First, 
he maintains that it is important that we understand these concepts before we attempt to 
use them in conjunction with one another. Secondly, there is often resistance to the 
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conflation by those who do not fit its narrative. Finally, biological and social scientists do 
not maintain this correlation between a racial genetics and cultural production.
240
 
Gracia argues that the reason that there is a tendency to treat race and ethnicity in 
a singular manner is because ethnicity, as he has described it, permits descent and 
morphology as potential features for an ethnos in the same way that it permits other 
factors such as culture or language. However, these features are contingent upon the 
dictates of historical development and therefore are able to change over time. This is not 
the case regarding race, however, because the presence of genetically transferable racial 
identifiers is a necessary condition for a group to be considered a race. So, Gracia asserts, 
in some circumstances it is possibly useful to talk about a particular ethnos in racial 
terms. However, it is inappropriate to do so without a mindfulness of that ethnic group’s 
historical and circumstantial contexts.
241
 
Another basis for confusing race and ethnicity is a consequence of the view that 
race and ethnicity are in a symbiotically productive relationship in which each yields 
characteristics for the other. Gracia offers the following example:  
“racial identification often leads to segregation, and this in turn may result in the 
development of an ethnos. The segregation of “Blacks” tends to link them 
together in ways that separate them from other races. This strengthens their 
historical interrelations and tends to produce ethnic features. Thus, one may speak 
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However, Gracia goes on to say that race and ethnicity are still different in this 
regard. When a person of a particular race is said to internalize or perform the ontology 
of a different race, it is not race that is being referenced, as there is no mention of any 
genetically transmitted features. Rather, such claims concern ethnic or cultural features, 
which, of course, speak to an ethnic dimension.
243
 
Gracia does state that ethnic features can facilitate the development of racial 
features, noticing how social mores can lead to ethnic isolation, which in turn results in 
phenotypic features. For, example, racial segregation in the south, may have lead to 
distinct bundles of physical features (skin color range) that become racially marked as 
“white” or “black.”
244
 However, Gracia points, out that there are several circumstantial 
factors that are able to facilitate the creation of ethnic or racial features (e.g. religious 
segregation, geography, economics, social mobility).
245
 However, this provides a greater 
mandate, in Gracia’s view, to keep race and ethnicity separate categories because the 
conflation of these constructs makes little sense when there are ways of understanding 
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Now that I have examined how these theorists approach issues such as identity 
and ethnicity, let us now turn to a brief sketch that shows how these philosophers frame 
the concept of race in relation to the problem of racism. 
Racialism, Racism, and White Supremacy 
 
It is common in academic scholarship to centralize such problems as racism and 
white supremacy without reference to the consequential role that the race construct 
actually plays in these matters. However, the four philosophers of race that I have 
investigated here see race as intrinsically bound to the issues of racism. This is perhaps 
most evident with Kwame Anthony Appiah. His theory of racism is, in actuality, a theory 
of racialism. Racialism, remember, is the belief in human races each of which share their 
own distinct and exclusive biological and non-biological traits; it is the belief in racial 
essences. Appiah contends that even though racialism is a false doctrine, as long as 
positive moral qualities are distributed across races, each can be respected, can have its 
‘separate but equal’ place” in a world of racial identification.
247
   He argues, however, 
that racialism is presupposed by two racialist doctrines, extrinsic racism and intrinsic 
racism. Extrinisic racism is the belief that races have morally relevant qualities that act as 
a basis for discriminating against that race (favorably or unfavorably). These qualities can 
be positive or negative. So, for example, if a person refuses to associate with a person of 
a different race because they believe that each member of that race is uncreative, then 
they are extrinsic racist. In the face of evidence that disproves the extrinsic racist’s belief, 
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she relinquishes that belief. If they will not relinquish that belief, then she either has a 
cognitive incapacity that prevents her from doing so or she is an intrinsic racist.
 248 
The intrinsic racist, on the other hand, believes that one’s race is an indicator of 
moral status. An example of an intrinsic racist would be someone who will not associate 
with whites because she considers them morally inferior. Unlike, the sincere extrinsic 
racist, the intrinsic racist cannot be swayed by evidence. Appiah also argues that an 
intrinsic racist extends her positive moral consideration to those with whom she shares 
racial membership. Thus, race for the intrinsic racist is like family. Examples of this form 
of racism would be the Ku Klux Klan, or Black Nationalism, the former being based on 




There are a couple of points worthy of note about Appiah’s racialist triad. The 
first, perhaps obvious, point is that, its impossible to talk about racism without 
acknowledging the false belief about races. So, in effect, racism is the acting out of 
racialism. A second point is that this conception racism provides a broader coverage, 
when it comes to classifying acts as it encompasses both subtle and overt or extreme 
forms of racism. A final point is that the racism is not necessarily asymmetrical in terms 
of who is guilty of racism. So, if we apply Appiah’s doctrines to Mills’s vertical race 
system, it is possible that an R3 can be intrinsically racist against R1 or R2 as much as R1 
can be racist against R2 or R3. So Appiah’s view is not meant to account for the stratified 
power differential of the American race system (white supremacy, distribution of 
                                                 
248
 Ibid., 377. 
249
 Ibid., 281,282. 
 
 160 
property, etc). Rather, it is intended to show the possible racialist and racist ideological 
positions available within the American race system. 
 In Race and Mixed Race, Naomi Zack makes use of Appiah’s distinction of 
intrinsic racism to illuminate the white family kinship schema, asserting that the doctrine 
is a prerequisite to her own distinctions of racism, unintentional and intentional racism.
250
  
She states,  
“[u]nintentional racism involves assumptions [on the part of whites] that blacks 
(and perhaps other people of color as well) that are not included in the important 
activities of one’s life. It is not necessary always to be aware of one’s own 
whiteness while living in this exclusion; one simply lives in a white world and 
non-whites are only occasional and important agents in that world.”
251
  
So, this type of racism involves passive indifference of non-whites, such as 
knowing blacks but not associating with them, not having blacks in your life, even not 
having to know any blacks. What makes unintentional racists “racist” is that they 
participate in a system in which black people are treated unfairly. Unintentional racism is 
like a weaker extrinsic racism in that it does not require a strong commitment to the belief 
in biological races. Their differential acts are due to their blind adherence to cultural 
norms that promote such acts.
252
 At the same time, most racialists would likely be 
unintentional racists by this view, unless they are actively attempting to prevent racism or 
to include blacks in their lives. 
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Intentional racism “entails a frequent or constant awareness that one is white, 
accompanied by strong value-negative judgments against blacks.”
253
 Intentional racists 
practice more overt forms of racism such as participating in hate groups or purposely 
attempting to undermine equality for blacks. Operatively, it seems like a less subtle from 
of intrinsic racism, only its commitment to the belief in racially inherited (presumably 
cultural or moral) traits is a matter of probability. In the cases of both unintentional and 




So, for Appiah and Zack, it is impossible talk about the problem of racism without 
first addressing the traditional concept of race, because racialism authorizes racism. If we 
take into account Mills’s description of the vertical system and the metaphysical position 
on race against which he has positioned himself against, it is evident that there is 
agreement between Mills and Zack. Like Zack’s binary racial schema, Mills’s vertical 
race system is based on assumptions of white supremacy and the idealized intersubjective 
agreement by those who fall within that system further ratifies the legitimacy of the 
dominant white positioning. There has always been the belief in racial realism that 
undergirds this system. Thus, it is also understandable why, in response to Appiah’s 
distinction between racialism (realism) and racism, Mills states, “not merely have all 
racists been realists, but most realists have been racists.”
255
 Race and racism are 
inherently bound to one another. 
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In the previous section, I stated that Gracia believes that his de-essentialized 
conceptions of race and ethnicity will provide a frame of reference that will help us better 
understand the historical and social nuances that surround the race concept. In addition to 
this stated purpose, Gracia also shares Mill’s view that the race concept will facilitate a 
greater comprehension of the more nefarious consequences of race. He states,  
“ Race has been the source of much oppression and abuse. To correct this requires 
not only that we refer to race, but also that we have an appropriate understanding 
of it. Without a concept of race, we cannot fight the ghosts that populate our 
social consciousness or overturn the oppressive structures that are embedded in 
our institutions…we need an appropriate and adequate understanding of race to 




 Appiah appears to reluctantly agree with the point that Gracia is making here. He 
believes that it may be a necessary step to maintain some conception of race, which is 
why he proposed a de-essentialized racial identity as a possible substitute for race. 
However, Appiah’s proposal is a cautious one because he believes collective identities 
often accompany their own axioms, or what Appiah calls “scripts.” Thus, he maintains, 
they have the tendency to dominate over other personal identities.
257
  He states, “Racial 
identity can be the basis of resistance to racism; but even as we struggle against racism—
and though we have made great progress, we have further still to go—let us not let our 
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racial identities subject us to new tyrannies.”
258
 Naomi Zack however, has historically 
diverged more starkly from this point of view (Appiah and Gracia), often arguing for the 
elimination of the race concept through education for these particular purposes. 
Although, in her more recent work she argues that to confront racism that we must also 
turn our focus toward gender as she holds that racial (and ethnic) taxonomy and 
oppression has always been a consequence of white male rule.
259
 
Philosophy of Race and Education 
All of these philosophers of race exhibit distinct analytical measures to approach 
the issue of race. Appiah’s analytic approach is useful for critical theorists because we 
can apply his analyses to ourselves. We can how we, and other theorists, use the concept 
of race in our analyses, how we contribute to its evolution, and how our own conceptions 
of race correspond to what is known about race in the sciences. Naomi Zack’s 
methodology provides an analytical avenue to examine a variety of existential 
consequences of axiomatic structure of the race concept. Both Mills and Gracia’s social 
constructivist approaches provide us with methods that allow us to create our own 
heuristic models and analyses by which we can explore race. 
These philosophers’ analyses yield substantial amounts of knowledge that are 
needed by critical theory in education. They expose various aspects of the way race is 
constituted and the way in which it can structure an individual’s identity. Charles Mills 
shares much in common with critical theorists like Asante, Kincheloe, Steinberg, and 
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McLaren because he is concerned with the nature and consequences of white supremacy. 
His analysis showed us how race, itself, is a manifestation of white supremacy because it 
ranks races hierarchically. Thus, race, for Mills is causal, not consequential, of white 
supremacy.  
Both Zack and Appiah’s conceptual analyses of race illuminate the problematic, 
conjectural development of the race concept. They demonstrate how the concept of race 
is predicated on now discredited scientific racialism and realism. In other words, race, as 
we know it, is and always has been a false concept. One reason that this should be 
important to critical theory in education is that the ways in which we sometimes affix 
cultural traits to race are arguably contemporary manifestations of racialism. This move 
on the part of critical theorists would require the assumption or imposition of shared 
essentialist properties that span across a broad range individuals, families, and ethnicities.  
Jorge Gracia highlights the necessity of understanding both race and ethnicity as 
distinct concepts. His new proposals for these concepts enable us to disencumber race 
and ethnicity when they are confused with one another, as they often are in critical and 
multicultural theory. Moreover, his conceptions provide us with ways of knowing if, 
when, and how race and ethnicity are connected in cases where we suspect there is 
connection or overlap. Gracia’s highlighting of the significance of historical relations in 
his conceptions of race and ethnicity allows us to see that race and ethnicity are in a 
contingent and circumstantial flux. This is important for critical theorists in education as 
it could help provide us with more effective and accurate ways to ensure that theory and 
practice are indeed culturally relevant by not locking students into racialized ethne that 
do not speak to their current ethnic and cultural realities. Furthermore, the contingency of 
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race and ethnicity mandate that we understand their development before we send these 
concepts for praxis in the classroom. 
One aspect of Gracia’s Familial-Historical View of ethnicity that speaks to the 
aforementioned point is that culture is a sufficient but not a necessary feature of an 
ethnos. This factor should be of great important for critical theory in that it sanctions that 
we are cautious when attempting to assign cultural products collectively to individuals. 
For example, even if black Americans qualify as an ethnicity under the Familial-
Historical View, culture may not necessarily be the feature that binds particular 
individuals to an ethnos. Thus, before we deploy strategies of black affirmation, it is 
necessary that we have an understanding of the multiplicity of ways and degrees in which 
students are related or relevantly invested in their ethnic membership(s). 
The problem of mixed racial identities is largely ignored within critical theory in 
education. This is because the persons to whom those identities would get assigned are 
often eclipsed by the essentialist racial binary. The transition from the biological 
paradigm of race to the ethnic (bio-ethnic) paradigm of race, has only served to further 
mask this problem.
260
 As I demonstrated in Chapter Four, our failure, as theorists, to 
recognize our own complicity in reinforcing the one-drop rule by treating blacks as a 
monolithic group can endanger students. Naomi Zack’s contribution on mixed raced 
identities makes it possible to understand how, in this way, we are affirming the 
traditional white supremacist model of race that attempts to maintain the purity of 
whiteness. Moreover, her analysis shows us consequences to the individual who fails to 
be recognized within the racial binary. The nature of mixed racial identities needs to 
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Jorge Gracia’s Common Bundle View and Familial-Historical View offer a 
possible solution to Zack’s analysis. These views facilitate our understanding of how an 
individual can have more than one racial identity and additionally, one or more 
candidates for ethnic identities of varying types (e.g. family, Creole, African American, 
Pan-African). Furthermore, his de-essentialized conceptions of race and ethnicity show us 
why we need to take care in assigning cultural or racial content to individuals in a 
hierarchical manner (i.e. showing greater deference to one’s “blackness” or 
“Africanness” over one’s  “whiteness” or “Europeaness” or vice versa). 
Another important contribution that these theorists make available for critical 
theory in education is that they all show how race is of crucial importance when 
confronting issues such as racism. Appiah’s racialist triad best highlights this point by 
showing that the primary difference between the belief in races and racisms is that the 
latter simply means that we act upon the knowledge that underlies the former. For 
example, the belief in an actual black race encompasses the belief that there are certain 
essential characteristics intrinsic to members of that race. Racism for Appiah is simply 
when we allow our racialism to inform how we view and treat persons from other races, 
whether that means that we consider them as part of our moral community or whether it 
compels us to oppress, alienate, or avoid those from other races.  
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Finally, the question of what to do given the nature of the race construct is a 
discussion that is sorely needed within critical theory in education. The above-mentioned 
methodologies and analyses can inform us on these matters. Furthermore, the potential 
consequences of race, such as those I have highlighted in the dissertation thus far, 
mandate that we do something. We cannot simply take to the field when more overtly 
destructive race-related consequences occur, yet passively sit in the stands on the matter 
of race. Action on the race construct is necessary because race is causally antecedent to 
the aforementioned consequences.  
If we are going to make legitimate attempts to mitigate the consequences of racial 
hegemony for students, we need to decide if facilitating the maintenance of realism in 
theoretical discourse is the best course of action. In this chapter, I have shown there are 
other options available. It is possible, that we may decide that we have to take up the 
eliminativist position(s) that Naomi Zack has endorsed in her works. We might need to 
adopt the reluctant anti-eliminativism of K. Anthony Appiah by asserting that we 
cautiously replace race with racial identity while moving toward a raceless society. 
Finally, it may be necessary that we engage race with the stronger anti-eliminativist 
constructivism of Charles Mills and Jorge Gracia where we create models and concepts 
to help explain the nature of race, racism, and white supremacy. The debates of these and 








 In this Chapter, I proposed that the philosophy of race is a theoretical resource 
that will allow critical theory of education to fill its “race gap.”  I argued that this can 
better enable critical theorists to contend with the problem of race in education. I 
examined the theoretical approaches from four of the most well known philosophers 
performing the metaphysics of race today. It is my hope that critical theory in education 
and the philosophy of race facilitate a theoretical and strategic merger between these 
areas for a philosophy of race in education. In the next chapter of this dissertation, I offer 
















Introduction: A Critical Philosophy of Race in Education 
  
In this dissertation, I have asserted that race is a hegemonic paradigm. What 
makes it hegemonic is not simply because it provides justification for persons from one 
racial group to act upon another nor that it authorizes individuals within racial groups to 
impose racial axioms intra-racially. It is hegemonic also in that, in American society, we 
are largely complicit in its dominance over us. Moreover, as I have shown, even some 
critical theorists in education who attempt to mitigate the consequences of racial 
hegemony treat race as a concept that is in no need of investigation, deliberation, or 
validation. In doing so, they too consent to its racial hierarchies. So, our complicity in our 
own hegemony (and by “our” I mean all of those assigned to racial groups) rests largely 
on what we do not understand or choose to ignore about races; there are no biological, 
ethnic, and cultural races. 
The racial obscurantism that casts a panoptic ethno-racial net over us makes it 
difficult to see how our actual existence and experiences, as biologically and culturally 
diverse persons in complex, symbiotic, conversation with one another, undermines the 
notion of racial essence. The consequence is that we approach the world with breached, 
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imperceptive senses and interpret our experiences and the experiences of others 
accordingly.  
As scholars who prioritize bringing about a just and fair environment for students, 
critical theorists in education should neither subject nor commit students to racial 
sovereignty. This requires that we approach race in a way that merges the visions of 
theorists like Cameron McCarthy and the philosophers of race we have discussed in the 
previous chapter. We must move toward a critical philosophy of race in education that 
attempts to confront race as a problem as it begins to intersect with the axes of education 
theory and praxis.  
In this Chapter, I outline the characteristics necessary for a liberatory critical 
philosophy of race in education. The first of these, I argue, should encompass a 
theoretical framework that challenges the traditional concept of race while also showing 
sensitivity to its social dimensions and consequences. I make a case for this framework as 
I evaluate moral arguments for and against the elimination of race.  
The second characteristic I contend is necessary for a critical philosophy of race 
in education is that it embraces and advocates an education for autonomy as liberatory 
education. I describe two of the fundamental features of this education: a skill-based and 
knowledge-based education for racial liberation. I recommend that this education for 
autonomy be conducted for potential theorists, pre-service teachers, and students. 
The final characteristic that I recommend for a philosophy of race in education is 
that it is a self-reflective endeavor. Let us begin the examination of the eliminativist and 




Eliminativist and Anti-Eliminativist Arguments 
 
A philosophy of race in education must consider how to push forward in the face 
of racialist hegemony and the consequences for those touched by it. At its heart, this is a 
moral and ethical issue facing critical theorists in education. So, a philosophy of race in 
education should take under deep consideration the legitimate moral concerns of 
proponents of racial eliminativism and anti-eliminativism. Jorge Gracia provides an 
overview of the principal moral arguments that represent both sides of this debate 
between these two theoretical stances. Let us first look to the arguments for continuing 
the use of the race concept. 
Arguments for Racial Eliminativism 
According to Gracia, there are three main arguments that call for the elimination 
of the race concept. The first argument asserts that racial designations tend to have 
“negative connotations.” Applying racial labels to individuals risk imposing these 
negative connotations upon them which can, in turn, act as justification for unequal 
treatment. We should, therefore, discontinue using the race concept.
262
 K. Anthony 
Appiah’s examination of Thomas Jefferson’s racialist beliefs about blacks shows how the 
tendency to ascribe unfavorable qualities along racial lines were always a feature of the 
racial paradigm, even by those once considered authorities on races. Even today, black 
racial designation is still associated with diminished intelligence, hyper-sexuality, and 
propensity for violence—a point aptly demonstrated by the selective presentation of 
blacks in media and celebrated within pop culture. 
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Furthermore, as Appiah pointed out racialism is the precondition for racism. The 
only thing that separates racism from racialism proper is whether we act on our racialist 
beliefs. We must also remember, however, that racism for, Appiah, was more complex 
than members of one racial group treating persons of other racial groups unfairly. Racism 
extends to both negative and positive moral qualities and moral status attributed to racial 
groups. We often act in the interest of others with whom we share racial membership 
because we assume that they are “like us” in a manner that transcends phenotypic and 
experientially grounded characteristics.  
In the aforementioned sense, the unequal treatment of others is subtle and 
implicit. The association of positive connotations set the conditions in which we grant 
moral consideration to our racial group, but not others, not because we consider them 
inferior. Rather, it is because we do not consider them. We act upon other racial groups in 
how we treat our own racial group. This is, perhaps, the most common and acceptable 
form of racism in American society today. An overt example of this is “I’m not anti-
black/anti-white, I’m pro-white/pro-black,” although I would argue that the more harmful 
instances of this type of racism occur in more subtle forms. We are typically pro-white or 
pro-black without even recognizing we are thinking this way. We unconsciously choose 
to stay in the company and act in consideration of those with whom we are most 
familiar.
263
 Often times, this is our racial group, because as Gracia stated, races are a type 
of family. Although, the familial connections of race, are deeper than Gracia was 
attempting to point out.  As I argued in previous chapters, races can designate moral 
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community—and in some ways that simply means the persons whom you “consider.” 
Unconsciously or consciously considering our own racial groups, but not considering 
others (because they are not like family) is still potentially dangerous. This form of 
racism is analogous to our moral nationalism exhibited when we empathize with those 
who suffer in this country while remaining indifferent to the similar or worse suffering of 
others elsewhere. Our lack of awareness and absence of volition in this regard make this 
type of racism more acceptable. We rarely consider it racism.  
It is also important to recognize that racial designations are not symmetrical and 
therefore do not affect racial groups in the same way. The white race in American society 
is largely regarded as the ideal race. In the broader societal context, “white” is a relatively 
raceless designation, meaning that an assignment of the label itself carries with it little to 
no collectively applicable value or meaning. When white individuals lie, cheat, or 
commit murder, it is not interpreted within American society as associated with their 
whiteness. Black people, on the other hand (and some other raced groups), are often 
assigned collective responsibility for actions or characteristics exhibited by individual 
members of the racial group.  
A common fear of critical theorists in education is that black students have 
internalized the negative characteristics assigned to them within white supremacist 
society and therefore have a lower sense of desire and self worth. I have shown in 
previous chapters that the implicit intention of theorists who put diasporic strategies into 
operation is to revise the black-devaluing traditional conception of race. The purpose is to 
help black students overcome the consequences of asymmetric ontological assignment. 
Of course, it is not considered necessary amongst theorists to affirm struggling white 
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students in the classroom with racially marked content—students whose socio-cultural 
circumstances may impede their success. After all, the white racial designation has no 
negative ontological import. It is therefore, understandable why theorists would move 
toward correcting the unevenness of ontological assignment.  
However, while well intentioned, such strategies are misguided even if they 
managed not to actualize diasporic conceptions of race. Group disproportionality is a 
constitutive feature of race, present since its initial application to humans. In other words, 
the ontological disparity between whites and blacks, figuratively speaking, came with the 
instruction manual for the race concept. Thus, it is a mistake to continue to treat only the 
symptoms of race, when we know that it has always carried ontological baggage. The 
necessary solution is that we do away with the ontologies that accompany racial 
categories. Effectively accomplishing this task requires that we eradicate the racial 
paradigm in American society. To maintain the racial paradigm is to continue to assign 
its fictitious and harmful ontologies to individuals and groups. Our complicity, as 
theorists, in subjecting students in the classroom to this danger is therefore morally and 
ethically irresponsible. 
Gracia describes a second eliminativist position that concerns the allocation of 
power in American society. This argument goes that racial groups are not situated equally 
within this distribution. Some racial groups have superior positioning over others. By 
continuing to apply racial labels to individuals, we are effectively placing them into the 
racial pecking order.
264
 Whites in the United States are the racial group that has the most 
power socially, institutionally, and politically. Even historically, non-racial groups who 
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suffered social and systematic discrimination, such as Irish, Italian, and Jewish 
Americans ultimately faced less hardship once accepted into the racial paradigm as 
members of the white racial group.
265
 This trend is continuing. As political scientist 
Andrew Hacker points out, “Hispanics and Asians are merging into the “white” category, 
partly through intermarriage and also by personal achievement and adaptation.”
266
 
However, for persons with known “black” ancestry, this racial mobility is not 
permitted.
267
 Indeed, while the white racial designation has expanded to include persons 
of descent not previously considered white, the black racial group has evolved over time 
in such a manner that excludes those with some black ancestry from white racial 
membership. For instance, through no historical accident there are no longer such 
designations as Mulatto; there is just the category “black.”
268
 Thus, even black 
individuals who share ethnicities now racially marked white, continue to be relegated to a 
lower position in the racial stratification.  
I have shown that critical and philosophical theorists (past and present) highlight 
the unequal positioning of racial groups and the dominance of whites within that 
paradigm. The question is “what are the options available to create fair and equitable 
circumstances for individuals, and specifically for students in the classroom?” Diasporic 
education places the unfair burden of having to overcome an undeserved set of 
circumstances upon black students by, in essence, attempting to manufacture within them 
a refurbished black self. Similarly, “white privilege” strategies steadfastly place the 
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burden upon white students to relinquish the privileged position in the racial hierarchy. 
Whether alone or in supplement, these strategies miss the big picture; as with the 
assignment of moral characteristics and status, the dominant position is intrinsic to the 
race system itself.  
Historically, stratificatory racial positioning has always been connected to the 
perceived moral status (intrinsically and characteristically) of racial groups. Even where 
there is no direct consequence of moral status, the socio-economic and cultural 
circumstances of blacks today are an effect of how they were morally regarded in the 
past. Slavery required the belief that blacks were morally inferior to whites, as did 
stripping African slaves of their religious, cultural, and social practices, and the 
committing of various other egregious acts against them. To varying degrees, the position 
of black people in American society today is a consequence of social engineering and 
neglect, and not a matter of accident (except by their birth into the racial system). The 
denial and manipulation of education for blacks, and the numerous other overt systematic 
attempts to maintain white supremacy are testaments to this fact. There is little doubt that 
the consequences of this subordination in education still manifest themselves throughout 
American society.  
We must remember that race is constructed as a hierarchy. By maintaining it, as 
critical theorists, and encouraging through teachers that students continue implementing 
and imposing racial categories, we only serve to galvanize teachers and students as 
complicit actors in their own racial oppression. No social gain justifies our continuing to 
breathe life into the race concept with awareness of its frequently demonstrated and 
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historically precedented consequences, especially when we can eliminate these 
consequences by purging the race construct. 
The final argument for racial eliminativism that Gracia describes is “the history of 
racial and ethnic naming indicates that these labels are usually imposed on dominated 
groups and do not reflect the views of the dominated.”
269
 In the case of race, the creation 
and application of its labeling has benefitted whites and acted to the detriment of blacks. 
Therefore we should cease using the race concept.
270
 While, the previous eliminativist 
arguments offer supplementary support to this argument, Naomi Zack’s analysis of the 
racial schema shows how, at its very core, race was designed to maintain white purity. It 
accomplishes this maintenance, in part, by treating “black blood” as inherently impure 
and, as consequence, a threat to the purity of “white blood.” Historically, the laws 
defining the biological parameters for white or black racial membership were subject to 
white authority. One example of this is the one-drop rule discussed by Zack. Another 
example are anti-miscegenation laws that remained a part of the legal fabric of this 
country well into the latter half of the 20
th




 Even today the structural preservation of racial categories is still subject to the 
opinions of those in the white racial majority. It does not matter if a person with both 
black and white ancestry regards himself as bi-racial or multi-racial. Furthermore, it is 
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inconsequential if most black Americans acknowledge and accept his self-identification. 
As long as white racial group is in a dominant position over blacks other racial groups, 
the recognition of racial identification will remain out of the hands of black individuals in 
the broader context of societal culture. It is reckless to indenture some students to the 
desires of those in racially privileged positions or to assign them into pre-existing, 
privileged positions by affirming racial categories. Moreover, it is not morally plausible 
to maintain a racial paradigm that was not only created by the privileged group, but that 
also still favors that group. 
All of the previous eliminativist positions, offered by Gracia, and supported by 
me, show how continuing to endorse the race construct is existentially harmful, especially 
for those assigned to unfavorable categories. Moreover, preserving the concept of race 
with knowledge of the aforementioned consequences while simultaneously decrying the 
conditions of white hegemony, as critical theorists in education often do, is theoretically 
and morally inconsistent. However, while I believe that the eliminativist arguments 
provided thus far are decisive, I would like to offer another possible argument for the 
eliminativist position that Gracia overlooks that a critical philosophy of race in education 
should take into account.  
The argument that I offer concerns the inherent obscurantism that has 
accompanied the constitution and application of the race concept. Race, in the traditional 
biological paradigm and even now as it continues to shift into the “ethnic paradigm,” 
conceals knowledge. In Chapter 4, I argued that critical theory of education exacerbates 
what the race concept already does; that is, it ignores the biological and ethno-cultural 
diversity that exists in human races, especially in regards to people racially marked as 
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black. I asserted that it accomplishes the denying of knowledge by elevating blackness as 
the unilaterally relevant and constituent factor that makes up an individual. One way that 
it does this is biologically.  
Consider the fact that geneticists have found the presence of significant European 
admixture in black Americans based on analysis of genetic markers associated with 
different African or European populations. Evidence also shows that even the degree of 
European ancestry varies from place to place within the United States, which some 
scientists attribute to the migration of Americans to northern regions. Moreover, black 
Americans appear to have more African ancestry than those who would be considered 
black (by Americans), such as in Jamaica and many other countries situated within the 
African continent (although even in those places there is a presence of European 
admixture in black populations).
272
  
With respect to the aforementioned evidence, we can infer that our current 
conception of race, which regards blacks with some white ancestry as ontologically 
identical to blacks with no white ancestry, buries histories. These are not just the histories 
of blacks, whites, and other racial groups. It is the history of the United States. Embedded 
within these histories are stories that explain how it is that persons who are thought to 
descend only from peoples of Africa came to have European admixtures and how persons 
thought to have only European ancestry came to have African ancestry. The current 
model in education treats white history and black history as though separate and unequal. 
The codification of theoretically reactive and prescriptive racial separatism supports and 
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exacerbates this problem. If the critique of the white supremacist model is that it 
deliberately prevents blacks from knowing and acknowledging their histories, certainly 
scientific information, as I provided here, makes the case that this inhibition begins with 
the invention of race. 
Racial obscurantism also extends to both ethnicity and culture. Race elevates only 
ethnic and cultural relations that we racially recognize as black as the relevant ethno-
cultural factors to understanding the black racial group, individually and collectively. 
Thus, race makes it difficult to recognize the important influences that make up black 
individuals. The descendents of American slaves for example, speak English, typically 
practice Christianity, and eat the same foods, celebrate the same holidays, and practice 
the same rituals as many white Americans. Moreover, they live in all parts of the country 
and socially and intimately interact with the cultural environment of their localities and 
regions. However, they are continuously referred to as a culturally distinct group. 
Differences are highlighted between white and black Americans that fail to apply to the 
entirety of either racial group. The cultural syncretism of African, Native American, 
Asian, and European cultures and its effects on individuals situated in the United States 
fails to get recognized as a consequence of race.
273
  
This epistemic concealment that occurs as a consequence of the racial paradigm 
has serious moral consequences. It forces us to deny what constitutes us as social beings, 
not only insofar as it ignores the richness of our individual cultural and biological 
development, but also our intricate social, cultural, and even biological connections to 
one another. Furthermore, it forces us to view others through this same binary lens. As an 
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example, Andrew Hacker points to how various peoples of the Caribbean acknowledge 
and attempt to maintain their diverse ancestries and histories.
 274
  However, the American 
racial paradigm encourages us to see only what is relevant to the paradigm itself when we 
view others. So, the consequences are global as well.  
Black Americans are not a homogenous group. We are persons of many origins, 
ethnicities, and cultures assigned to a monolithic category. What happens when racially 
marked people from the Caribbean come to the United States and are denied recognition 
of their ethnic and cultural ties by persons in this country? What happens to the Haitian 
Americans, Cuban Americans, and Jamaican Americans who are born in this country but 
retain cultural elements of the cultures of previous generations? The racial paradigm 
encourages them to either purge their own ethnicities and cultures or it forces them to 
have to fight for acknowledgment within American society. This dilemma has serious 
ramifications under racial hegemony. If the ascription of the black label means that 
individuals (or groups) have to deny their ethnic relations and cultural practices, it is 
understandable why they would feel compelled to distance themselves from that racial 
designation or group. In addition, an ascription of a negative racial ontology is only going 
to exacerbate this desire.
275
 Therefore, racial conditions in the United States create the 
social circumstances in which individuals have to distance themselves from what is 
perceived in society as their blackness, further marking “black” as the undesirable 
category.  
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So, the race concept not only shapes individuals but acts upon those who do not 
fit neatly within its categories. Diminishing the knowledge and role of social groups in 
shaping people by ignoring the actual groups themselves rests firmly at the foundations 
of racial hegemony. Moreover, considering both that racialism is such a widely held 
belief system and that non-white racial groups are increasingly viewed as a distinct 
cultural groups, the sub-groups that fall under these racial outgroups are pitted against 
one another (e.g. African Americans against Dominican Americans, Puerto Ricans 
against Mexican Americans). The only way to prevent these circumstances is to free 
these individuals and groups from the constraints of race. This means that we must 
eliminate the race concept as a legitimate system of categorization. 
Anti-Eliminativist Arguments 
Now that I have examined some of the arguments against the race concept, I 
would like to briefly turn the focus to some of the objections to eliminating race. While, I 
have argued for the eliminativist position, I believe that these anti-eliminativist positions 
are not easily dismissible and thus should be taken into account before attempting to 
construct a philosophy of race in education.  
Jorge Gracia provides three central concerns of the anti-eliminativist positions. 
The first position asserts that “race [and ethnicity] have influenced, and still influence, 
the course of human history in significant ways and have substantially affected the lives 
of individual persons.”
276
 Thus, to eliminate these concepts would mean ignoring the 
whole host of harms that have occurred as a consequence of racial and ethnic 
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 The second position against the elimination of race argues that given its 
past and present impact, we cannot discard race as this would leave us with no way to 
adequately address its negative consequences. Race is crucial to understanding how 
racism and white supremacy operates.
278
 The final moral argument against racial 
eliminativism is that keeping race allows us to have an appropriate frame of reference by 
which we, as a society, can learn from our past to insure that we do repeat the mistakes of 
race in the future. Getting rid of race increases the potential for the worsening and 
repetition of destructive racial consequences.
279
 
These three arguments are similar because they all assert that we need race to 
adequately understand race and address its consequences. Indeed, the point is well taken. 
There is no way to comprehend the personal, socio-cultural, and systematical oppression 
of black people without referencing the essentialist American racial paradigm that treats 
whites as the morally and ontologically superior group. It is also necessary to racially 
label persons affected negatively affected by race in order to adequately address and 
alleviate their circumstances. 
On the surface, these arguments appear damaging to the eliminativist position. 
However, a closer look reveals that these anti-eliminativist arguments are not really 
incompatible with eliminativism. The eliminativist arguments that I have provided deal 
more precisely with the existential implications of race—how racial positions situate 
individuals morally, characteristically, and socio-politically in the racial hierarchy and the 
epistemic burdens race puts on individuals. These eliminativist arguments maintain that 
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because the race generates immoral consequences, utilizing the race concept is in itself 
immoral, and as I have added, unethical in the classroom space. The moral arguments 
against eliminating the race concept are a theoretically different sort of argument; they 
posit race as heuristically and analytically valuable. They seek to preserve race as a 
necessary tool that permits us to understand and effectively address the immorality of its 
consequences. This is quite different than suggesting that we continue assigning racial 
ontologies. 
 In our discussion in the previous chapter it was quite clear that these arguments 
undergird the positions of the three anti-eliminativist philosophers of race, including 
Gracia. Moreover, it is implicit in the eliminativist arguments of Naomi Zack, who uses 
the race concept to expose its own falsity and demonstrate the asymmetry of its binary 
schema. The goal of the aforementioned philosophers of race is to deconstruct and 
disentangle race from its inherent essentialism. In this sense, their positions are 
eliminativist because a de-essentialized race concept is no longer the traditional race 
concept. In other words, to demonstrate the bio-metaphysical falseness of race, which 
these theorists do, is not simply to argue for eliminativism as an end, it is actively 
eliminating the race concept through analysis. Thus, the above-mentioned philosophers 
race demonstrate that an existential racial eliminativism and an analytical anti-
eliminativism are theoretically consistent positions. This is a point to which I will later 
return.  
It is important to address an assumption that Gracia mentions in addendum to the 
third anti-eliminativist position that intends to respond to racial eliminativism. Gracia 
states, “Refusing to accept the role of race in our experience in particular and even talk 
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about it, only serves to exacerbate racism. It also misses the point that race…can be used 
to correct social ills, provide meaning, and develop a beneficial sense of identity in 
people.”
280
 This first claim seems plausible, as we cannot simply pretend that race does 
not exist socially in hopes that it will go away. To pretend would allow racism to 
continue without utilizing the most effective tool that we have to address it—the race 
concept.  
However, the second point, which posits race as a normative prospect for meaning 
and identity, is more troublesome given the danger, as Appiah accurately points out, for 
racial identities to become dictatorial over our other personal and social identities. In 
addition, this nourishing of racial identities risks re-substantiating racial boundaries as the 
perimeters for moral community. Once again, as I demonstrated in Chapter 2, Molefi 
Asante’s political revision of race differs from the traditional notion of race insofar as it 
does not apply negative characteristics to blacks as a group. However, he imposes its 
refurbished Afrocentric ontology upon others as the basis for moral judgment (denying 
one’s racial ontology). Furthermore, we also witnessed that Asante’s diasporic racialism 
is broadly applied and imposed on the black racial group by critical theorists in education 
which, I argued, is not without moral consequence. 
Nevertheless, I believe that the idea of race as a source of meaning and identity 
bears some import and offers a fourth potential argument for maintaining race. It is an 
argument that has real world relevance as it concerns our conceptions of self and others, 
and thus, is necessary for consideration by a philosophy of race in education. As I have 
stated, race often acts as an ideological basis by which we conduct our lives. It works its 
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way into our personal, social, political, and professional choices. For some of us whose 
racial group occupies an out-group status, racial boundaries demarcate a figurative  (and 
sometimes literal) safety zone. We may appreciate the artistic creations of others because 
they share our same racial designation. Racial labeling may mark for us a (local, regional, 
or global) community from which we draw significant relational, ideological and cultural 
value. The fact that race plays such a valuable role in our lives creates somewhat of a 
dilemma for critical theorists. Should we dispose of race because it is a moral and 
epistemic aberration or should we attempt to preserve it because of the considerable 
meaning that it provides for many people?  
I believe that the aforementioned dilemma is not without some precedent. After 
all, there have been a number of hegemonic paradigms that throughout the course of 
history have no doubt been the basis of meaningful relationships. There have been blood-
based aristocracies dividing groups into royalty, nobility, and commoners; religions that 
mark some people as chosen and others as condemned; caste systems that mark people as 
outcasts by virtue of the biological descent from ancestors who worked “lowly” 
occupations. Race, in essence, is like all of these paradigmatic frameworks. A person’s 
presumed race was used to assign him to a particular group. If he was white, they were 
considered of higher moral stock than those of other raced-groups and, as I have alluded 
to in this dissertation, social, cultural, and political power were and largely still is 
distributed along racial lines. However, like these other oppressive paradigms, race sets 
the conditions in which individuals are locked into circumstantial relationships with 
similarly grouped others, and those others, at least in some cases, will act as the persons 
to whom individuals are going to best be able to relate. Moreover, as both Appiah and 
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Gracia highlight, ethnicity and culture can emerge as a result of the aforementioned racial 
circumstances. The ends, however, do not justify the means, or at least they would not 
justify them in other similarly oppressive frameworks. 
Take, for example, the economic class system in the United States where there are 
primarily three recognized groups: lower class, middle class, and upper class. Each of 
these groups has different degrees of socio-cultural mobility, access and (coercive and 
volitional) isolation contingent upon economic factors in combination with other 
variables (race, ethnicity, etc). Gangster rap, for example, emerged from persons living in 
environments where the consequences of violence were felt in ways unlikely to occur in 
more affluent, well-protected, neighborhoods. Operas, orchestras, and academic societies 
are cultural manifestations that materialize amongst those who are financially better off.  
The relationships amongst people who fall under these groupings are likely to be 
different as well. For instance, growing up in my hometown, being both impoverished 
and black meant that there was only a small selection of neighborhoods that my family 
could live in—ones that we could afford and ones that were safe for blacks to live in. 
However, having limited access in this regard meant that I grew up knowing and feeling 
connected to the other people who were restricted to the same circumstances--namely, 
other poor, black persons. There is little doubt that the meaning derived from these 
circumstances shaped not only my conception of self and others today, but also has 
influenced and informs the career path that I have chosen today. In healthier racial socio-
economic circumstances than those of my childhood, a person is likely provided with less 
communally compact relationships, but with a broader range of choices. As a 
consequence, charting a path for herself that secures a just environment for oppressed 
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people may not be a priority or recognizable choice. She may feel more connected to 
people who share her economic and racial status, because they are who she recognizes as 
“like her.” So, her choices in life might simply reflect the status of her more privileged 
grouping. However, her affluence and relative freedom from the social constraints of race 
do not make her life any less meaningful to her than my lack of wealth and freedom did 
to me.  
The problem is that despite the value of social class, the meaning and sense of 
identity in the aforementioned cases would not exist if not for the hegemonic framework 
of class. Would we argue that we should keep the class system, because its class 
groupings are beneficial?  Should we teach students that they should embrace lower class 
status because it provides them with distinctive types of meaning and identities? The 
tactics in critical theory in education seem to go in the opposite direction of this, where 
theorists often condemn the oppressive class structure created by capitalism. Critical 
theorists concerned with social justice would not argue for a return of aristocracy or that 
we should affirm a Japanese-American student as burakumin (low caste).  
Race should be no different. It is true that race has been a source of valuable 
meaning for individuals. However, we must remember that as such, it is also a 
fundamental basis for social, cultural, and systematic oppression. If race were not a 
source of meaning and identity there would not have been the subjugation of American 
Indians, African and Asian descent in this country. Meaning and identity, in this regard, 
cut both ways and this will always be the case in oppressive paradigms. As theorists in 
education, we must be sensitive to the meaningful role that races plays in the lives of all 
students in the classroom, but that does not mean that we should ignore or affirm the 
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hegemonic paradigm on which that meaning is based. To not mitigate hegemony where 
we can is ethically irresponsible as theorists. 
Considering all of the above arguments both for and against racial eliminativism, 
I believe that a philosophy of race in education must attempt to satisfy the valid concerns 
of both sides of the debate. Therefore, a philosophy of race in education must attempt to 
eliminate racial hegemony and this means that we work toward the deflation and the 
removal of the race concept existentially. Heuristically, however, the race concept is 
necessary in order to address the circumstances of students and permit them to confront 
their own racial conditions in rational and informed manners. This means that a 
philosophy of race in education should assist students in recognizing that race and its 
ontologies are false, while acknowledging that as a consequence of racialism it has been a 
source of division, oppression, and in many cases meaning and creativity. For this 
eliminativist/anti-eliminativist project to have success, it is necessary that theorists, 
teachers, and students are educated to effectively engage race conceptually and 
existentially. In the following section, I argue the type of education that I consider 
necessary for a comprehensive philosophy of race in education. 
Education for Autonomy as Liberatory 
 
To overcome racial hegemony, race must be challenged both as a conception of 
the good and as social construct. Race has three primary strengths, all of which help 
maintain it. First, it is regarded or treated as self-evident and therefore goes unchallenged 
by theorists, teachers, and students. Secondly, it is often such a crucial aspect to our 
senses of value, self, and choice that it is self-affirming. Finally, it is socially and 
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culturally accepted as biologically real and its attachment to ethnicity and culture affirm 
race for people. These strengths concern race as a conceptual and ideological problem 
and therefore account for its complex ground. 
However, race also has its weaknesses. First, it is a scientifically discredited 
concept. There are no human races. Secondly, race’s ideological trajectory, over time, has 
gradually moved further from its initial ontological framework, and therefore it exhibits a 
provable contingency.
281
 Third, race is not a conception of the good like a religion 
because the fideistic commitment to race is involuntary. These weaknesses all show how 
race is also an epistemological problem. We believe that it exists because we were 
presented with false knowledge continually perpetuated by the society around us.  
At first glance, it would appear that all it would take to exploit the weaknesses of 
the race concept is to provide counter-knowledge to its epistemic assumptions. The 
problem, however, is the evidence demonstrating the falsity of race has been available for 
quite some time. Moreover, in the years since race’s discrediting by the sciences, there 
has not been a collective race to the podium to announce its demise as biological truth. 
This is in no small part due to the ideological nature of race. And while it may not be like 
a religion, we often have a cult-like commitment to it and its explanatory value in our 
lives. So, a philosophy of race in education that seeks to existentially eliminate the race 
concept needs tools that are able to attend to both the strengths and weaknesses of race. 
An education for autonomy is, I believe, necessary as a liberatory tool for this task.
282
 For 
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success of this endeavor, an education for autonomy requires at least two indispensable 
features: a skill-based component and a knowledge-based component. 
Before I offer a more detailed vision of what this education may entail, it is 
necessary to offer a bit of a disclaimer about my reliance on autonomy. As I have 
mentioned, it is not my desire to ensnare myself in debates about the importance of 
autonomy as a liberal ideal, although I value it as such. Moreover, as I have argued, the 
concern by critical theorists regarding the imposing of white supremacist teaching on 
black students seems to allude to something that bears resemblance to personal 
autonomy, even if not stated explicitly by those theorists. Indeed, I would assert that if we 
are not concerned with whether black students are able to have a part in the construction 
of their own values and life plans, there is little ground on which white supremacy can be 
critiqued, given that it is like any another social and cultural factor that constitutes us as 
individuals. 
I acknowledge, however, that as Michele Moses points out, some theorists in 
education have argued that importance of autonomy in education is overstressed because 
it neglects the role of groups in making up individuals.
283
 However, I share her view that 
the development for personal autonomy is necessary to “provide students with the 
capacity for deliberation about their own cultural community as well as others.”
284
 
Moreover, this sentiment captures the goal of the education for autonomy that I am 
proposing. It is important that individuals are able to rationally reflect on the conceptions 
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of the good life with which their various communities indoctrinate them. The education 
for autonomy that I am advocating here is intended as a liberatory tool rather than a 
liberal ideal. To overthrow racial (or sexual, ethnic, and gender) hegemony, as theorists, 
teachers, and students, it is important that we have the tools to liberate ourselves to avoid 
being complicit in our own and others’ subjugation.  
Furthermore, one of my central arguments against utilizing diasporic conceptions 
of race and, indeed, race itself is that it hides the truth about what actually constitutes 
individuals and groups. I have argued that the ethnic paradigm of race acknowledges and 
imposes one monolithic group as relevant to an individual’s identity, instead of allowing 
for the possibility of other group relations. It is my view that an education for autonomy 
helps bring these other possible group connections to into the light from wherever racial 
hegemony has hidden them from view.  
It is also important to note my advocating of an education for autonomy is not an 
endorsement of the current model of liberal education. Liberal education, in many ways, 
has not lived up to its promise and its promises. It has been unsuccessful in providing 
students (of all levels) with the skills that permit them to critically engage the world in a 
sophisticated and adaptable manner. Moreover, it has not supplied them with a broad, 
accurate, and unabridged knowledge about the world. However, it is not clear that this 
malfunction is simply a result of liberal education itself. Its failure is due in part to the 
limitations put on what skills and knowledge students learn and who gets to benefit from 





 There is a reason theorists such as Gloria Ladson-Billings, 
Molefi Asante, Joe Kincheloe, and Shirley Steinberg are compelled to critique the 
absence of blacks and Africans in the content of education. Educational institutions, like 
most social and political institutions, are sometimes platforms for hegemony. My analysis 
up this point is an attempt to demonstrate this point.  
However, the above mandates that theorists, teachers, and students need to have 
the skills and knowledge to critically evaluate what is taught, how it is taught, why it is 
taught, and the subsequent consequences of this information. If we do not have the 
critical tools necessary to liberate ourselves from racial hegemony, even as it acts through 
liberal education (which means liberating ourselves from the current model of liberal 
education), then how are we, as theorists, going to help free others? This requires that a 
philosophy of race in education endorse a model of education that is liberatory, meaning 
that it is geared toward the use and production of the aforementioned tools. Let us now 
look to the role that a skill-based approach plays in this an autonomy education for racial 
liberation. 
A Liberatory Role for Reason in a Philosophy of Race in Education 
It is essential that potential theorists, teachers, and students acquire the skills that 
will allow them to critically engage race as a conception of the good. The focus of this 
education in the K-12 classroom would, of course, mean the development of reasoning 
skills that not only help students problem solve, but also identify problems, and critically 
engage those problems with other students. However, it is imperative that in this 
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education that the subject of race is incorporated into the development of reasoning 
skills.
286
  This is crucial given that students are typically indoctrinated with racialism 
from youth and this racialism is constantly affirmed at all levels of society and 
interaction. There is no way for students to escape the confines of race and racial 
ontology if they do not have the skills to do so. An education for autonomy will make it 
easier for students to recognize their own racial conditions and conditioning.  
Education for autonomy as skill-based education should also be promoted in 
education programs that house future theorists and teachers. I believe that philosophy 
programs in the Western tradition, where rational thinking and discourse are synonymous 
with doing philosophy, provide a useful template by which advanced degree and pre-
service teacher programs can model themselves. From the first undergraduate philosophy 
course, there is a focus on the enhancement of reasoning skills, whether by practicing the 
Socratic method, taking practical reasoning classes, or analyzing philosophical texts. This 
critical thinking as reason component is the one mainstay throughout every course in 
philosophy programs. Thus, the young philosopher’s capacity to negotiate, improve upon, 
and problematize difficult subject areas is able to cultivate through the course of her 
education.  
The philosopher is also trained to critically evaluate new and unfamiliar areas of 
knowledge, not only in texts, but also in dialogue with others. The cultivation of 
analytical skills in this regard are crucial when attempting to negotiate the complex and 
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murky waters of race (and ethnicity)
287
 Collective and dialogical analysis is important in 
an education for autonomy for racial liberation because race is a social construct. Thus, it 
should be engaged both critically and socially. This is an aspect that should be allowed to 
develop in within education programs, in a similar manner as it develops in philosophy 
programs. 
Our work is applied and has a lot at stake. Therefore, a philosophy of race in 
education advocates that our own field of education and its sub-disciplines attempt to 
develop and nurture similar skill-sets in our future theorists and teachers. This begins 
with implementing analytical components in our own courses. This way theorists and 
teachers can acquire the skills denied to them elsewhere and be able to merge these 
analytical skills with other forms of critical thinking often hidden from view by the racial 
(and gender) paradigms in education.  
Moreover, courses with analytical components will encourage students in 
education programs to put those skills to use by examining and creating the applied 
content of our field. For example, a philosophy of race in education course might 
evaluate the works of theorists such as Ladson-Billings or Kincheloe and Steinberg, or 
Jorge Gracia. As part of this critical evaluation, the course requires that students provide 
critical exegeses of these theorists’ works. This will help students recognize the strengths 
and weaknesses in these theoretical works. However, analytical skills will help students 
correct these weakness, further develop the strengths, and help students determine when, 
where, how, to whom, or whether these theories are applicable. An education for 
                                                 
287
 Examples of this are the philosophers of race in Chapter 5 who are in constant conversation with one 
another, improving upon each other’s works. 
 
 196 
autonomy in this manner will assist in cultivating stronger theory and instruction to help 
contend with the problem of race in our own discipline, including in our own work. 
Another important benefit of analytical training in education programs is that 
theorists and, especially K-12 teachers, will have more capabilities to pass on to their 
students in the classroom. As I stated in the previous section, liberal education has failed 
students by not providing them with the skills and curriculum necessary to critically 
examine the content of their personal, social, political and global surroundings. A skill-
based education for autonomy provides teachers with the means to fill in the skill and 
race gaps created by liberal education, thereby providing a necessary resource(s) that 
permits students to confidently engage the problem of race.  
 An additional reason, that analytical education is important for theorists and 
teachers is that it will help nurture our ability to identify the encumbrances placed upon 
theory and praxis by racial hegemony. It is, for example, important that we are able to 
recognize how teachers are reifying race in the classroom or imposing ethno-racial 
models on students, or acting as authoritative validators for problematic race theory. It is 
also important that we apply this same analysis to our own works to help ensure that we 
are not inadvertent agents of racial oppression acting upon students. We, too, are 
indoctrinated by society to see race and to see race as ethnicity. This makes us see racial, 
ethnic, and cultural properties that are not actually there and it also prevents us from 
seeing what there is. It is my hope that a skill-based education for autonomy will help 
reveal for us what the racial paradigm has concealed—the truth.  
However, truth means knowledge. A liberatory education for autonomy is an 
insufficient tool for theorists, teachers, and students to deal with the problem of race, if it 
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is solely a skill-based education. So, let us now look at the function of knowledge in an 
education for autonomy. 
A Liberatory Role for Knowledge in a Philosophy of Race in 
Education 
The view that I am proposing requires a somewhat different approach to the 
problem of race than most critical and multicultural theorists recommend inasmuch as I 
do not advance the idea that knowledge is the primary component in confronting issues 
facing black students. Rather, I advocate that knowledge, as part of an education for 
autonomy, supplements a skill-based strategy for racial liberation. I am in agreement with 
Appiah who, in regard to education for autonomy, states that it is important that we 
“prepare students with the truth and the capacity to require more of it.”
288
 The role that I 
am positing for knowledge in this project is intended to set the record straight about race 
because for too long, we have allowed race to the write the record for us.  
The ethnic paradigm of race is firmly embedded in multicultural education and 
critical theory in education. As a consequence, theorists condemn teachers and students to 
a hierarchical, axiomatic ontological system that is based upon scientifically invalidated 
assumptions about humans. The analysis in this dissertation has shown that this 
condemning often gets carried out by the promotion of epistemic frameworks that affirm 
racial ontology. This use of knowledge is misguided because the knowledge itself is in 
error. 
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To free students from the constraints of racial hegemony, a philosophy of race in 
education advocates that we problematize knowledge, not act from problematic 
knowledge. For race, this means that we critically engage information compromised by, 
or more specifically, constructed from racially hegemonic materials. We must confront 
knowledge that affirms racial categories, treats racial categories as ethnic categories, and 
that attempts to broadly apply content to individuals marked by racial categories. 
Thus, a philosophy of race in education must do more than advocate an education 
for autonomy; it must embrace it by providing its own liberatory knowledge. It should 
advance knowledge that tells the truth about the race concept. We cannot approach race 
as though it is real biologically, ethnically, or culturally just because it is socially real. 
We must treat it as a construct. This means that we impart knowledge that shows how 
racialism, the belief in human races, has shaped the lives of those who fall within racial 
boundaries in harmful and sometimes even meaningful ways. Moreover, we must attempt 
to illuminate, for teachers and students (through praxis), the various ways in which 
racialism intersects and intermingles with other paradigms such as class, gender, 
sexuality, and ethnicity.  
A similar way in which knowledge will play a role in an education for autonomy 
is by bringing attention to conflicting racial paradigms. For instance, the American racial 
paradigm has its own distinctive characteristics, such as its one-drop rule, its asymmetric 
racial ontologies, its limited number categories, and its consistent mixture of racial and 
pan-ethnic categories (black, white, Asian, American Indian). As I stated in my 





 Emphasizing knowledge of these competing frameworks not only 
demonstrates to students how race is socially constructed, but also shows how persons 
hailing from places where other racial, ethno-racial, or ethnic models affect individuals 
existentially when they come into contact the American paradigm of race (racism, 
ethnocentrism, labeling, racial and cultural reductionism). This example shows how a 
philosophy of race in education advocates for both an existential eliminativism and a 
heuristic anti-eliminativism. It demonstrates how theory and praxis can address the 
historical, geographical, and cultural contingency of the race concept, while still utilizing 
race to address its consequences.  
Multicultural approaches often interpret experiential and cultural knowledge 
through the ethnic paradigm of race. A philosophy of race in education encourages the 
elimination of racial obscurantism, through an education of autonomy that recognizes the 
uniqueness and diversity of individual and group experience. Moreover, it collects this 
knowledge from various forms, such as the narrative experiences collected through 
academic, artistic, and literary work. It goes beyond this, however, by also activating the 
experiential knowledge brought to the table by theorists, teachers and students as valid 
sources of unsettled knowledge worthy of critical evaluation. 
In addition, an education for autonomy attempts to shed light on the existential 
realities of race, ethnicity, and culture through self-identification and reflection while 
allowing for new ways of understanding individuals and groups. For example, a student 
brings her own unique perspective into the classroom. Society might designate her as a 
member of the black racial group, but she expresses how her parents, who are also 
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designated black hail from very different backgrounds. She knows that her father grew up 
a poor farmer from Kentucky and that his ancestors were African slaves. Her mother is a 
Creole of West African, French, Portuguese, and Native American descent from the city 
of New Orleans. An education for autonomy encourages the student to express and 
attempt to understand the ways in which her own values and cultural practices are 
amalgamations of her upbringing by her parents and growing up in San Diego, 
California. Moreover, it encourages her to recognize other outside influences that play a 
role in constructing her identity. The ethnic paradigm of race interprets this as the African 
American or black experience, but an education for autonomy attempts to free the student 
from essentialist entanglement by acknowledging her experience as distinctive to her as 
an individual, and as a member of her commonly unique family, and as members of her 
various other socio-cultural environments.  
We get a sense, then, of how an education for autonomy attempts to provide the 
conditions in which the student utilizes her own knowledge to free her from the 
constraints of race. This education allows her to express her narrative as she experiences 
it, not by a racial framework that is imposed up on her. However, this education does not 
ignore how the racial framework shapes the student’s sense of identity in relation to her 
environment or to others within it. It does not advocate that the student’s identity be 
stripped from her. It does encourage, however, that her racial identity is critically 
evaluated through truth and not through racialist interpretation.  
The self-evident, racialist paradigm typically stops the dialogue when it is 
challenged by knowledge that undermines its dominance. Education for autonomy 
attempts to supply students, teachers, and theorists alike with the skills to engage, 
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negotiate, problematize, and make sense of and apply the knowledge learned where 
related to the race concept. So, an education for autonomy is where skill and knowledge 
and community come together and allows that conversation about race to continue in a 
critical and sophisticated manner. 
Toward a Philosophy of Race of Education 
 
The final aspect that I consider necessary for a critical philosophy of race in 
education is that it is self-reflective. In other words, in cannot simply act as a philosophy 
of race in education, it must also perform as a philosophy of race of education. This 
necessitates that it conducts metaphysical analyses of the race concept as it is utilized in 
theory and praxis and throughout the broad discipline of education, including the 
philosophy of race in education itself. It is important that as a discipline a philosophy of 
race in education is always evolving and self-correcting and always sensitive to itself as a 
part of an institution situated in a society where the commitment to racialism is one of the 
most dominant, stubborn, long lasting, and widely-held conceptions of the good. 
Furthermore, a self-reflective philosophy of race in education must broaden its 
knowledge base to include information and strategies outside of the field of education. It 
cannot simply create epistemic, strategic, and theoretical dialogue with disciplines that 
overtly share the same social and political goals. It must also draw from the variety of 
broad and valuable resources available to it both in and outside of the Academy. It must 
try to be informed by the theory emerging from social and biological sciences, Women’s 
Studies, Philosophy, Law, Queer Studies, and Black Studies. Furthermore, it cannot cut 
itself off from the real world if it seeks to help the students who live within it. It must 
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attempt to know how people really think on the ground, in everyday life, in the multitude 
of unique circumstances in which they reside. It must attempt make sure that its theories 
and the praxis that it informs corresponds with actual life. To do this will keep the field of 
education honest and relevant, to make sure that its theory does not overshoot the 
circumstances of the actual world while trying to bring about a just future world. 
Conclusion: Toward A Philosophy of Race For Education 
 
In this Chapter, I argued that critical theory in education should create its own 
philosophy of race in education. I recommended an existential eliminativist and analytical 
anti-eliminativist hybrid project that advocates a skill and knowledge-based education for 
autonomy. I argued for this approach for a philosophy of race for education because it 
can assist students, teachers, and theorists to best recognize and challenge race as an 
inherited conception of the good and free the epistemic constraints that it puts on our 
conceptions of self and others. 
Racial hegemony has plagued this country since its inception and degraded its 
racial minorities. However, everyone has suffered as a consequence of race. It deprives us 
of knowing and learning about our differences and similarities and places barriers 
between the variety of possible human relations, identities, and meaning that we have not 
been able to forge with one another. It is my hope that a philosophy of race in education 
can help reverse this damage to bring about a just social environment in which 











In this dissertation, I examined the nature of the reified conception of race as it 
relates to theory taking place in the field of education, specifically in the field of critical 
theory education. My analysis began in Chapter Two, where I showed that race is so 
pervasive that even as critical theorists in education, we often put forward analyses and 
strategies, intended to reverse the consequences of racial hegemony, but that ultimately 
reaffirm the essentialist notion of race that has been a mainstay in American society for 
centuries. The presuppositions that undergird the approaches of such scholars as Molefi 
Kete Asante, Gloria Ladson-Billings, Peter McLaren, Joe Kincheloe and Shirley 
Steinberg frequently present the black racial group as a monolithic human entity. I 
demonstrate this point by highlighting ways in which ethnic and cultural properties were 
attributed across the racial groups. For instance, the primary remedy used to relieve the 
social and racial circumstances for black students was the normative application of 
African content for the purpose of black affirmation, as was the case with Ladson-
Billings, Asante, and Kincheloe and Steinberg. 
In Chapter Three, I presented a historical analysis of the problem of racial 
reification in critical theory in education. I examined some of the key scholars and events 
that helped shaped the education of black people in this country. The important figures 
and theorists of my examination included Booker T. Washington, W.E.B. DuBois and 
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Carter Woodson. DuBois and Woodson offered diasporic racial strategies for liberal 
education intended for the aim of bettering the circumstances the black racial group. The 
vision of these two philosophers of education inspired the events that eventually led to 
the creation of Black Studies programs in higher education. My analysis concluded that 
philosophies and events that emerged from this history, especially the acceptance of 
Black Studies in the American academy, provided the grounding by which critical 
theorists in education conceptualized the black racial group biologically, ethnically, and 
culturally. I argued, however, that the critical theorists in education of my analysis 
converted the normative conceptions of race from the history of black education into 
substantive conceptions of the black racial group. 
Chapter Four was an analysis of the consequences of critical theorists in education 
implementing diasporic strategies attached to an unproblematized reified race concept. In 
this analysis I took a closer look at the race concept in American society. I explored how 
as an axiomatic paradigm, race creates expectations and requirements for the 
performance racial ontology. Given the nature of race, I concluded that if critical theorists 
in education operationalize diasporic conceptions of race in the classroom, then they risk 
tightening racial constraints on black students, consequently inhibiting their personal 
autonomy.  
In Chapter Five, I argued that the harms to students mandate that critical theorists 
in education attempt to circumvent the problem of race. I suggested that we draw from 
the theoretical, strategic, and epistemic arsenals of the philosophy of race. I offered an 
analysis of four of the most well-known and respected philosophers of race. They are 
Kwame Anthony Appiah, Naomi Zack, Charles Mills, and Jorge Gracia. My analysis of 
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these philosophers’ theories illustrated how the philosophy of race can reveal the inherent 
oppressive and essentialist nature of the race construct. Further, I offered 
recommendations to show how the philosophy of race can provide critical theorists in 
education with useful tools that will allow us to make sense of race and better inform 
theory and praxis. 
  Finally, I recommended the development of a philosophy of race in education that 
seeks to bring an end to the racial hegemony for students by moving toward the 
existential elimination of the race concept. The philosophy of race that I suggested 
promotes an education for autonomy as a tool for racial liberation. This education is 
intended to provide the analytical skills and corrective knowledge that will cultivate in 
theorists, teachers, and students, the capacity to engage race as a hegemonic conception 
of the good. I further argued that it is necessary that a philosophy of race in education is 
willing to analytically engage the broad field of education in the academy to ensure that 
as a discipline we are not complicit conduits for racial hegemony. This is the project that 
I have attempted to carry out in this dissertation--a metaphysical analysis of race in the 
discipline of critical theory in education.  
As theorists in education, we are, in many ways, the first and last line of defense 
against racial hegemony for students in the classroom. It is our theories that teachers 
utilize to inform their interactions with students. Thus, it is important that our theories not 
oppress students by condemning and locking them into ethno-racial constraints as a 
consequence of our positing and authorizing racialist conceptions of identity. The 
analysis that I provided in this dissertation is intended to show how we sometimes fail in 
this regard. However, its purpose is also to act as a demonstration, as one philosophy of 
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race in education, to help us understand how and why we sometimes fall short and also to 
help us understand the necessity for preventing its occurrence—the need to pick 
ourselves back up. 
As the last line of defense, theory in education attempts to inform the classroom 
in such a way that it protects students from the consequences of racial hegemony. We are 
situated in a society where race permeates through every aspect of our culture(s) and 
institutions. As critical theorists, it is important that we ensure that students are protected 
from racial hegemony through effective education. That means that we need to make 
certain that they are provided with tools that can help safeguard them from the oppressive 
venues of hegemony in society, including us, as critical theorists and our impositions on 
them when we fail to act with caution in our theories. The philosophy of education that I 
am advocating is intended to offer students of all levels a stronger and tighter last line of 
defense. 
It is my hope that both the analysis and normative arguments in the metaphysics 
of race that I conduct in this dissertation have implications beyond my immediate 
scholarly confines. It is my wish that my work inspires others to conduct their own 
philosophical analyses. The field of education can only benefit from a critical philosophy 
of race in education to provide a means to challenge racial hegemony where it begins, 
from the race construct itself.  
A philosophy of race in education, working in conjunction with theorists such as 
Gloria Ladson-Billings, can develop culturally relevant strategies for education that draw 
out and address the concerns of the substantial number of cultural groups that are 
currently hidden or ignored as a consequence of the ethnic paradigm of race. A 
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philosophy of race in education can work closely with feminist theorists in education to 
attempt to make sense of the complex interactions that occur at the conceptual and 
consequential intersections of race and gender and to develop strategies that encompass 
other ways of knowing and learning. It can work with qualitative and quantitative 
research theorists to attempt to develop strategies for gaining precise research on how the 
racial essentialism, racial obscurantism, and racial axioms adversely affects students and 
teachers within the classroom.  
Furthermore, a philosophy of race in education can also have implications on 
educational policy. While there is an effort by policymakers to mitigate the consequences 
of race in education, very little takes place attempting to diminish the concept of race. A 
philosophy of race in education can provide important analyses, arguments, and research 
that make a case for the need to implement broad-scaled strategies that move toward the 
elimination of race while also attending to its consequences. Indeed, a philosophy of race 
in education, if successful, can change the way in which we approach race and ethnicity 
insofar as it attempts to make lucid what the racial paradigm has made unintelligible. 
The most important possible implication of the work that I offered here is that its 
reverberations reach beyond the classroom space to the social and global world that has 
been imprisoned by the American racial paradigm. We must remember the classroom is a 
microcosm of the society that surrounds it. That means that what takes place within its 
walls does not end once students and teachers exit the room. My analysis and 
recommendations for a philosophy of race in education, if successful, provide a means by 
which individuals (and groups) may eventually find liberation from racial hegemony and 
are able to forge a world for themselves without reference to false ontologies. In this 
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sense, they activate themselves as persons better able to develop their own conceptions of 
the good life, with one less constraint on their freedom and choices. As they interact with 
the world, hopefully persons will see that world’s doors suddenly open to new 
possibilities that were once ideologically shut. 
Before I joined the field of education, I was a graduate student in philosophy. 
Being a black person in Western academic philosophy is akin to being an anomaly. You 
are the elephant in the room that everybody sees, but that nobody wants to be caught 
noticing for fear that you might want to talk about it. When I came to the field of 
education I became African American and that is all anyone seemed to notice. In both 
cases, my racial designation told my instructors and colleagues everything they needed to 
know about me. Yet, in this dissertation I have merged the best of the two fields that I 
hold dear to create a philosophy of race in education. I hope that the work the I offer here 
will mean that one day someone who used to share my racial designation is able to walk 
into her philosophy or philosophy education class, sit down, open her books, and smile 
because there are is no elephant in the room and she has a story of her own that she can’t 
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